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INTRODUCTION

A cardinal principle in dealing with every type of legal arrangement is to keep
steadily in view the kinds of people to whom the directions of the arrangement in
question are initially addressed-who the people are, in other words, who are
expected to act or refrain from acting in accordance with the arrangement if it works
successfully, and under what circumstances they are expected to act.1

If asked to envision a polluter, most of us would describe a tall
stack from a large industrial facility billowing smoke or a pipe
releasing foaming liquid into a stream. The environmental laws and
academic commentary of the last thirty years reflect this common
conception. With few exceptions, the environmental laws enacted since
the 1970s have directed command and control requirements at large
industrial sources of pollution. Similarly, in law reviews, books and
congressional hearings, advocates of command and control regulation
have battled with economic incentive enthusiasts over the optimal
measures for regulating large industrial sources. 2 The participants in
this debate differ on the effectiveness of various regulatory
instruments and the need for regulatory reform, but they share an
important, although often unspoken, premise: that the principal

1.
HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 118 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
2.
Command and control advocates have pointed to the ability of administrative agencies
to implement prescriptive environmental statutes and the pollution reductions that have
resulted from these statutes. See, e.g., Howard Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency:
Implementation of Uniform Standardsand 'ine-Tuning" Regulatory Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REV.
1267 (1985); Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying"the Rulemaking Process,41
DUKE L.J. 1385 (1992); Sydney A. Shapiro & Thomas 0. McGarity, Not So Paradoxical.'The
Rationale for Technology-Based Regulation, 1991 DUKE L.J. 729; Rena I. Steinzor, Devolution
and the Public Health, 24 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 351 (2000) [hereinafter Steinzor, Devolution and
the Public Health]; Rena I. Steinzor, Reinventing EnvironmentalRegulation: The Dangerous
Journey from Command to Self Control,22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 103 (1998); Wendy E. Wagner,
The Triumph of Technology-Based Standards, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 83. Critics have noted the
rigidity, inefficiency and other weaknesses of these measures and have suggested economic
incentives as regulatory alternatives. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart,
Reforming EnvironmentalLaw, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333 (1985); Daniel C. Esty, Toward Optimal
Environmental Governance, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1495 (1999); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell,
Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HARv. L. REV. 713 (1996);
James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedralin
Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 440, 447-64 (1995); Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global
EnvironmentalRegulation:Instrument Choice in Legal Context, 108 YALE L.J. 677, 679 (1999).
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sources of pollution are large industrial facilities and the principal
3
victims are individuals.
This Article suggests that the reality today is quite different.
We are polluters. Each of us. We pollute when we drive our cars,
fertilize and mow our yards, pour household chemicals on the ground
or down the drain, and engage in myriad other common activities.
Although each activity contributes minute amounts of pollutants,
when aggregated across millions of individuals, the total amounts are
stunning. Industrial sources continue to be major sources of pollution,
and other important pollution sources exist, but individuals are now
the largest remaining source of many pollutants. The time has come to
focus attention in their direction. Treating individuals as regulated
entities, however, will require fundamental changes in the theories
and methods of environmental law. Moreover, the need to focus on
individual behavior exists across a wide range of health, safety and
other areas, and will require substantial modifications in many
aspects of the post-New Deal regulatory state.
This Article proceeds in six Parts. After the introduction in
Part I, Part II examines the environmental regulatory debate. The
Part demonstrates the extent to which the debate has focused on large
industrial sources, and it explores the importance of source
identification.
Although a central issue in the debate is the
identification of optimal regulatory instruments, source identification
is often overlooked and is at least as important. In some cases,
environmental harms are caused by both individual and industrial
emissions, and environmental goals may be achieved at lower cost if
changing individual behavior is one of the options available to
regulators. In other cases, individuals and households are the sole or
principal remaining source of pollution, and changes in individual
4
behavior may be the only means of achieving environmental goals.
Part III then defines individuals and households as a discrete
source category and provides the first profile of the quantities of
pollutants released from this source category. 5 The failure to conceive
3.
Since at least the early 1990s, several authors have noted the importance of numerous,
diffuse sources, but few have evaluated the nature of these sources or the regulatory tools best
suited to reducing their environmental impacts, and no one has identified individual behavior as
a discrete source category. See discussion infra notes 68-74.
4.
There is widespread, although certainly not universal, agreement among environmental
law scholars that additional emissions reductions will be necessary in the United States if
economic development is to continue without erosion in existing environmental quality. See
Richard B. Stewart, A New Generationof Environmenta]Regulation 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 21, 28
(2001).
5.
In many cases, individual behavior is the obvious source of pollution, and the behavior
is beyond the reach of regulatory schemes aimed solely at the producers of consumer products
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of individuals and households as a source category has resulted in a
virtual wasteland of data regarding the contributions of individual
behavior to pollutant releases and environmental harms. Empirical
studies rarely collect data on the pollution attributable to individual
behavior, and government reports rarely present the data that are
collected in a way that identifies individuals as a source category. 6 As
a result, academicians, regulators, and the public have a limited
understanding of the emissions and harms caused by individual
behavior.
To overcome the shortcomings in the available information,
Part III draws on data from a wide range of government and other
reports to profile individuals and households as a discrete source of
pollution. The profile concludes that individuals release almost a
third of the chemicals that form low-level ozone or smog, and that
households release at least as much mercury to wastewater as do all
For several air toxics, the
large industrial facilities combined.
numbers are even more striking: individuals release fifty times more
benzene than all large industrial facilities combined and five times
more formaldehyde. 7 In many cases, the proportion of pollution

(e.g., backyard burning). In other cases, the emissions from individuals and households could be
attributed either to individual behavior or to the industrial firms that produce consumer
products (e.g., automobile tailpipe emissions and the emissions from utilities that produce
residential electricity). In these cases, the Article uses the extent to which individuals can control
the emissions arising from their behavior as the principal criterion for determining which
pollutants should be attributed to individuals and which should be attributed to the producers of
consumer products. See infra Part III.A.
For example, the federal Environmental Protection Agency routinely studies the sources
6.
and effects of urban runoff (the leading cause of impaired estuaries in the United States), but
these studies typically do not collect or report data in a way that identifies the extent to which
pollutants in urban runoff arise from residential as opposed to industrial areas. See, e.g., EPA,
NATIONAL WATER QUALITY INVENTORY 2000 REPORT 31 (2001) [hereinafter EPA, 2000 WATER
QUALITY REPORT] (concluding that urban runoff is the leading cause of impaired estuarine
waters but not distinguishing between residential and other sources of pollutants in urban
runoff), http://www.epa.gov/3056/2000report. In fact, the most comprehensive government report
from which some indication of the residential share of pollutants in urban runoff can be gleaned
is more than twenty years old. See EPA, RESULTS OF THE NATIONWIDE URBAN RUNOFF PROGRAM,

VOLUME 1-FINAL REPORT 6-28, 6-31 (1983) (concluding that the bodies of water that receive
runoff from residential areas are comparable in water quality to those that receive runoff from
industrial areas). Similarly, EPA reports often identify the air emissions from motor vehicles,
but they do not identify the share of motor vehicle emissions attributable to private individuals.
See, e.g., OFFICE OF AIR QUALITY PLANNING & STANDARDS, EPA, NATIONAL AIR POLLUTANT
EMISSION TRENDS 1900-1998 (EPA-454/R-00-002) tbls. 3-2, 3-3 (2000) [hereinafter EPA, 2000
AIR TRENDS REPORT] (identifying mobile source nitrogen oxide and hydrocarbon emissions but
not distinguishing between the emissions from private vehicles and the emissions from vehicles
http://www.epa.gov/ttn
operated by business, government or other organizations),
/chiefltrends/trends98/index.html.
7.
See infra Part III.
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attributable to individuals is growing.8 Demographic trends explain
much of this growth and suggest that the role of individual behavior is
likely to become increasingly important over the next several decades.
For example, if the population increases by 38 percent over the next
thirty years, as it did over the last thirty years, in 2030 roughly 390
million people will live in the United States.9 In addition, activities
with significant adverse environmental consequences, such as miles
traveled per vehicle, are increasing at a faster rate than the
population. 10
Despite the large and growing role of individuals, the focus of
environmental regulation on large industrial sources may be
defensible if individuals are not amenable to regulation. To address
this proposition, Part III also briefly explores the extent to which
environmental regulators have sought to impose legal requirements
on individuals. The same pattern has occurred in area after area:
regulators have sought to impose restrictions on individual behavior
only rarely, and when they have done so, the restrictions have been
unpopular and have provoked a public backlash. Perhaps as a result,
few regulations focus directly on individual behavior, and those that
do are rarely enforced.1 1
Part IV examines the implications of the dilemma posed by the
large individual role in pollution coupled with the public resistance to
formal legal regulation of individual behavior. The Part suggests that
8.
A number of studies include data that suggest that individual sources now comprise a
substantially larger proportion of the total emissions and environmental quality effects than
they did in 1970. See, e.g., EPA, 2000 WATER QUALITY REPORT, supra note 6, at 31 (concluding
that urban runoff now accounts for a larger percentage of all impaired estuarine waters than
industrial discharges); see also William F. Pedersen, Regulation and Information Disclosure,
Parallel Universes and Beyond, 25 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 151, 165 n.53 (2001) (noting that
industrial sources now account for small percentages of air toxics, ozone, and other pollutants).
9.
More than 281 million people live in the United States, and the population grew by 38
percent between 1970 and 2000. See EPA, DRAFT REPORT ON THE ENVIRONMENT x (2003)
[hereinafter
EPA,
ENVIRONMENT
REPORT],
http://www.epa.gov/indicators/roe/pdf/EPA_DraftROE.pdf. The 281 million people currently living in the United States comprise 105.5
million households. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICAN FACT FINDER, QT-P10, HOUSEHOLDS AND
FAMILIES: 2000 (2000) (estimating the number of households in the United States to be
105,480,101 in 2000), http://factfinder.census.gov/households. The increasing number of
individuals is particularly important given individuals' large share of energy consumption
generally and fossil fuel consumption in particular. See GERALD T. GARDNER & PAUL C. STERN,
ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 258, 273 (1996).
10. See discussion infra notes 154-158. The risks posed by releases from individuals are
more difficult to assess, but for a number of pollutants they appear to be substantial. See
discussion infra notes 104-105.
11. Although environmental laws regulate the products individuals purchase (e.g.,
automobile tailpipe emissions standards) and the emissions from the industrial facilities that
manufacture those products (e.g., automobile manufacturing facilities), the regulatory target in
each of these cases is industry, not individuals. See infra Part III.B.
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the large numbers and unusual alignments of individual polluters; the
chronic, long-term nature of their environmental harms; and the
effects of insufficient information, cognitive limitations, and social
influences on decision making make most command and control and
economic incentive efforts difficult to develop and implement. In fact,
the lack of effective coercive authority over millions of individuals may
render the regulation of individual behavior more akin to the
regulation of nations in an international regulatory regime than to the
regulation of domestic industrial sources.
Although the traditional regulatory instruments that dominate
the debate over the regulation of industrial sources have limited
prospects, at least as first order measures, there is reason to believe
that individual environmentally significant behavior can be changed
through a mix of traditional and new approaches. 12 The goal of this
Article is not to demonstrate the extent to which any particular
individual behavior can be modified, but to suggest that empirical
studies and experience with a wide range of behaviors now undermine
the implicit assumption that such modification cannot occur. Rather
than dismissing the possibility of changing individual behavior out of
hand, the analysis of whether change can be induced at an acceptable
cost should be conducted on a behavior-by-behavior basis. 13 In
particular, empirical studies suggest that personal and social norms
may create non-market corrective pressure to change behavior. If
skillfully presented, information may affect the expected utility
calculus by triggering norms.
Thus, information, alone or in
combination with other regulatory instruments, may have substantial
effects on individual behavior.
Part V suggests that the growing need to focus on individuals
as regulated entities is not limited to environmental law, but extends
to health, safety, and other regulatory areas. The focus on reducing
risks created by individuals only through regulation of industrial
firms is a characteristic not only of the regulatory regime
implemented by the federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
but also of the regimes implemented by the other federal agencies that
were created in the 1960s and early 1970s, such as the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration and the Occupational Safety

12. The term "environmentally significant behavior" has been used in the social
psychological literature. See, e.g., Paul C. Stern, Toward a Coherent Theory of Environmentally
Significant Behavior,56 J. SOC. ISSUES 407, 407 (2000).
13. Research on seat belt use, smoking, and other behaviors suggests that major shifts can
occur where the behavior change will benefit the individual. Where the harms of an individual's
behavior are externalized, or where habits or other barriers exist to self-interested change,
influencing behavior may be far more difficult. See discussion infra notes 378-379.
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and Health Administration. 14 To address the perceived inability of
common law actions and command and control regulation to change
individual behavior, the architects of these new regulatory regimes
sought to address conduct on a larger scale. In many of these
regulatory areas, the preferred target was the firm.' 5 As with
environmental regulation, however, the firm-focused approach is
achieving diminishing returns. For example, individual behavior is
not only an increasingly important source of pollution, but it also is
the most common cause of motor vehicle crashes, surpassing both
vehicle and roadway safety. Similarly, obesity has become the second
6
leading cause of preventable deaths in the United States.'
The new focus on individuals as regulated entities will require
modifications not only in regulatory instruments, but also in agency
expertise and administrative procedures. If individual behavior is to
be a regulatory target, scholars will need to improve models designed
to explain and predict the influences of legal, economic, social, and
psychological incentives on individuals. 17 Agencies will need to shift
staffing and resources in response to the new focus. For example,
agency resources and staffing may need to be devoted to public
information campaigns at levels comparable to those now devoted to
informal rule making. Similarly, agencies may need to conduct social
psychological analyses of agency regulatory efforts directed at private
individuals at the same level of sophistication as is now achieved for
economic analyses of command and control regulations directed at
8
industrial sources.'
To the extent agency information dissemination begins to rival
rulemaking as an important regulatory function, the need for
procedural protections also will become more significant.
The
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) reflects the focus of the New Deal
regulatory state on promulgating formal and informal regulations to
direct the conduct of large firms.
In contrast, the procedural
14. See JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY 4 (1990);
see also Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Legal Profession and the Development ofAdministrative Law,
72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1119 (1997) (discussing the legal profession's resistance to the regulatory
state).
15. See MASHAW & HARFST, supra note 14, at 229 (discussing seat belt regulation).
16. See discussion infra notes 395-396.
17. In the last decade, substantial progress has been made in the development of models
that account for social influences on behavior. See, e.g., Paul C. Stern, Information, Incentives,
and ProenvironmentalConsumer Behavior,22 J. CONSUMER POLy 461, 467 (1999) (discussing
model of environmentally significant behavior).
18. In addition, to the extent members of Congress, regulators, and interest groups are
concerned that changes in individual behavior will not occur, agencies may need to conduct
rigorous, quantitative assessments of the effects of information-based efforts on behavior. See
discussion infra notes 398-400.

2004]

THE NEW ERA OFENVIRONMENTAL LAW

523

protections of the APA for the most part do not extend to the types of
agency actions that are likely to be directed toward individuals, such
as data disclosure and public information campaigns. Procedural
safeguards will be needed to ensure that some measure of the public
access, transparency in agency decision making, and careful
deliberation that are required by the APA for rulemaking is extended
to agency information dissemination efforts.
In Part VI, the Article concludes by suggesting that in light of
the surprisingly large role of individuals as risk-creators, scholars in
environmental law and other regulatory fields may need to take a
fresh look at the extent to which the law can-and should-influence
individual behavior.

II. THE ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATORY DEBATE
Over the last three decades, advocates of command and control
regulation and economic incentive measures have engaged in a debate
that has been described as "the ceaseless sport of environmental
law."'19 In recent years the focus has broadened somewhat to include
the relative merits of informational regulation. 20 Part II examines the
targets of the academic debate over environmental regulation. This
Part demonstrates that although the participants in the debate differ
19.

Wiener, supranote 2, at 679.

20. See discussion infra notes 51-67. Although the debate has concerned the relative merits
of these regulatory instruments, it also reflects underlying differences about the goals of
environmental protection. Command and control advocates often begin with a public welfare
perspective that assumes that environmental standards are necessary to protect the public
interest. They seek to design and implement regulatory instruments to achieve those standards.
See, e.g., Latin, supra note 2, at 1284. For a discussion of the public welfare perspective on
regulation, see MASHAW & HARFST, supra note 14, at 8. Economic incentive enthusiasts
emphasize the need to achieve efficiency and are apt to view environmental standards as
variable based on the costs of control. See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 2, at 1333; Bruce A.
Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law: The Case for Market
Alternatives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 171 (1988); Daniel Dudeck & John Palmisano, Emissions
Trading. Why Is This ThoroughbredHobbled 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 217 (1988). Despite the
fundamental differences between command and control and economic incentive advocates, there
is widespread agreement that a principal underlying justification for state action to address
pollution, regardless of the instrument, is that environmental quality is a public good that will
not be adequately protected in the absence of government intervention. The under-protection will
arise because the costs of using the good are not borne by the user, but are externalized. In the
classic analysis, the tragedy of the commons arises as users of common resources make decisions
that are individually rational but collectively deficient. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the
Commons, 168 SCI. 1243, 1244 (1968). Resolution of the problem without government
intervention may be difficult because of the transaction costs of negotiating with the multitude of
other users of the good and because of incentives for free riding. In the absence of government
intervention, these problems thus hinder the development of private solutions to public goods
problems. For the classic discussion of collective action problems, see MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC
OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 1-52 (1971).
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widely in their views of environmental protection, they have almost
uniformly presumed that industrial facilities should be the principal,
if not sole, regulatory targets.
A. Regulation of Industrial Sources
The assumption that industrial facilities are the appropriate
targets of environmental regulation has a distinguished lineage
stretching back more than forty years. In his seminal 1960 article,
Ronald Coase began his analysis with "the standard example," which
he described as "that of a factory the smoke from which has harmful
effects on those occupying neighboring properties." 2 1 In a 1972 article
that shaped much of the modern environmental regulatory debate,
Calabresi and Melamed explored and built upon the Coasian
analysis. 2 2 Calabresi and Melamed suggested that legal resolution of
"the pollution problem" can be understood by viewing rights to pollute
or be free from pollution as entitlements protected by property rules or
liability rules. 23 Entitlements and the legal rules that protect them
are determined by the state to avoid the "might makes right"
allocation that would otherwise occur. 24 The article identified the
21. Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1, 1 (1960). The Coasian
analysis has not only had a substantial impact on the academic regulatory debate, but also on
legal education. See, e.g., A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 13

(3d ed. 2003) (describing the Coase Theorem by suggesting that the reader "[clonsider a factory
whose smoke causes damage to the laundry hung outdoors by five nearby residents"); RICHARD L.
REVESZ, FOUNDATIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 4, 16-17 (1997) (noting that Coase

examines a situation involving "a factory that emits fumes and a laundry that is harmed by the
presence of these fumes" and asking students to "think of the victim of pollution as an individual
who suffers as a result of pollution emitted by a firm" and to explore "[w]hat are sources of
transaction costs when there is a single polluter and a single pollutee? What are the sources of
transaction costs when many pollutees must bargain with a single polluter?"). For a discussion of
the alignment of the parties when individuals are understood to be the sources of pollution, see
discussion infra notes 273-79.
22. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability:One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1089 (1972); Krier & Schwab, supra
note 2, at 440 (describing the Calabresi and Melamed article as "perhaps the most widely known
and influential contribution" applying Coase's insights).
23. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 22, at 1089-90 (noting the existence of property,
liability, and inalienability rules and analyzing the applicability of property and liability rules to
pollution problems).
24. Id. at 1090. In brief, entitlements protected by property rules are absolute, protected by
the right to obtain injunctive relief, and can be taken from the holder only upon payment of the
value the holder assigns to the entitlement (e.g., an interest in real property that can be
protected with injunctive relief). Id. at 1092. Entitlements protected by liability rules may be
taken from the holder at an objectively determined value (e.g., eminent domain and nuisance
cases in which injunctive relief is not available). Entitlements protected by inalienability rules
may not be transferred between a willing buyer and seller (e.g., because of the seller's
incapacity). Using this construct, Calabresi and Melamed evaluate the various potential
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importance of the assignment of the entitlement as well as the
25
available legal rules for protecting the entitlement.
Equally important, Calabresi and Melamed reinforced
implicitly the operational premise for the debate going forward. The
premise is that the environmental harms worthy of attention are
caused by one or a relatively small group of firms, and the victims are
individuals, generally in large numbers. For example, Calabresi and
Melamed contrast "having more widgets" with "breathing the
pollution that widget production implies." 26 Although they use
singular terms at times when describing a polluter and victim, for the
bulk of their application of property, liability, and inalienability rules
27
to pollution, their analysis assumes one polluter and 10,000 victims.
assignments of entitlements and legal rules to determine the optimal forms of government
intervention for resolving the pollution problem. Calabresi and Melamed initially analyze a
situation in which one party is a polluter and another is a victim. Id. at 1115-24. Following
Coase, they note that when the least cost avoider can be determined, the government can place
the entitlement not to be affected by pollution on the other party. Id. at 1118-19. They
acknowledge that in many cases involving pollution the government cannot make the
determination of which party is the least cost avoider. Id. at 1119-20. In theory, in the absence of
transaction costs and uncertainty about valuation, it should not matter who is granted the
entitlement: if the entitlement is misallocated, Coasian bargaining will lead to an efficient
outcome. See id.at 1091, 1094 (citing R.H. Coase, The Problem ofSocial Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1
(1960)). Calabresi and Melamed recognize, however, that where the least cost avoider cannot be
determined and the parties face bargaining problems, the government cannot simply assign the
entitlement to either party and assume that the parties will bargain to an efficient outcome. In a
situation in which there is one polluter with multiple victims, property rules may not be efficient
even if the polluter's cost of control is less than the victims' damages, because the victims may
have incentives to hold out in the face of an offer from the polluter. Id. at 1119. In addition, if the
victims' damages are higher than the polluter's costs of control, free rider problems may
undermine the victims' attempts to buy out the polluter. As a result, the initial entitlement
protected by a property rule is often not subject to trading, and property rules in the classic
pollution scenario Calabresi and Melamed envision often will not lead to an efficient outcome.
25. Calabresi and Melamed appear to conclude that when the lowest cost avoider cannot be
determined and transaction costs are high, liability rules are preferable to property rules
because liability rules will provide incentives for parties to act efficiently. Id. at 1119. For
example, Calabresi and Melamed note that when harm occurs but the least cost avoider cannot
be determined "traditional legal doctrine" will determine that a nuisance exists and impose
damages but not enjoin the nuisance. Id. at 1119-20 (citing Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur,
Copper & Iron Co., 83 S.W. 658 (Tenn. 1904)). Liability rules thus produce outcomes that are
similar to those that would be reached if transaction costs did not prevent the parties from
bargaining. Liability rules require greater state intervention than property rules, however,
because the government must not only assign the entitlement, it must determine its value (via a
court). At least implicitly, the use of entitlements backed by liability rules thus assumes that the
government has the ability to determine the value of the harm and to enforce a judgment. For a
discussion and critique of the conventional reading of Calabresi and Melamed regarding the
importance of valuation problems, see Krier & Schwab, supra note 2, at 451-55. But see Kaplow
& Shavell, supra note 2, at 729-30.
26. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 22, at 1097.
27. Id. at 1119 ("[alssume we enjoin Taney and there are 10,000 injured Marshalls"). Later,
when discussing their "fourth rule," Calabresi and Melamed assume "a factory which, by using
cheap coal, pollutes a very wealthy section of town and employs many low income workers to
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They characterize situations with one polluter and multiple victims as
"the normal ones in the pollution area." 28 This premise would become
entrenched over the next three decades, when the vast majority of the
literature focused on two general categories of instruments: command
and control regulations and economic incentives.
1. Command and Control
In a command and control system, the government sets both
the environmental ends to be achieved (e.g., national air quality
standards) and the methods by which they will be achieved (e.g.,
pollution control requirements for major sources).29 Command and
control environmental regulation is typified by statutory mandates
that require EPA to set specific end-of-pipe emissions levels, often
based on a determination of the "best available technology" (BAT) to
control emissions. 30 Congress and EPA have targeted the command
and control requirements principally at large industrial facilities. 3 1
Advocates of command and control have pointed out that, despite
substantial increases in economic activity, command and control
regulations have achieved remarkable reductions in emissions over
the last thirty years, particularly from BAT controls on large
industrial point sources and controls on automobile tailpipe emissions.
In addition, command and control proponents suggest that the
technology-based requirements of many command and control
regulations have been far easier to develop and implement than

produce a product purchased primarily by the poor." Id. at 1121. They thus include the concerns
of the employees and customers of the industrial firm in the analysis. This is the closest
Calabresi and Melamed come to the multiple plaintiff-multiple defendant analysis discussed
infra notes 277-279.
28. Id. at 1119.
29. Command and control government regulation may be viewed as a form of property rule
in which government, not a private party, holds the entitlement and enforces the rule protecting
the entitlement. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 2, at 705. Alternatively, such regulation may
be viewed as a "conduct instrument" distinct from price (taxes, subsidies and liability rules) and
quantity (tradable allowances and property rules) instruments. See Wiener, supra note 2, at 704.
Much of the literature treats command and control regulation as a distinct category, and this
Article does so as well.
30. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A) (2000) (requiring "application of
the best available technology economically achievable").
31. For example, one EPA rule sets a precise limit (0.0014 pounds per 1,000 pounds
maximum for any one day) of pentachlorophenol in the wastewater of "bleached kraft facilities
where pulp and fine papers are produced." See 40 C.F.R. § 430.25(b)(2) (2003). Although in
theory a kraft mill can achieve the discharge limit through a variety of means, standards such as
this one are set based on an evaluation of the effectiveness and costs of particular pollution
control technologies, and the effect may be to dictate the pollution control technology adopted by
the mill.
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competing regulatory schemes. 32 Command and control enthusiasts
also suggest that these requirements provide equitable treatment to
the regulated community, and that compliance with these
33
requirements is efficient to monitor and enforce.
From the outset, command and control advocates have focused
on imposing regulatory requirements on large industrial sources. For
example, one of the most influential early defenses of command and
control regulations focuses on the benefits of BAT approaches, which
are almost exclusively directed at large industrial facilities. 34 A more
recent defense of command and control methods points to their
administrative efficiency and assumes that the "regulatees" are
industrial firms. 35 Rarely have command and control advocates
suggested targeting entities other than large industrial facilities. 36
2. Economic Incentives
Advocates of economic incentives have criticized the
inefficiency, rigidity, fragmentation, and lack of democratic
37
accountability that arise from command and control regulation.
They have identified two principal types of alternatives.3 8 The first
are property or tradeable allowance schemes (sometimes referred to as
Coasian schemes), which provide the holder with an entitlement to
generate or be free from an environmental harm.3 9 The second are
32. See Shapiro & McGarity, supra note 2, at 739-44.
33. See id.
34. See Latin, supra note 2, at 1271.
35. See McGarity, supra note 2, at 1397, 1414-17 (examining EPA responses to judicial
review of Clean Water Act technology-based "best practicable technology" rule makings); Shapiro
& McGarity, supra note 2, at 739-44 (defending technology-based regulation on normative
grounds).
36. An exception is Thomas McGarity's focus on automobile inspection and maintenance
programs. See Thomas 0. McGarity, Regulating Commuters to Clear the Air"Some Difficulties
in Implementing a NationalProgramat a Local Level, 27 PAC. L.J. 1521 (1996).
37. See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 4, at 21. Economic incentive strategies differ from
command and control strategies in that although the government sets the environmental ends to
be achieved (e.g., through the quantity of marketable allowances created, the level of taxes or
subsidies, or the assignment and oversight of private property or liability rules), it allows the
market to allocate the costs of achieving the environmental ends. Importantly, even in economic
incentive strategies, so long as government intervenes to avoid "might makes right," government
is at least implicitly making decisions about the desired level of environmental protection. For a
discussion of the informational demands on government when using economic incentives to
address environmental problems, see Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information as Environmental
Regulation: TRI and Performance Benchmarking, Precursorto a New Paradigm, 89 GEO. L.J.
257, 270 (2001).
38. For an overview of the economic regulatory instruments available to environmental
regulators, see Wiener, supranote 2, at 679-80, 704-35.
39. See Coase, supra note 21.
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price-based schemes, such as taxes, subsidies and liability rules
(sometimes referred to as Pigouvian schemes after the economist A.C.
Pigou), which require a source to pay the social cost of an
environmental harm. 40 Although economic incentive enthusiasts note
that the appropriate economic incentive will vary based on several
factors, they have pointed to the efficiency and incentives for
41
innovation created by these types of instruments generally.
The concept of using marketable allowances to control pollution
has been a leading contribution of economic incentive advocates.
Marketable allowances were proposed as early as the 1960s, although
full debate did not begin in earnest until the early 1980s, after the
high costs and rigidity of the command and control system became
apparent. 42 Advocates of market allowance schemes have asserted
that such schemes will address many of the ills created by command
and control regulation, and marketable allowances have been used on
the federal level in several regulatory programs. 43 For example,
Congress included a statutory sulfur dioxide emissions trading scheme

40.

See A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (4th ed. 1932).

41. See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 2, at 1333-40. Critics of economic incentives
generally have noted that many of the informational shortcomings that make command and
control regulations difficult to develop also plague some economic incentives. As Bradley
Karkkainen has noted, "[sitandard justifications for environmental regulation tacitly presuppose
that central regulators will be able to isolate, analyze and understand discrete problems, their
causes, and potential cures well enough to craft effective solutions through regulatory
intervention." Karkkainen, supra note 37, at 283. In recent years, scholars have presented
differing views on whether property rules or liability rules are preferable for cases such as
pollution when the information about harm is limited. James Krier and Stewart Schwab have
noted that liability rules will function poorly when information about harm is limited, making it
difficult for courts to determine the actual level of harm. See Krier & Schwab, supra note 2, at
447-64. A concern with a liability rule is that if a court could not ascertain the harm of pollution,
it might set the damages at a level below the firm's prevention cost, thus inducing the firm to
pollute. Assigning an entitlement to the victim protected by a property rule would avoid this
problem. Calabresi and Melamed suggested that inalienability rules may be justified where costs
are externalized but the objective measurement is difficult, but the example they used involved a
moral prohibition on slavery. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 22, at 1111-12, 1125-27. Louis
Kaplow and Steven Shavell have asserted that so long as a court makes its best estimate of
harm, which they define to be "the average harm for cases characterized by the facts the court
observes," liability rules are superior to property rules. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 2, at 719.
They argue that if prevention costs are high, a property rule will lead a firm on average not to
pollute even when the costs of prevention exceed the cost of the pollution.
42. The concept of marketable allowances was proposed in the 1960s by J.H. Dales. See
generally J.H. DALES, POLLUTION, PROPERTY & PRICES 93-97 (1968) (proposing the development
of markets in pollution rights). The debate over their use began in earnest after a proposal by
Professors Ackerman and Stewart. Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 2, at 1333-40.
43. For a discussion of marketable allowance schemes, see Jonathan R. Nash & Richard L.
Revesz, Markets and Geography. Designing Marketable Permit Schemes to ControlLocal and
Regional Pollutants,28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 559, 572-77 (2001).
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in Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments. 44 Emissions
trading has been implemented to a lesser extent on a regional and
local level as well, and is the subject of national and international air
45
pollution initiatives.
The focus of economic incentive proponents has been on large
industrial facilities. For example, advocates of marketable allowance
schemes have directed their attention toward the air and other
emissions from large industrial facilities. 46 Similarly, one recent
examination of property and liability rules noted that multiple parties
may exist on both sides, but analyzed the "classic pollution parable"
with "a single P [polluter] and many Rs [residents]." 47 Another
assumed that polluters are "firms" when examining property and
liability rules. 48 When applying the analysis to environmental harms,
the authors discuss "industrial pollution" and evaluate examples in
49
which bargaining problems arise because there are many victims.
Only when discussing the reasons why distributional concerns should
not affect their conclusion that liability rules are preferable to
property rules do the authors discuss a situation in which there are
large numbers of individuals causing pollution as well as large
Thus, much of the scholarship assigns
numbers of victims. 50
individuals the role of victims and assumes that there will only be one
or a handful of industrial polluters.
3. Informational Regulation
In recent years, legal scholars have begun to move beyond the
command and control versus economic incentives debate to focus on
the limited ability of either regulatory instrument to steer the
behavior of industrial sources in the face of an increasingly complex,

44. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651-7651o (2000)).
45. See Nash & Revesz, supra note 43, at 572-77. In addition, recent "Clear Skies"
legislation proposes to extend emissions trading to additional pollutants. See, e.g., Clear Skies
Act of 2003, H.R. 999, 108th Cong. § 403 (2003) (requiring the EPA Administrator to establish an
allowance system for emissions of sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides and mercury). Emissions
trading concepts also have been proposed for and in some cases included in initiatives to address
global climate change gases and other international environmental pollutants. See Wiener,
supra note 2, at 709-14.
46. See, e.g., Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 2, at 1341-51 (discussing implementation of
tradeable rights system for facilities subject to BAT controls).
47. Krier & Schwab, supra note 2, at 460.
48. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 2, at 719.
49. Id.at 748.
50. Id. at 735 (discussing a "population of injurers whose prevention costs vary").
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evolving economy. 5 1
Instead, the more recent scholarship has
identified the need for the use of additional regulatory instruments,
either alone or in combination with command and control and
economic measures. 52 One of the most promising developments is the
concept that information may be a surprisingly effective and efficient
regulatory instrument. 53
Informational regulation enthusiasts
suggest that disclosure may be preferable to command and control and
economic regulatory instruments in several ways.
For example,
information disclosure may be less expensive for regulators and
regulated entities than command and control requirements, may be
more flexible and efficient than command and control or market
mechanisms, and may enhance deliberative democracy. 54 Critics have

51. See, e.g., Eric W. Orts, Reflexive EnvironmentalLaw, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1227 (1995).
52. See Esty, supra note 2, at 1549-72 (discussing optimal environmental strategies);
Stewart, supra note 4, at 151-73 (discussing elements of an ideal regulatory system).
53. See Cass R. Sunstein, InformationalRegulation and InformationalStanding:Akins and
Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613, 613 (1999) (calling informational regulation or regulation
through disclosure "one of the most striking developments in the last generation of American
law"); see also WESLEY A. MAGAT & W. KIP VISCUSI, INFORMATION APPROACHES TO REGULATION
(1992); Michael Barsa, California'sProposition 65 and the Limits of Information Economics, 49
STAN. L. REV. 1223 (1997); Paul R. Kleindorfer & Eric W. Orts, Informational Regulation of
Environmental Risks, 18 RISK ANALYSIS 155 (1998); David Markell, The Role of DeterrenceBased Enforcement in a "Reinvented" State/FederalRelationship: The Divide Between Theory
and Reality, 24 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 99 (2000); Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein,
Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1995). For an interdisciplinary
examination of informational regulation and other new regulatory instruments, see generally
NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, NAT'L ACAD. OF SCIENCES, NEW TOOLS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION: EDUCATION, INFORMATION AND VOLUNTARY MEASURES (Thomas Dietz & Paul C.
Stern eds., 2002) [hereinafter NRC, NEW TOOLS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION]. Of course,
informational regulation is not new. Several scholars have noted that informational regulation
has common law origins, and has been used in a variety of New Deal-era and more modern
regulatory laws. See, e.g., Karkkainen, supra note 37, at 284; Sunstein, supra,at 618-24. Indeed,
the use of information as a tool for governments to regulate industry behavior originated long
before the New Deal. Nineteenth century railroad regulators debated the role of information
disclosure versus command and control (e.g., for controlling tariffs) in the regulation of what was
a new, complex, and rapidly evolving industry. The early railroad regulatory efforts used both
instruments, although ultimately much of railroad regulation settled on command and control
regulation. See JAMES W. ELY, JR., RAILROADS AND AMERICAN LAW 85 (2001) (noting that
railroad development in the mid-1800s confronted governments with complex problems and that
"legislators and judges were simply not in a position to supervise the dynamic and complicated
operations of railroad companies").
54. See Sunstein, supra note 53, at 625 (noting that information is a "far less expensive and
more efficient strategy than command-and-control" and that "deliberative democracy requires a
certain degree of information, so that citizens can engage in their monitoring and deliberative
tasks"). As Sunstein has noted, information may be seen as a public good and governmental
regulatory requirements may be necessary to address market failures that result in an
undersupply of information. See id. at 624; see also Christopher H. Schroeder, American
Regulatory Policy: Have We Found the "Third Way"? Third Way Environmentalism, 48 U. KAN.
L. REV. 801, 823 (2000) (describing informational regulation as a "third way" regulatory
measure).

2004]

THE NEW ERA OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

pointed out that simply replacing command and control requirements
with informational and other "soft" requirements may undermine
compliance incentives for industrial sources, jeopardizing the
environmental gains of the last three decades. 55
Even in the new field of informational regulation, however, the
principal focus of the regulatory debate and of existing environmental
regulations has been on large industrial firms. 56 The Toxic Release
Inventory (TRI) is the leading example of informational regulation in
environmental law. 57 The distinctive feature of the TRI is that it uses
information to regulate firm conduct: it requires public disclosure of
toxic release data by regulated facilities but does not set permissible
55. See, e.g., Clifford Rechtschaffen, Deterrence vs. Cooperationand the Evolving Theory of
EnvironmentalEnforcement, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 1181, 1215 (1998); Steinzor, supra note 2, at 353.
56. Some have examined the use of information to steer consumer behavior and have noted
the need to focus on areas in which labels are more effective than price to convey information
about the environmental effects of products. See, e.g., Mary L. Lyndon, Information Economics
and Chemical Toxicity: DesigningLaws to Produce and Use Data, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1795 (1989);
Peter S. Menell, Structuringa Market-OrientedFederalEco-information Policy, 54 MD. L. REV.
1435 (1995). Others have noted that product disclosure schemes such as California Proposition
65 may require information disclosure for individual decision making that may be ineffectual or
counter productive. See Christine Jolls et al., A Beha vioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50
STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1533-37 (1998); Sunstein, supra note 53, at 626-27 (noting that "[pleople
have a limited ability to process information" (citing JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY:
HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982));. Even if information has the
desired influence on some of its targets, its benefits may be inequitably distributed. In
particular, those who lack education may gain proportionately less benefit. Also, where risks are
placed on those not in a contractual relationship with the risk creator, there may be no avenue
available to the person whose risk is increased to do anything about the risk. See id at 628-29
(noting that "[tihe most promising setting involves a market failure in the provision of
information and reason to believe that information can be provided in such a way as to be
understandable to the people who receive it").
57. See Karkkainen, supra note 37, at 260 (suggesting that TRI is a "watershed" in the
development of innovative environmental regulatory tools). Congress included TRI as Section
313 of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 (EPCRA), Pub. L.
No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1741 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §11023(a)-(c) (2000)). Information
disclosure also has been described as a "new model" of environmental regulation. See DAVID
WHEELER, INFORMATION IN POLLUTION MANAGEMENT: THE NEW MODEL (New Ideas in Pollution

Regulation, Working Paper, Econ. of Indus. Pollution Control Research Project, 1997),
http://www.worldbank.org/nipr/work-paper/ninfo/index.htm.
Examples
of
informational
regulation in environmental law in addition to TRI include the pesticide labeling requirements of
the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(9) (2000), the
requirement for regulated businesses to prepare and disclose risk management plans for
hazardous air pollutants under Section 112(r) of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 42
U.S.C. § 77412(r) (2000), and the requirement of the Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of
1996 that community drinking water providers prepare and disseminate to consumers annual
'consumer confidence reports." 42 U.S.C. § 300g-3(c)(4) (2000). Information-based approaches
also have been proposed for other areas of environmental law. See, e.g., Michael P. Healy,
Information Based Regulation and International Trade in Genetically Modifled Agricultural
Products: An Evaluation of the Cartegena Protocol on Biosafety, 9 WASH. U. J. L. & POL'Y 205
(2002) (suggesting application of information disclosure techniques to regulation of genetically
modified organisms).
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limits on toxic releases. Only large industrial facilities are subject to
the reporting requirements. 58 The TRI provisions have been hailed in
the academic literature as one of the primary environmental law
59
innovations of the last two decades and as "the wave of the future."
TRI enthusiasts suggest that TRI circumvents the "information
bottleneck" that confronts command and control and economic
incentive measures by requiring regulated entities to disclose data on
toxic chemical releases. 60 The public disclosure of TRI data may
induce firms to reduce emissions for a variety of reasons. 61 TRI also
may have democracy benefits by increasing citizen participation and
62
by enhancing the legitimacy of agency decision making.
In the most expansive view, the use of TRI and other
informational regulation, in combination with other instruments,
constitutes a new "reflexive environmental law." 63 In this view, the
58. See 42 U.S.C. §11023(b)(1)(A); Pedersen, supra note 8, at 155 (describing the facilities
that meet these requirements as "large industrial facilities").
59. See DANIEL A. FARBER, EcO-PRAGMATISM: MAKING SENSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL
DECISIONS IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD (1999); Daniel Esty, Next Generation Environmental Law:
A Response to Professor Stewart, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 199 (2001) (describing a new "information
age" in environmental law); Pederson, supra note 8, at 155 (describing TRI and other "social cost
disclosure" programs as a "stepping stone" toward improved environmental regulation);
Sunstein, supra note 53, at 622, 625 (describing TRI as "an exceptional success story" and "the
wave of the future"). Richard Stewart has identified the TRI reporting scheme as one of only two
instances in the three decades following 1970 when Congress has enacted statutes with
"significant use of alternatives to the command system" (the other being the sulfur dioxide
emissions trading program of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments). Stewart, supra note 4, at 24.
60. See generallyKarkkainen, supra note 37, at 283-86.
61. For firms, the generation and disclosure of TRI data facilitates both internal and
external monitoring of environmental performance. The performance monitoring and
benchmarking functions of TRI avoid many of the shortcomings of command and control and
market-based regulatory instruments and create incentives for continuous improvement. Id.at
261. By creating performance metrics and facilitating monitoring without creating fixed levels at
which releases are permissible, TRI creates incentives for continuous improvement. In contrast,
command and control requirements may create a "ceiling" of simply complying with
environmental requirements. Market mechanisms can have the same effect at the emissions
level established through the market response to government-established taxes, subsidies, or
tradeable allowances. Id.
62. See Sunstein, supra note 53, at 625 (noting the democracy effects of informational
regulation). The TRI provisions have even been described as a new form of "democratic
experimentalism." See Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998); see also Pedersen, supra note 8, at 151, 154-55,
183 (asserting that TRI represents a form of "social cost disclosure" that can improve the
performance of EPA and other agencies by engendering pressure on EPA to better define its
regulatory goals, and placing EPA in the role of objective expert gathering, interpreting,
publishing and refining environmental data). Over the long run, the TRI data and other
informational regulatory schemes may thus enhance the legitimacy of EPA decision making and
reduce susceptibility to interest group capture. See Orts, supra note 51, at 1335.
63. Reflexive environmental concepts have been advanced in the sociology literature, see
generally GUNTHER TEUBNER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND ECOLOGICAL RESPONSIBILITY:
THE CONCEPT AND PRACTICE OF ECOLOGICAL SELF-ORGANIZATION (1994) (suggesting that

2004]

THE NEW ERA OFENVIRONMENTAL LAW

533

informational regulatory approach of TRI is a primary aspect of
second generation or "reflexive" regulation-regulation that moves
away from command and control approaches toward more flexible,
information-based environmental incentives for reducing pollution.
Proponents of reflexive environmental law assert that the complexity
of environmental problems undermines both command and control
and
market
mechanisms
as
regulatory
tools. 64 Reflexive
environmental law proponents suggest a greater "proceduralization" of
environmental law in the form of "procedures for regulated entities to
follow," such as internal firm management systems, "[riather than
detailed pronouncements of acceptable behavior. '65
Although the notion of informational regulation in the
instrument choice debate is relatively new, the principal focus has
remained on industrial sources. Perhaps because the emergence of
informational regulation has coincided with a growing recognition that
sources other than large industrial facilities are important causes of
environmental harms, or perhaps because informational regulation's
leading example, TRI, so clearly excludes all sources other than large
industrial facilities, its advocates have tended to note the importance
of a range of additional sources.6 6
Nevertheless, informational
regulation enthusiasts have directed the bulk of their analyses and
prescriptions toward large industrial sources. 67
B. The Sources of Environmental Harms
The focus of the regulatory debate on large industrial sources is
problematic if other sources cause a meaningful amount of
reflexive environmental law leads to "ecological self-organization"), and in the legal literature.
See Orts, supra note 51, at 1227.
64. See David W. Case, The Law and Economies of Environmental Information as
Regulation, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,773 (2001); Orts, supra note 51, at 1227. The need to establish
concrete outcomes undermines the ability of both command and control and market mechanisms
to address evolving, complex environmental problems. Id. at 1264. Although Orts targets several
sources of environmental harms, his prescriptive focus is on corporate firms. He recommends
that EPA require firms to conduct self-audits of environmental management systems and
environmental performance, and suggests greater use of environmental management schemes to
steer firm behavior. Id. at 1264. Orts has described the production and use of information in
regulation as "a primary aspect of the reflexive model." See Kleindorfer & Orts, supra note 53,
at 156 n.9. Orts and Kleindorfer appear to define informational regulation in a way that focuses
on firm behavior by stating that "informational regulation is any regulation which provides to
third parties information on company operations." Id. at 156.
65. Orts, supra note 51, at 1264.
66. See, e.g., Karkkainen, supra note 37, at 334; William F. Pedersen, Can Site-Specific
Pollution ControlPlans Furnish an Alternative to the Current Regulatory System and a Bridge
to a New One?, 25 ENVTL. L. REP. 10, 486 (1995); Pedersen, supra note 8, at 166-68.
67. See, e.g., Karkkainen, supra note 37, at 334.
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environmental harm and if those other sources require different
regulatory measures. In recent years, legal scholars have recognized
that after several decades of regulations directed principally at
industry, there are indications that non-industrial sources cause a
68
large and growing proportion of the remaining environmental harms.
For example, anecdotal information suggests that many types of
sources release large quantities of toxic chemicals. According to an
estimate by the Office of Technology Assessment, the total quantity of
toxic chemicals released in 1988 by the large industrial facilities
subject to TRI reporting requirements represented only 5 percent of
the total releases of toxic chemicals in that year. 69 A number of
scholars have noted that numerous, diffuse, non-point sources are of
increasing importance. 70 Recent work has explored the importance of
several non-industrial sources of pollutants, including the service
sector 7 ' and agriculture. 72 In addition, a number of scholars have

68. Richard Stewart acknowledges "the achievements to date of our command regulation
system in achieving significant reductions in pollution and improved waste management by large
industrial facilities," but asks whether the regulatory system is well suited for "what some have
termed 'second generation' environmental problems." Stewart, supra note 4, at 26. Stewart
includes in the "second generation" sources that will require additional attention "those
generated by small sources of pollution and waste sources and the burgeoning service economy,"
id., and states that "discharges from small, non-point or area sources must be significantly
curtailed, including those in the consumer services, and agricultural sectors." Id. at 28.
69. Hearing Before the United States Senate Subcomm. on Superfund, Ocean & Water
Protection of the Comm. on Env't & Public Works, 101st Cong. 4 (May 10, 1989) [hereinafter
OTA, Senate Testimony] (statement of Kirsten Oldenburg, Deputy Director, Hazardous Waste
and Waste Reduction Projects, Office of Technology Assessment) (stating that "the enormous
amount of releases reported to the public a few weeks ago, the 20 billion pounds of toxic
chemicals, we feel is just the tip of the toxic tower. We estimate that as many as 400 billion
pounds, or 200 million tons, of these substances in wastes, pollutants, and discharges are
probably being generated by American industry, and the public is subject to even more if you
consider non-point sources such as automobiles."). Remarkably, the Office of Technology
Assessment estimate did not include individuals and households as sources when determining
that 95 percent of toxics were not included in the initial round of TRI reporting. The OTA
estimate was limited to industrial sources and did not include the toxic releases from motor
vehicles or other individual and household releases. Id.
70. See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty & Marian R. Chertow, Thinking Ecologically:An Introduction,
in THINKING ECOLOGICALLY: THE NEXT GENERATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 1, 15 n.3
(Marian R. Chertow & Daniel C. Esty eds., 1997) [hereinafter THINKING ECOLOGICALLY] (noting
that "we have done a great deal to address the biggest 'point' sources of pollution; we have done
much less to control "nonpoint" emissions. These diffuse harms persist in part because they are
hard to see, not easily measured or matched to the ills they inflict, and difficult to prevent or
control."); Stewart, supra note 4, at 28 (suggesting that "discharges from small, non-point or area
sources must be significantly curtailed, including those in the consumer services, and
agricultural sectors"); Michael P. Vandenbergh, An Alternative to Ready, Fire, Aim: A New
Framework to Link Environmental Targets in Environmental Law, 85 KY. L.J. 803, 818-23
(1997) (identifying types of "second generation" environmental problems).
71. See James Salzman, Beyond the Smokestack: EnvironmentalProtectionin the Service
Economy, 47 UCLA L. REV. 411 (1999).
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noted the importance of small businesses, although the sector has not
73
been profiled comprehensively.
Despite the growing recognition that non-industrial sources are
responsible for a large proportion of the remaining environmental
harms, the notion that individuals are an important source category
has only been identified in rare circumstances. 74 Some have noted the
importance of "second generation" sources generally, and some have
mentioned individuals in the context of informational regulation. To
the extent individuals have been a part of the mix, however, the focus
has been largely on how to regulate the manufacturers that sell
pollution-causing products to individuals. When individuals have
been identified as sources of pollutants, typically automobile use and
consumer activity have been the only environmentally significant
behaviors identified. 75 No one has identified the contributions of
individuals on a comprehensive basis or explored the implications for
regulatory instrument choice. As a result, little analysis has been
conducted of the potential instruments that may be available to
reduce the emissions from individuals or the optimal allocation of
72. See Jan G. Laitos & Thomas A. Carr, The Transformation on Public Lands, 26 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 140 (1999); J.B. Ruhl, Farms, Their Environmental Harms, and Environmental Law, 27
ECOLOGY L.Q. 263 (2000); C. Ford Runge, Environmental Protection from Farm to Market, in
THINKING ECOLOGICALLY, supranote 70, at 200.
73. Richard J. Pierce, Small Is Not Beautiful: The Case Against Special Regulatory
Treatment of Small Firms, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 537, 559-60 (1998) (concluding that small
businesses "are responsible for a massively disproportionate share of water and air pollution");
see also Markell, supra note 53, at 23 (discussing the Small Business Fairness Enforcement Act).
Several scholars have noted the large volume of toxics that are not subject to TRI reporting
because small businesses are exempt. See Karkkainen, supra note 37, at 334; Pedersen, supra
note 66, at 10,486.
74. The commentators who have identified individuals as discrete sources of pollution
appear to assume that individual behavior contributes a share of overall emissions that is too
small to merit regulatory attention or that individual behavior is too difficult to control. See, e.g.,
William F. Pedersen, Contractingwith the Regulated for Better Regulations, 53 ADMIN. L. REV.
1067, 1095 n.74 (2001). For example, Eric Orts has suggested that "[a] reflexive environmental
law might require each citizen to report the 'environmental impact' of the individual or family in
the past year." Orts, supranote 51, at 1268. According to Orts, such a required annual disclosure
might "increase the amount of self-reflection and social communication concerning serious
environmental issues-in this case, an internal self-critical reflection about one's personal
environmental habits." Id. Orts concluded that such an approach would be impractical for
individuals and families, but he suggested that it "is not a far-fetched idea" for large industrial
companies. Id.
75. See OTA Senate Testimony, supra note 69, at 4 (discussing automobile use); see also
Karkkainen, supra note 37, at 334 (concluding that TRI is "radically underinclusive" because it
excludes "most small businesses, non regulated sectors, and diffuse sources like automobiles and
farms"); Pedersen, supra note 8, at 191 (recommending addition of "small sources-for example,
gas stations" to TRI). The problems arising from consumer product consumption have been noted
by several authors. See, e.g., Douglas A. Kysar, Law, Environment and Vision, 97 Nw. U. L. REV.
675, 711-13 (2003); James Salzman, Sustainable Consumption and the Law, 27 ENVTL. L. 1243
(1997).
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pollution control costs across large industrial sources, individuals and
other types of sources.
This oversight has tremendous significance. Not only does the
selection of regulatory targets affect instrument choice and the costs of
achieving environmental standards, but it also may affect the
underlying environmental standards themselves. In some cases, the
cost of compliance will influence the level at which the environmental
standard is set. 76
For these regulatory programs, adding
consideration of individuals or other sources may lower the costs of
achieving environmental protection, and thus may lead to more
stringent standards. On the other hand, under current laws some
environmental standards must be set without regard to cost, although
cost considerations may affect the measures chosen to achieve the
standards. An example is the establishment of National Ambient Air
Quality Standards (NAAQS) for "criteria pollutants" such as low-level
ozone. 77 For these types of environmental standards, the broadening
of regulatory targets may determine whether the standard will be
achieved at all, may increase the speed with which the standard is
achieved, or may reduce the costs of achieving it.
The existence of many types of significant pollution sources,
the importance of regulatory targets for environmental standardsetting, and the variability in the regulatory tools that are effective in
steering the behavior of those sources all suggest that regulatory
target identification is a critical aspect of regulatory reform. Although
a focus on industrial sources in the regulatory debate may have been
reasonable in the first era of environmental law, in the next era
regulatory target identification should precede any debate about the
appropriate regulatory instruments. Both academic scholarship and
government policy making would be far more productive if an
identification of the sources targeted, as well as their environmental
78
emissions or harms, preceded each proposal for regulatory reform.
Part III does so for individuals and households. In doing so, Part III

76. For example, several BAT standards require EPA to evaluate the cost of control in
determining the environmental standard that will be applied to a particular emission from a
particular industrial category. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7429(a)(2)(1) (2000) (requiring
the Administrator to set new source performance standards for reduction of air emissions from
solid waste combustion facilities "taking into consideration the cost of achieving such emission
reduction").
77. The EPA Administrator may not consider costs when setting National Ambient Air
Quality Standards under Clean Air Act Section 109, 42 U.S.C. § 7409. See Whitman v. Am.
Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
78. See GARDNER & STERN, supra note 9, at 256 (noting that "quantitative and technical
information" rather than "intuition and informal personal impressions" should be used for
determining the targets for efforts to change environmentally significant behaviors).
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demonstrates that the implicit premise of the instrument choice
debate-that large industrial sources constitute the only meaningful
source of environmental harms-is no longer sustainable.
III. INDIVIDUALS AS SOURCES

No comprehensive studies have quantified the individual and
household pollutant emissions in the United States or their effects on
human health and the environment. In fact, government reports
rarely identify individuals as a source category, and no government
agency or office has the mission of gathering, analyzing, and
publishing data on the environmental emissions and harms caused by
individuals, much less assessing and developing policies tailored to
change their environmentally significant behaviors. Private nongovernmental organizations similarly have not focused on analyzing
and reporting data on individuals. 79 The result of this gap in data
collection and reporting is that a reliable accounting of the
contribution of individuals to pollutant emissions in some cases is not
possible based on the available information.8 0 In other cases, although
individual behavior has been linked to pollution, the linkage has been
anecdotal and is of limited value to policymakers.8 1 For example, one
79. A few non-governmental organizations have profiled or supported efforts to profile some
aspects of the emissions and environmental effects of individuals and households. See, e.g.,
MICHAEL BROWER & WARREN LEON, THE CONSUMER'S GUIDE TO EFFECTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL
CHOICES: PRACTICAL ADVICE FROM THE UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS 43-80 (1999)

(identifying the environmental impacts from household consumption); JOHN C. RYAN & ALAN
THEIN DURNING, STUFF: THE SECRET LIVES OF EVERYDAY THINGS 7-66 (1997) (identifying the

results of a Northwest Environment Watch study of the environmental effects of a day in the life
of a typical Seattle-area consumer); Leonardo Academy, Inc., How Much Air Pollution Do We
Cause?
(profiling the air emissions of an average
American
household),
at
http://www.cleanerandgreener.org/schools/pollution.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2003). In addition,
several non-governmental organizations have generated reports on the emissions of specific
substances, such as global climate change gases, that provide some basis for calculating the
individual and/or household contribution. See, e.g., JOHN M. BALBUS & MARK L. WILSON, PEW
CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, HUMAN HEALTH & GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE: A REVIEW OF
THE

POTENTIAL IMPACTS IN THE UNITED STATES (2000), http://www.pewclimate.org/global-

warming-in-depthlall reports/human_health/index.cfm.
80. A reliable quantification requires not only additional data gathering in some cases but
also the type of careful analysis of detailed reports that is difficult for policymakers working
under pressing time demands and virtually impossible for the public.
81. The difficulty of using anecdotal data to make regulatory resource allocation decisions
has been well documented in environmental law. See, e.g., Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein,
Availability Cascadesand Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683 (1999); Ruhl, supra note 72, at
27-91; Saltzman, supra note 71, at 444-60. One nonprofit group has concluded that the average
household contributes 458 pounds of low level ozone or smog-forming pollutants per year.
Leonardo Academy, Inc., supra note 79, at 1. This is the only published report that attempts to
aggregate the contributions of individuals and households to ozone precursors, but the total is
simply the EPA estimate of all of the emissions nationwide of one (nitrogen oxides) of the two
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organization's widely reported characterization of petroleum pollution
by individuals suggested that the combination of individual dumping
of used motor oil into municipal storm sewers and runoff from urban
and suburban streets releases fifteen times more oil to the ocean each
year than the Exxon Valdez spill.82 If this estimate is correct, then as
much as 154 million gallons of oil reach the ocean from these sources
each year, and the releases from individuals and households account
for a substantial portion of that total.83 But this 154 million gallon
total is more than double the best estimate from the most recent
report by the National Research Council of the National Academy of
Sciences (the 2003 NRC report) of all releases to oceans. Further, the
2003 NRC report cautions against being "tempted to calculate the
'Exxon Valdez-equivalence' by comparing the quantity of petroleum
released from a specific source to that released during the Exxon
Valdez spill. '8 4 This example is not intended to criticize prior
attempts to characterize individual sources, but to demonstrate the
difficulty of assessing individuals as a source category based on the
currently available data.
Nevertheless, Part III demonstrates that sufficient nonanecdotal, reliable data are available from which to begin building a
profile of individuals as sources of pollution. Part III.A provides a
foundation for the profile, which is presented in Part III.B. The profile
demonstrates that for a number of important pollutants, individuals
constitute a surprisingly large source, both in terms of the quantity of
pollutants released and their potential adverse effects. In fact, for
several pollutants, individuals account for a far larger proportion of
the overall quantities released than the combined total from all large

pollutants (nitrogen oxides and hydrocarbons) that form ozone divided by the number of
households in the United States. See LEONARDO ACADEMY, INC., CONSUMER GUIDE TO GREEN
ENERGY
CHOICES
(1999),
http://www.cleanerandgreener.org/download/GreenEnergy.pdf,
Telephone Interview by John Lucas with Steve Olson, Leonardo Institute (May 28, 2003).
82. Margot Higgins, Individuals Called Biggest Threat to Oceans, ENVTL. NEWS NETWORK
(Jan. 15, 2003) (reporting polling results by the Ocean Project suggesting that public knowledge
of the functions of the ocean and causes of ocean pollution was lacking), http://www.enn.com/
news/enn-stories/1999/12/120399/oceanpoll7801.asp.
83. The Exxon Valdez spill released approximately 35,000 tons of oil. See NAT'L RESEARCH
COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACADS., OIL IN THE SEA III: INPUTS, FATES, AND EFFECTS 22 (2003)

[hereinafter 2003 NRC REPORT]. The product of 15 and 35,000 is 525,000 tons, and 525,000 tons
times 294 gallons per ton is 154,350,000 gallons. Id.
84. According to the report, the ecotoxicological effects of petroleum releases are caused not
by the volumes released to the environment but by the dose of petroleum hydrocarbons available
to the organism. Id. According to the NRC study, "dose is rarely directly proportional to the
amount released." Id. At the same time, the NRC report recognized the importance of
quantifying releases as a means of identifying areas for further study. Id.at 17.
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industrial facilities.85

In addition, individuals' proportionate share
may be growing as population, consumption, and activity levels
increase, and as command and control and other regulatory
86
instruments reduce emissions from large industrial sources.
A. Individuals as a Source Category
1. Defining Individuals and Households
At the outset, simply defining "individuals" as a source
category is an important task. For the purposes of this analysis, an
individual is defined to mean a person acting in a private capacity, not
in the course of employment. Emissions in some cases are more
susceptible to measurement by household (e.g., emissions from
residential electricity consumption), and a household is defined as all
of the individuals living in the same housing unit.8 7 The emissions
attributable to individuals in the course of their employment are
excluded because different means of controlling behavior are available
when individuals function as employees than when they function as
private individuals (e.g., command and control, economic, or other
instruments directed at employers). In addition, the inclusion of all
emissions generated in the course of employment or in the production
of consumer goods and services would lead to the problem that all
pollution ultimately could be attributed to individuals, but doing so
negates the utility of the category. To avoid the over-inclusiveness
problem, the profile does not apportion to individuals the emissions
from the industrial sources that manufacture consumer goods. For
example, although the profile apportions to individuals the emissions

85. By "large industrial facilities" I mean those non-governmental facilities that are subject
to TRI reporting requirements. See 42 U.S.C. § 11023(b)(1)(A) (2000); Pedersen, supranote 8, at
151 (describing the facilities subject to TRI requirements as 'large industrial facilities").
86. See sources cited supra note 6.
87. This is consistent with the approach followed by the United States Census Bureau,
which defines households to include
all the people who occupy a housing unit. A housing unit is a house, an apartment, a
mobile home, a group of rooms, or a single room that is occupied (or if vacant, is
intended for occupancy) as separate living quarters. Separate living quarters are
those in which the occupants live separately from any other people in the building and
which have direct access from the outside of the building or through a common hall.
The occupants may be a single family, one person living alone, two or more families
living together, or any other group of related or unrelated people who share living
arrangements.
U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, Using the Data: Subject Definitions,
http://www.census. gov/acs/www/UseDatalDef/Hhld_rel.htm (last modified Mar. 24, 2004).
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from consumer solvent use, it excludes the emissions released during
the manufacturing of consumer solvents.
The profile attributes to individuals the emissions from several
types of sources that could be assigned to either the industrial or
individual category. For example, the emissions from on-road and
non-road motor vehicle use could be assigned to the motor vehicle
manufacturers or to the individuals who operate the motor vehicles.
Similarly, the emissions attributable to residential electricity use
could be assigned to electric utilities or residential electricity users.
Where individuals have a substantial ability to control the emissions
by changing the amount or manner of use, and where data are
available, the profile includes these emissions in the individual
category.
The profile thus includes the emissions from private
individuals' motor vehicle use and from the electricity generated for
residential use. Data on the emissions from a range of other consumer
behaviors that are largely within individuals' control, such as other
home energy use and certain consumer product use, were not readily
available and were not included in the profile.
2. A Typology of Environmentally Significant Behavior
Individual environmentally significant behavior includes at
least four distinct types of activities. First, consumer product choices
are perhaps the most obvious and have been the subject of the most
academic commentary and regulatory attention. 88 Consumer product
choices may have been the subject of the most regulatory activity
because consumer product manufacturers are easy targets for
regulatory efforts, such as product content or labeling requirements.
Although the individual source category may be easily conflated with
consumers, a focus only on consumer product choices will exclude
many individual behaviors that have potentially significant
environmental impacts, yet fall outside the consumer category.8 9 For
example, the extent to which individuals idle their vehicles may have
surprisingly large effects on ozone precursor production, yet a
consumer focus will address this issue only obliquely by addressing
consumer vehicle or fuel purchases. 90
88. See, e.g., Menell, supra note 56, at 1436 (noting that "[iun the United States, the
principal thrust of public policy in this area has been focused on point-of-purchase labeling of
environmental claims").
89. An example is that home disposal of used motor oil has surprisingly large effects on
water quality, yet a consumer focus is more likely to address the purchase of new motor oil, with
only attenuated effects on the disposal of used motor oil.
90. See discussion infra note 274. As discussed above, conflating individuals with
consumers as a source category also may create an over-inclusive category: the consumer sector
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Second, activity types are important. Whether individuals
drive or take mass transportation to work can have tremendous
implications for the environment. Similarly, whether individuals use
manual or motorized watercraft may have large implications for the
impact of individuals on estuarine environments. 9 1
Third, activity levels are less obvious but equally important.
Examples include the frequency with which an individual uses a car,
furnace or household solvent. If an individual purchases a car that is
50 percent cleaner than an alternative vehicle, yet drives it twice as
much, a focus on activity levels, rather than simply consumer product
choices, will be necessary to capture the full environmental effects of
individual behavior.
Fourth, and equally important in many cases, is the activity
location. The use of a personal watercraft in the open ocean may have
minimal effects given the assimilative capacity of the environment
and the flora and fauna present in the open ocean. Use of the same
watercraft in a sensitive marine ecosystem may be quite a different
matter, as the 2003 NRC report suggests.9 2 Similarly, use of a
particular solvent outdoors may not be harmful if it does not result in
significant human exposure and degrades quickly in the environment.
Use of the same solvent indoors may present a significant human
health risk. The spatial distribution of residential and commercial
activities also may be remarkably important. A community that is
widely dispersed will require greater use of resources for
transportation and will have larger amounts of impervious surfaces
(e.g., roads and parking lots), with resulting environmental impacts,
than one that combines high density in some locations with
93
undeveloped land in others.
B. The Contributionof Individuals to Environmental Pollutionand
ultimately could include essentially all economic activity, thus all industrial and government
emissions could be attributed to individuals. This approach would not distinguish emissions from
household behaviors that are under a substantial degree of control by the individual from
emissions that are generated by industrial or other sources to meet consumer demands, and thus
are under only indirect individual control. As a result, attributing all industrial emissions to
consumers would not provide a valuable tool for identifying and changing the contributions of
various source categories.
91. See 2003 NRC REPORT, supra note 83, at 22.
92.

See id.

93. Academicians and government agencies have recognized the importance of suburban
sprawl for a host of environmental issues, including air pollution, non-point source water
pollution and others. See generally GAO, LAND USE: FEDERAL AGENCIES CAN Do MORE (2001)
(identifying potential government actions to reduce the environmental effects of sprawl); NEW
GROUND: THE ADVENT OF LOCAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (John R. Nolon ed., 2003) (noting the

growing importance of local environmental requirements).
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Environmental Harms
The contributions of individuals can be assessed from a variety
of perspectives, including the types of pollutants released (e.g., toxics
or conventional pollutants), the quantities of pollutants released (both
absolute and relative to industrial or other sources), the media to
which the pollutants are released (air, water, and land), and the
effects on human health and the environment.
Although a
comprehensive analysis is not possible based on existing data, the
profile examines individuals' emissions of several important
pollutants: low-level ozone or smog, mercury, several air toxics from
mobile sources, pesticides, and petroleum. Individuals contribute
substantial quantities of other pollutants not profiled here, including
air pollutants such as climate change gases, 94 carbon monoxide, 95 and
particulate matter,96 as well as various toxic chemicals in consumer
products that are released to air, land and water. 97 EPA has
94.

Substantial quantities of climate change gases are released by driving and other

individual behaviors. See OFFICE OF AIR AND RADIATION, EPA, EMISSION FACTS (EPA 420-F-00-

013) 2 (2000) (the average annual carbon dioxide emissions of a passenger car are 11,450 pounds,
and light trucks emit 16,035 pounds), http://www.epa.gov/otaq/consumer/f00013.htm. Each
gallon of gasoline burned in a motor vehicle releases about twenty pounds of carbon dioxide,
including 5.47 pounds of carbon, into the atmosphere. ARNOLD W. REITZE JR., AIR POLLUTION
CONTROL LAW: COMPLIANCE & ENFORCEMENT 270 (2001); OFFICE OF SCIENCE & TECH. POLICY,
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CLIMATE CHANGE STATE OF KNOWLEDGE 1-6, 9 (1997).

95. Tailpipe emissions controls on passenger cars have reduced emissions of carbon
monoxide by roughly 90 percent over pre-1970 cars, and ambient levels of carbon monoxide have
dropped. OFFICE OF MOBILE SOURCES, EPA, OMS FACT SHEET #3: AUTOMOBILES AND CARBON
MONOXIDE (EPA 400-F-92-005) 1 (1993),
http://www.epa.gov/otaq/consumer/03-co.htm.
Nevertheless, 95 percent of all carbon monoxide emissions in cities arises from tailpipe and
minor source emissions, much of which can be attributed to individuals. EPA, 2000 AIR TRENDS
REPORT, supra note 6, at 2-1 to 2-2; see also OFFICE OF AIR & RADIATION, EPA, REDUCING AIR
POLLUTION FROM NONROAD ENGINES (EPA420-F-00-048) 2 (2000) [hereinafter EPA, NONROAD

ENGINES REPORT] (concluding that lawn and garden equipment produces 62 percent of the
carbon monoxide from non-road sources), http://www.epa.gov/otaq/regs/nonroad/foo48.pdf.
96. Particulate matter ("PM") is an air pollutant with important human health effects that
is released in substantial quantities by individuals. EPA, NONROAD ENGINE REPORT, supra note
95, at 2 (concluding that lawn and garden equipment produces 11 percent of the PM from nonroad sources). A number of studies have focused on PM from motor vehicle emissions and its
health effects. See, e.g., Michael Brauer et al., Air Pollution From Traffic and the Development of
Respiratory Infections and Asthmatic and Allergic Symptoms in Children, 166 AM. J.
RESPIRATORY CRITICAL CARE MED. 1092 (2002); Yifang Zhu et al., Concentration and Size
Distribution of UltrafineParticlesNear a Major High way, 52 J. AIR & WASTE MGMT. AsS'N 1032
(2002).

97. The total quantity of toxic chemicals included in consumer products is unknown, as are
the fate and effects of these chemicals. One public interest group has suggested that the toxic
chemicals contained in consumer products produced by large industrial facilities may exceed the
total amount of hazardous waste generated by those facilities by ten to twenty times. INFORM,
The Community's Right to Know More 7, http://www.informinc.org/rtkm_07.php (last visited
May 10, 2004). For a list of consumer products that are found in household hazardous waste, see
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estimated that individuals generate 1.6 million tons of household
hazardous wastes annually, and that the average home has
accumulated up to 100 pounds of hazardous wastes. 98 Some seemingly
innocuous behaviors, such as the use of consumer products9 9 and the
burning of waste materials in barrels, 10 0 may release substantial
Office of Solid Waste, EPA, List of Common HHW Products, http://www.epa.gov/epaoswer/nonhw/muncpl/hhw-list.htm (last visited May 10, 2004). According to one source, household
hazardous wastes generated from consumer products are a "serious problem" and can damage
sewage treatment plants when disposed of down sinks, pollute drinking water, harm sanitation
workers when improperly disposed of in garbage, harm septic tanks, and add to runoff when
applied to yards or disposed of down storm sewers. UNIV. OF MO,, MANAGING HOUSEHOLD
HAZARDOUS WASTE (Univ. of Mo., Household Hazardous Waste Project, Publication No.
WM6004, 1993), http://muextension.missouri.edu/explore/wasteman/wm6O04.htm.
98. EPA, ENVIRONMENT REPORT, supra note 9, at B-2 (citing Office of Solid Waste &
Emergency
Response,
EPA,
Household
Hazardous
Waste
(Oct.
29,
2002),
http://www.epa.gov/epaoswer/non-hw/muncpl/hhw.htm). Remarkably, the definitive periodic EPA
report on household waste excludes consideration of hazardous wastes in the household waste
stream. See OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE & EMERGENCY RESPONSE, EPA, MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE IN
THE UNITED STATES: 2000 FACTS AND FIGURES (EPA 530-R-02-001) 25 (2002). EPA has estimated

that 206 million pounds of "toxic chemicals in waste" were disposed of in RCRA Subtitle C
facilities in 2000, or roughly 2.9 percent of the TRI releases. EPA, ENVIRONMENT REPORT, supra
note 9, at 3-8. In May 1989, the OTA testified that 500 million tons of RCRA-defined hazardous
wastes were generated annually in the United States. OTA, Senate Testimony, supra note 69, at
5. The OTA noted that this figure included mixtures with non-toxic chemicals, such as water,
and RCRA wastes that are not toxic, such as flammable wastes and some acids. Id. Individuals
also generate roughly 4.5 pounds of solid waste per day, a figure that is far higher than the
amount generated in the 1960s, but that has remained constant over the last decade. EPA,
ENVIRONMENT REPORT, supra note 9, at 3-14.

99. Toxic chemicals in consumer products are released by individuals when the products are
used, flushed down drains, discarded on-site or through informal off-site dumping on land or into
storm sewers, burned in trash barrels, or sent off-site for disposal (e.g., to landfills or
incinerators). There is some indication that although industrial releases of toxic chemicals have
declined since 1988, the quantities included in consumer products has not. See, e.g., TED
SCHETrLER ET AL., GREATER BOSTON PHYSICIANS FOR SOC. RESPONSIBILITY & THE MASS. PUB.
INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP EDUC. FUND, GENERATIONS AT RISK: How ENVIRONMENTAL TOXINS
MAY AFFECT REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH IN MASSACHUSErS: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2 (1996) (noting
that "[e]nvironmental release of chemicals with some evidence of reproductive toxicity have
declined substantially since reporting requirements were established in Massachusetts.
However, the amount of these chemicals incorporated into products has not changed
significantly."), http://www.safe2use.com/datajprecaut.htm.
In addition, publicly owned
treatment works, which treat household wastewater, may not be equipped to treat toxic
chemicals, leading some toxic chemicals in consumer products to pass through to waterbodies.
See ASS'N OF METRO. SEWERAGE AGENCIES, EVALUATION OF DOMESTIC SOURCES OF MERCURY 7
(Aug. 2000) [hereinafter AMSA, DOMESTIC SOURCES OF MERCURY], http://www.amsacleanwater.org/pubs/mercury/mercury.pdf.
100. An EPA study found that the toxic chemicals released into the air when household
products are burned in backyard barrels include hydrogen cyanide, polychlorinated biphenyls,
chlorobenzenes, polychlorinated dibenzo-p-dioxins, aldehydes, ketones, hydrogen chloride,
hydrogen cyanide, and various other VOCs and metals. See PAUL M. LERNIEUX, EPA,
EVALUATION OF EMISSIONS FROM THE OPEN BURNING OF HOUSEHOLD WASTE IN BARRELS,

TECHNICAL REPORT (1997), http://www.epa.gov/ttn/catc/dirllbarlbrnl.pdf. Air toxics are also
released through other forms of combustion, such as the use of furnaces and water heaters, and
gas and wood stoves. EPA, 2000 AIR TRENDS REPORT, supra note 6, at 7-1 to 7-6.
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quantities of pollutants when the totals from individual activities are
aggregated. These releases also may have substantial environmental
and human health effects. For example, EPA reports that consumer
products, such as paint, are among the sources of toxic chemicals in
urban runoff,10 1 and urban runoff is one of the leading causes of water
pollution in the United States. 10 2 Individuals also contribute to
environmental harms through activities that do not involve the
release of chemical pollutants, such as destroying endangered species
or filling wetlands. The effects of these activities are worthy of further
study but are beyond the scope of this profile. For each of the
pollutants profiled here, the discussion first identifies the potential
environmental and human health effects posed by the pollutants
released, then assesses the quantities released by individuals as
compared to large industrial facilities (and other types of sources
where data are available), and concludes with an analysis of the
03
regulatory efforts taken to date. 1
The profile focuses more on the quantities of pollutants emitted
than on the risks posed by these pollutants. Not all types of pollution
are equal, and not all releases of the same type of pollutant are worthy
of the same level of regulatory effort. Although the risks presented by
the pollutants profiled are identified where possible, often it is not
possible to make the leap from specific quantities or types of releases
to specific risks or harms. 10 4
Identifying quantities released
101. EPA, 2000 WATER QUALITY REPORT, supra note 6, at 31. A project conducted by the
University of Missouri concluded that releases by individuals and households that enter
waterways through storm drains include antifreeze, fertilizers, motor oil, paint and other
household hazardous waste (e.g., paint thinners, cleaners, auto waxes and swimming pool
chemicals). UNIV. OF MO., STORM DRAINS AND WATER QUALITY 2-5 (Univ. of Mo., Household
Hazardous Waste Project, Publication No. WM6011, 1994), http://muextension.missouri.edu
/explore/wasteman/wm601 1.htm.
102. EPA, 2000 WATER QUALITY REPORT, supra note 6, at 31.
103. See discussion infra notes 106-271.
104. The assessment of the risk created by the release of a particular pollutant may involve
many variables. For example, the relatively constant, low-level releases over a long period of
time from 100,000 households of a substance that breaks down in the environment and does not
bioaccumulate may have less harmful effects than the same quantity emitted in a pulse over a
short period of time from an industrial facility. In other situations, such as those involving the
release of substances that are persistent and that bioaccumulate, the concentration of the initial
release may be less important than the total quantity released. The location of releases from
individuals also may occur in areas, such as coastal estuaries, that lead smaller quantities to
create greater risks. 2003 NRC REPORT, supra note 83, at 21-22 (discussing releases from
personal watercraft to sensitive estuaries). Similarly, EPA has concluded that exposure to
mutagenic carcinogens early in life may pose a substantially greater risk than later exposure.
OFFICE OF RESEARCH & DEV., EPA, DRAFT REPORT OF THE SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE FOR
ASSESSING CANCER SUSCEPTIBILITY RESULTING FROM EARLY-LIFE EXPOSURE TO CARCINOGENS
(2003), available at http://www.epa.gov./sciencel/pdf/final scagsreport091203drft.pdf. As a result,
exposure of children to household chemical and pesticide use may be far more important than
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nonetheless is an important starting point, without which an
assessment of the risks created and the optimal government response
cannot begin. 105
1. Low-Level Ozone
Ozone is formed by reactions involving oxides of nitrogen (NOx)
and hydrocarbons (principally volatile organic compounds or VOCs), in
the presence of sunlight. 10 6 Although ozone at high levels in the
atmosphere protects the earth against harmful ultraviolet radiation
generated by the sun, ozone near the ground is the main constituent of
smog.107 Ozone is a potent lung irritant that causes lung damage,
1 08 It
chest pain, coughing, nausea, throat irritation, and congestion.
also may exacerbate bronchitis, heart disease, emphysema, and
asthma. 10 9 In addition, ozone reduces the growth of plants by
interfering with the production and storage of starches, causing
damage to crops and other vegetation.1 10 In some plant species, the
previously recognized. For a discussion of the factors considered in environmental and human
health risk determinations, see SCI. ADVISORY BD., EPA, REVIEW OF THE SECTOR FACILITY
INDEXING PROJECT (EPA-SAB-EEC-97-012) A-4 (1997), http://www.epa.gov/sab/pdf/eec9712.pdf.
105. For example, the chair of the study that generated the 2003 NRC Report acknowledged
that the quantitative data in the study provide a baseline and guide for further studies. 2003
NRC REPORT, supra note 83, at ix.
106. NOx and VOCs are commonly referred to as ozone precursors. Ozone is a gaseous
molecule with three oxygen atoms. OFFICE OF MOBILE SOURCES, EPA, FACT SHEET OMS 4:
AUTOMOBILES AND OZONE (EPA 400-F-2-006) 1 (1993) [hereinafter OMS, AUTOMOBILES AND
OZONE], http://www.epa.gov/otaq/consumer/04-ozone.pdf. VOCs in vehicle emissions consist of a
mixture of hydrocarbons and nitrogen oxides that contain varying amounts of nitrogen and
oxygen. OFFICE OF MOBILE SOURCES, EPA, EMISSION FACTS: IDLING VEHICLE EMISSIONS (EPA
420-F-98-014) 2 (1998). Ozone concentrations tend to be elevated during the summer months
(sometimes referred to as the "ozone season") and tend to be highest on hot summer afternoons.
OMS, AUTOMOBILES AND OZONE, supra,at 1.
107. Office of Transp. & Air Quality, EPA, Mobile Source Emissions-Past, Present and
Future: Definitions, http://www.epa.gov/otaq/invntory/overview/defintions.htm (last modified
Apr. 14, 2003).
108. OFFICE OF AIR & RADIATION, EPA, AIRNOw: WHAT YOU CAN Do 2 (2003),
http://www.epa.gov/airnow/consumer.html (noting that ozone has a number of human health
effects, including that it "can limit the ability to take a deep breath, and it can cause coughing,
throat irritation, and breathing discomfort. There is also evidence that ozone can lower
resistance to respiratory disease (such as pneumonia), damage lung tissue, and aggravate
chronic lung disease (such as asthma or bronchitis)").
109. OFFICE OF AIR QUALITY & PLANNING STANDARDS, EPA, OZONE: GOOD UP HIGH, BAD
NEARBY 1-2 (1994) [hereinafter EPA, BAD NEARBY] (noting that exposure to ozone can affect
vulnerable populations, such as children, the elderly, and individuals with respiratory problems,
as well as those without particular vulnerabilities, and that healthy adults are particularly
affected by ozone during heavy exercise), http://es.epa.gov/techinfo/faccts/ozone3.html.
110. EPA, BAD NEARBY, supranote 109, at 2. EPA has estimated that the costs to agriculture
of ozone levels above the new 8-hour standard are two to three billion dollars per year. EPA,
2000 AIR TRENDS REPORT, supra note 6, at 1-1.
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effects may not become evident for years, but long-term adverse effects
may occur in various ecosystems, including those with endangered
plants and wildlife.1 1 ' In response to new studies on the effects of
ozone, EPA in 1997 promulgated a new, tougher standard (commonly
called the eight-hour standard because it is measured over an eight
112
hour period) for ozone to replace the earlier one-hour standard.
a. Individual Contribution
Individuals and households contributed at least 26 billion
pounds (12,979,700 tons) of ozone precursors in 1998,113 or roughly 246
pounds of ozone precursors per household." 4
Individuals and
households thus contributed more than 30.6 percent of all low-level
ozone precursors nationwide. Industrial, commercial, government,
and other types of sources contributed the remainder. Table 1
identifies the volumetric and percentage contributions of each of the
individual sources that were included in the estimate.

111. See EPA, 2000 AIR TRENDS REPORT, supra note 6, at 1-1 to 1-2; EPA, BAD NEARBY,
supra note 109, at 3 (noting that the effects include reductions in crop yields and noting that
ozone limits the ability of plants and trees to fight diseases). In addition to the effects on plants
and animals, ozone also has other non-human health effects, such as contributing to regional
haze and reducing visibility, with adverse effects on tourism. See EPA, 2000 AIR TRENDS REPORT,
supra note 6, at 6-1 to 6-4 (noting sources of visibility impairment).
112. National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg. 38,856 (July 18, 1997)
(codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 50.9-.10); see also Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457
(2001) (reviewing the EPA eight-hour ozone standard). EPA has estimated that full attainment
of the new 8-hour ozone standard could result in human health effects with a monetary benefit of
$1.5 to $8.5 billion dollars per year in the United States. See EPA, REGULATORY IMPACT
ASSESSMENT ES-17 (1997), http://www.epa.gov/ttn/oarpg/naaqsfin/ria.html. The monetary benefit
estimate does not include other benefits that could result when full attainment of the new
standard is achieved, including reduced incidents of pulmonary inflammation, decreased
susceptibility to respiratory infection, and environmental and other non-human health benefits.
Id. at ES-16.
113. The 12,979,700 ton figure is 30.6 percent of the 42,370,000 tons that EPA estimates to
be the total 1998 production of ozone precursors in the United States. EPA, 2000 AIR TRENDS
REPORT, supra note 6, at tbl. ES-1. The 42,370,000 tons of ozone precursors includes 17,920,000
tons of VOCs and 24,450,000 tons of NOx. Id.
114. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 9. The average household share of 246 pounds was
calculated by dividing the total amount of ozone precursors produced by individuals (12,972,700
tons) by the total number of households in America (105.5 million households). EPA, 2000 AIR
TRENDS REPORT, supra note 6, at tbls. 3-2, 3-3.
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Table 1:
115

IndividualSources of Ozone PrecursorEmissions (in tons)

Source Category

Individual
Amount

Share of
Individual

Individual
Share of Total

On-road Motor Vehicles
Cars
Light-duty Trcks
Subtotal

4,295,700
3,243,900
7,539,600

33.1%
25.0%
58.1%

10.1%
7.6%
17.7%

Non-road Motor Vehicles
Recreational Marine Vehicles
Lawn & Garden Equipment
Recreational Gas Engines
Subtotal

668,000
1,037,200
240,200
1,945,400

5.1%
8.0%
1.9%
15.0%

1.6%
2.4%
0.6%
4.6%

Fuel Comb. Elec. Util.
Residential
Subtotal

2,155,000
2,155,000

16.6%
16.6%

5.1%
5.1%

Consumer Product Use
Consumer Solvents
Pesticide Application
Architectural Coatings
Subtotal

1,099,000
30,400
210,300
1,339,700

8.5%
0.2%
1.6%
10.3%

2.6%
0.1%
0.5%
3.2%

12,979,700

100.0%

30.6%

Total

The individual activities included in the 30.6 percent estimated
share of total national ozone precursor emissions are as follows: (1)
operation of on-road motor vehicles (including cars and light-duty
trucks, e.g., pick-up trucks and sport utility vehicles or SUVs);116 (2)
115. The table was compiled from data in the sources identified infra notes 116-34. All
figures are for 1998 unless otherwise specified.
116. The EPA on-road motor vehicle category includes heavy-, medium- and light-duty
trucks, as well as cars. EPA, 2000 AIR TRENDS REPORT, supra note 6, at tbl. 3-3. The estimate of
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operation of non-road motor vehicles (including lawn and garden
equipment, recreational marine equipment, and certain other
recreational vehicles, such as all-terrain vehicles and off-road
motorcycles);117 (3) residential electricity consumption (including the
emissions from electric utilities attributable to residential electricity
consumption);118 and (4) consumer product use, including consumer
use of solvents, 11 9 pesticides,1 20 and architectural coatings (e.g.,
household paints).121
individuals' ozone precursor emissions omits all heavy- and medium-duty trucks, as they are
unlikely to be owned and operated by individuals acting outside of their employment. As to cars
and light-duty trucks, the estimate also includes only the emissions from the proportion of lightduty gasoline cars and trucks not likely to be owned or operated by individuals acting outside of
their employment. According to the U.S. Department of Energy, individuals acting outside the
scope of employment comprised 76.3 percent of all light-duty car drivers, and the same group
comprised 82.5 percent of all light-duty trucks driven on roadways in the United States in 2000.
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,

ASSUMPTIONS

FOR THE ANNUAL

ENERGY

OUTLOOK

2003

(2003),

http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/assumption/transportation.html.
117. EPA identifies this category as "off-road" or "non-road" motor vehicles. EPA, NONROAD
ENGINES REPORT, supra note 95, at 1. The term "non-road" is used in this Article. According to
EPA, non-road vehicles are a "diverse collection of engines, equipment, vehicles, and vessels. The
category includes outdoor power equipment, recreational vehicles (including boats, snowmobiles,
etc.), farm and construction machinery, lawn and garden equipment, marine vessels,
locomotives, aircraft, and many other applications." Id. The profile excludes the emissions from
several types of non-road motor vehicles that EPA includes in the category but that are not likely
to be operated by individuals during the summer, such as snowmobiles, or that are not likely to
be operated by individuals acting outside of their employment, such as aircraft, locomotives and
construction equipment. OFFICE OF TRANSP. & AIR QUALITY, EPA, FINAL RULE FOR CLEANER
LARGE INDUSTRIAL SPARK IGNITION ENGINES, RECREATIONAL MARINE DIESEL ENGINES, AND

RECREATIONAL VEHICLES (EPA 420-F-02-037) ch. 6 (2002) (stating that snowmobiles emitted
in
2000),
1,400
tons
of NOx
of VOCs
and
205,000
tons
approximately
http://www.epa.gov/otaq/cleanrec.htm. The emissions levels from non-road vehicles will be
declining as a result of new EPA regulations and state voluntary agreements, but as with onroad motor vehicles, these emissions reductions will be offset to some extent as the number of
these vehicles increases. According to EPA, all non-road engines in 2000 contributed 3,677,000
tons of hydrocarbons (as compared to 3,772,000 tons of highway hydrocarbon emissions), and
5,461,000 tons of nitrogen oxide emissions (as compared to 7,988,000 tons of highway nitrogen
oxide emissions). EPA, NONROAD ENGINES REPORT, supra note 95, at 2 (predicting that new
regulations will reduce nonroad diesel emissions of nitrogen oxides by 60 percent by 2008).
118. According to a Department of Energy estimate of the overall electric sales in the United
States, the individual/residential share comprises 35.7 percent of the total electricity purchased
in the United States in 2001. See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY

see also
REPORT tbl. 2c,
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaflelectricity/esr/tablelabcd.xls#Al05;
GARDNER & STERN, supra note 9, at 273 (referring to individual and household percentage of all
fossil fuel consumption); ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, ELECTRICITY INFOCARD 2001

(2001) (noting that individuals consumed at least 35 percent of the electricity produced in the
U.S. in 2000), http://www.eia.gov/neic/brochure/elecinfocard.html.
119. The consumer solvent category includes the use of personal care and household products
that contain solvents such as hairsprays, deodorants, paint thinners, and dishwashing products.
EPA, 3 EMISSION INVENTORY IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMCHAPTER 5: CONSUMER AND COMMERCIAL
SOLVENT USE (1996) [hereinafter EPA, AIR INVENTORY CONSUMER SOLVENTS REPORT]

(identifying several of the products used in this category), http://www.epa.gov/ttn/chief/
eiip/techreport/volume03; see also EPA, 2000 AIR TRENDS REPORT, supra note 6, at tbl. 3-3
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Not surprisingly, automobiles and light-duty trucks are the
largest single source of ozone precursors from individuals, accounting
for approximately 17.7 percent of the total amount of ozone precursors
emitted nationwide in 1998.122
In some areas, the percentage
contribution from cars and light trucks is much higher. 123 By
comparison, no single industrial source category comes close to 17.7
124
percent of the total.
In addition, many seemingly innocuous activities other than
automobile driving also have substantial impacts on ozone formation.
For example, in 1998, individual use of non-road vehicles, including
lawn and garden equipment, recreational marine equipment (e.g.,
motorboats and personal watercraft using inboard and outboard
engines), all-terrain vehicles, and off-road motorcycles comprised 4.6
percent of all ozone precursors emitted nationwide.1 25 The
(noting that consumer solvents accounted for 1,099,000 tons or 6 percent of all national
emissions of VOCs in 1998).
120. The consumer pesticide category includes the use of pesticides approved for home and
garden use. EPA, 3 EMISSION INVENTORY IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM CHAPTER 9: PESTICIDESAGRICULTURAL AND NONAGRICULTURAL 9.2-1, tbl. 9.6.6 (2001) [hereinafter EPA, AIR INVENTORY
PESTICIDES REPORT] (noting that pesticides contain VOCs), http://www.epa.gov/ttn/chief/
eiip/techreport/volume03; see also EPA, AIR INVENTORY CONSUMER SOLVENTS REPORT, supra
note 119, at 5.2-4, tbl. 5.2-1 (noting that the consumer pesticide category includes products
approved for home and garden use); EPA, 2000 AIR TRENDS REPORT, supra note 6, at tbl. 3-3
(noting that total pesticide application accounted for 405 tons or 2.3 percent of national
emissions of volatile organic compounds in 1998).
121. EPA, ECONOMIC IMPACT AND REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ANALYSES OF THE FINAL
ARCHITECTURAL COATING VOC RULE 1-12 (1998) (stating that "do-it-yourselfers" consumed 41
percent of the total gallons of architectural coatings used in the United States in 1991),
http://www.epa.gov/ttnecasl/regdata/eiaaim.pdf, EPA, 2000 AIR TRENDS REPORT, supra note 6, at
tbl. 3-3 (noting that all architectural coatings accounted for 491 tons or 2.7 percent of all national
emissions of VOCs in 1998); see also EPA, 3 EMISSION INVENTORY IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM
DOCUMENT CHAPTER 3: ARCHITECTURAL SURFACE COATING (1995) [hereinafter EPA, AIR
INVENTORY ARCHITECTURAL COATINGS REPORT] (noting that consumer paint use generates
hydrocarbon air emissions), http://www.epa.gov/ttnL/chiefleiip/techreport/volume03.
122. According to EPA data, in 1998 individuals emitted 4,295,700 tons of ozone precursors
from light-duty cars and 3,243,900 tons from light-duty trucks. EPA, 2000 AIR TRENDS REPORT,
supra note 6, at tbls. 3-2, 3-3. The totals were calculated by reducing the totals from all lightduty cars and light-duty trucks by the percentages of private individual operation of each. In
total, light-duty gasoline cars and trucks emitted 9,613,000 tons of ozone precursors in 1998,
which constituted approximately 23 percent of the total amount of ozone precursors emitted in
that year. Id. In contrast, light-duty cars and trucks owned and operated by businesses,
government agencies and other non-individual owners contributed roughly 5 percent of all ozone
precursors nationwide. Id.
123. See, e.g., Craig N. Oren, Getting Commuters Out of Their Cars: What Went Wrong 17
STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 141, 152 (1998).
124. See EPA, 2000 AIR TRENDS REPORT, supra note 6, at tbls. 3-2, 3-3 (identifying VOC and
NOx emissions by source category).
125. In 1998, non-road motor vehicles contributed 18.3 percent of all ozone precursor
emissions from all sources nationwide. Id. Obviously, individuals use many types of non-road
vehicles, but this profile only attributes the emissions from lawn and garden equipment,
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subcategories of non-road vehicle use attributable to individuals also
include several large sources of ozone precursors. For example, lawn
and garden equipment was responsible for approximately 2.4 percent
126
of the total amount of ozone precursors emitted nationwide.
Although new mowers are 70 percent less polluting than old mowers,
using an older model lawn mower (many of which are still frequently
used today) for two hours produces the same quantity of ozone
precursors as driving between 100 and 300 miles in a late-model
automobile. 127 Similarly, recreational marine equipment contributed
recreational marine equipment, all terrain vehicles, and off-road motorcycles to individuals from
non-road vehicles. Id. The profile excludes emissions from non-recreational marine vehicles,
locomotives, aircraft, and other vehicles unlikely to be owned and operated by individuals outside
of the scope of their employment.
126. EPA includes lawn and garden equipment in the off-road or non-road category. See
EPA, NONROAD ENGINES REPORT, supra note 95, at 2-4. Lawn and garden equipment produced
approximately 1,037,200 tons of ozone precursors in 1998. Id. Although lawn and garden
equipment produces less than 3 percent of the total NOx emissions categorized as non-road
emissions by the EPA, it also produces 40 percent of the non-road VOC emissions. Id. at 2. Lawn
and garden equipment also contributes a large percentage of the carbon monoxide (62 percent)
and particulate matter (11 percent) emissions categorized as non-road emissions by EPA. Id.
(identifying percentage values). All lawn and garden equipment ozone precursor emissions were
assumed to be generated by individuals. The 2.4 percent total is derived from data in the 2000
EPA Air Trends Report, which identifies a total from all sources of 42.37 million tons of ozone
precursors produced per year. EPA, AIR TRENDS REPORT, supra note 6, at tbls. 3-2, 3-3. The nonroad report provided percentages for lawn and garden equipment emissions in 2000 (40 percent
of the total VOC non-road emissions and approximately 1 percent of the total NOx emissions
from non-road vehicles). EPA, NONROAD ENGINES REPORT, supra note 95, at 2. These
percentages were multiplied by the total NOx (5,280,000 tons) and VOC (2,461,000 tons)
emissions from non-road vehicles provided in the Air Trends Report. EPA, AIR TRENDS REPORT,
supra note 6, at tbls. 3-2, 3-3. The 2.4 percent figure is approximate because the non-road report
does not give an exact number of tons of NOx produced by lawn equipment. Id. at 2. The lawn
and garden equipment total was assumed to be 52,800 tons, which is 1 percent of the non-road
NOx emissions. Id. The 52,800 estimate was based on the assumption that the category entitled
"other" in the non-road report constituted 3 percent of the total NOx emissions from non-road
sources. Id. This "other" category included only individual activities, namely lawn and garden
equipment use, recreational marine equipment use, and recreational gas engine use. Id. The 3
percent was apportioned equally among these three categories (1 percent each). Id. (concluding
that 3 percent of the total NOx emissions come from the three non-road sources noted above).
127. In addition to the direct emissions from lawn and garden equipment, ozone precursors
are emitted from gasoline re-filling and other activities. See OFFICE OF MOBILE SOURCES, EPA,
YOUR YARD AND CLEAN AIR 1-2 (1996) (recommending that individuals avoid spilling gasoline
when filling lawn and garden equipment, properly maintain the equipment, consider replacing
dirtier equipment, use manual tools, reduce mowing time, decrease lawn area, and recycle rather
than re-sell old equipment), http://www.epa.gov/otaq/consumer/19-yard.pdf); EPA, OFFICE OF
TRANSP. & AIR QUALITY, LAWN AND GARDEN (SMALL GASOLINE) EQUIPMENT 1, http://www.epa.
gov/otaq/equip-ld.htm (last viewed May 10, 2004). Even when spilling does not occur, portable
gas cans may be a surprisingly large source of ozone precursors. The California Air Resources
Board has estimated that the 9.2 million residential gas cans and 600,000 commercial gas cans
in California contribute 87 tons per day of ozone precursors in the state, a figure that was
expected to grow to 96 tons per day before the imposition of new regulations on gas cans and
spouts. CAL. AIR RES. BD., NEW REGULATIONS FOR PORTABLE GAS CANS AND GAS CAN SPOUTS
REGULATIONS],
http://www.arb.ca.gov/msprog/
(1999),
[hereinafter
CARB, GAS CAN
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roughly 1.6 percent of the total ozone precursors emitted
128
nationwide.
Another major category of individual contributions to ozone
precursor emissions arises from individuals' residential electricity
consumption.
Government estimates suggest that on average
individuals in the United States consume approximately 35.7 percent
of the electricity generated from electric utilities, much of which is
generated from burning fossil fuels, such as coal, oil and natural
gas. 129 As a result, in 1998 individuals' electricity use constituted
roughly 5.1 percent of the total amount of ozone precursors emitted
30
nationwide by all sources.

spillcon/gascanfs/gascanfs.htm. The 87 tons per day is the equivalent of approximately one
million cars. Id. The gas cans contribute to the release of ozone precursors through permeation
through the plastic (polyethylene) walls of some gas cans, fumes that escape during fuel
dispensing, spilling, and evaporation through vent holes and inadequately capped spouts. Id.
128. EPA, 2000 AIR TRENDS REPORT, supra note 6, at tbls. 3-2, 3-3. More than 12 million
marine engines are operated in the United States. The vast majority of these marine engines are
owned and operated by individuals, and they are among the largest contributors to NOx and
VOC emissions in many parts of the United States. Office of Air & Radiation, EPA, Boating
Pollution Prevention Tips (1996) (suggesting steps for existing vehicle operation and fueling,
and new vehicle purchase to reduce air emissions), at http://www.epa.gov/otaqlboat-fs.htm. As
much as 30 percent of the fuel used in the two-stroke engines that have been commonly used for
personal watercraft and motorboats is not burned or is only partially burned and passes directly
into the air or water. Lorraine McCarthy, New Jersey:Industry Agrees on Deadline to Ensure
Certain Marine Engines Are Low-Polluting, STATE ENV'T REP. (BNA), A-2 (Mar. 4, 2003)
(discussing New Jersey voluntary agreement on emissions reductions and noting that New
Jersey has approximately 225,000 registered personal watercraft and boats with outboard
motors).
129. See sources cited supra note 118; see also DEP'T OF ENERGY, PERCENT OF U.S.
ELECTRICITY SALES BY CLASS OF CONSUMER (2000) (noting that residential electricity use
constituted 35.7 percent of the total electricity used in the United States in 2000),
http://www.eia.gov/neic/brochure/elecinfocard.html; DEP'T OF ENERGY, SALES TO BUNDLED AND
UNBUNDLED CONSUMERS, ANNUAL ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY REPORT tbl. lb (2001) (noting that
residential electricity use constituted 35.7 percent of electricity purchased in the United States
in 2001), http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/esr/tablelabcd.xls#Al05; GARDNER & STERN,
supra note 9, at tbls. 10-5, 10-6 (noting that in the United States individuals also consume 35
percent of all fossil fuel, of which 40 percent is used for transportation, 23 percent for space heat,
14 percent for motors and appliances, 11 percent for water heat, 6 percent for lighting, and 6
percent for cooling).
130. EPA, 2000 AIR TRENDS REPORT, supra note 6, at tbls. 3-2, 3-3. If individuals contribute
35.7 percent of these emissions, the individual share of fuel combustion emissions was 2,155,000
tons. The fuel combustion category includes additional subcategories that were not included in
the estimate of individuals' contributions to ozone precursors, including residential wood burning
and burning in backyard barrels. The "residential wood burning" category includes wood used for
wood stoves and fireplaces. Residential wood burning alone contributes 69.4 percent (or 620,000
tons) of the total amount of VOCs produced by all types of fuel combustion, which demonstrates
the large role that individuals play in fuel combustion emissions. Id. at tbl. 3-3. The residential
wood-burning emissions identified in the 1998 Air Trends Report are the total for the entire
year. Telephone Interview by John Lucas with Megan Von Isenburgh, Librarian, EPA Office of
Air Quality Planning and Standards (June 4, 2003). Residential wood burning was not included
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Household consumer product use is another surprisingly large
source of ozone precursors. Three types of household consumer
product use are particularly important: consumer solvent use, private
home and garden pesticide use, and individual architectural coating
use. Consumer solvent use, such as the use of household cleaners,
produced more than a million tons of ozone precursors nationwide in
1998.131 Consumer solvent use thus constituted approximately 2.6
percent of the total ozone precursors emitted from all sources. To put
the consumer solvent use figure into perspective, the million ton total
exceeds the combined total of all ozone precursor emissions from
EPA's Metal Processing, and Chemical and Allied Product
Manufacturing categories. 132
The use of architectural coatings and pesticides around the
home also produces a large quantity of ozone precursors. 133
Nationwide, private individuals use 41 percent of all paints and other
architectural coatings. 134
As a result, the individual share of
in the estimate because it is likely that a large percentage of the 620,000 tons of ozone precursor
emissions reported are released during the winter, not during the summer ozone season.
131. EPA, 2000 AIR TRENDS REPORT, supra note 6, at tbl. 3-3 (noting that consumer solvent
use accounted for 1,099,000 tons or 6.1 percent of national emissions of VOCs in 1998). The
California Air Resources Board (CARB) has noted that consumer products that release ozone
precursors include deodorants, hair spray, cleaning products, and insecticides and that
"[a] Ithough each product only contains a small amount of VOCs, Californians use half a billion of
these items every year."
CAL. AIR RES. BD., CONSUMER PRODUCTS AND SMOG (2003),
http://www.arb.ca.gov/html/brochure/consprod.htm. According to CARB, consumer products
released 265 tons of smog-forming pollutants every day in the Los Angeles area in 1990, more
than all of the refineries and gas stations combined. Id. CARB has phased in new requirements
for twenty-eight product categories since 1990 and has set a goal of 85 percent reductions by
2010. Id. According to CARB, the average cost of reducing VOCs from consumer products is
between twenty-five and eighty-five cents per pound of VOC emissions. Id. This compares
favorably to the $5 per pound average cost of industrial VOC emissions reductions. See CAL. AIR.
RES. BD., GAS CAN REGULATIONS, supra note 127, at 1-2.
132. See EPA, 2000 AIR TRENDS REPORT, supranote 6, at tbls. 3-2, 3-3.
133. See id. at tbl. 3-3 (noting that architectural coatings accounted for 491 tons or 2.7
percent of the national VOC emissions in 1998). The percentages vary on a state-by-state basis.
For example, the New York Department of Environmental Conservation has estimated that 8.2
percent of the VOC emissions in the state arise from the combined total of architectural and
industrial maintenance coatings. See N.Y. DEP'T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS

TO

AIR

POLLUTION

REGULATIONS,

http://www.dec.state.ny.us/website/dar/

amendments.html (last visited May 10, 2004).
134. The 41 percent figure is based on data indicating that "residential do-it-yourselfers"
consumed 41 percent of the total gallons of architectural coatings used by all sources in the
United States in 1991. EPA, ECONOMIC IMPACT AND REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ANALYSES OF THE
FINAL ARCHITECTURAL COATING VOC RULE 1-12 (1998), http://www.epa.gov/ttnecasl/regdata/
eiaaim.pdf. For the profile, individuals were assumed to be responsible for 41 percent of the air
emissions from the coatings (as applied to 1998 data from the 2000 Air Trends Report). Id. This
assumption was based on the fact that the emission factors used by the EPA are virtually
equivalent for all types of these coatings, therefore the type of product used by consumers should
not have an effect on the total amount of VOCs released. Id. The 41 percent figure will increase if
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architectural coating emissions nationwide in 1998 was 0.5 percent of
the total ozone precursors emitted from all sources. 13 5 This 0.5
percent share may have significant impacts on a regional basis. The
South Coast Air Quality Management District, the principal air
regulatory body for the Los Angeles area, has estimated that on an
average day drying paint releases more smog-forming compounds
than all the oil refineries and gas stations combined in the Los
Angeles area. 136 Similarly, home pesticide use contributes a notable
1 37
percentage of the total volume of ozone precursors nationally.
Pesticides often include VOCs, and EPA's air office estimates that
between 7 percent and 8 percent of all pesticides in the United States
are used in private homes and gardens. 3 8 As a result, the individual
share of pesticide emissions in 1998 accounted for 30,400 tons or 0.1
percent of the total ozone precursors emitted from all sources
nationwide.139
b. Regulatory Response
To combat high ozone levels, the Clean Air Act (CAA)
principally employs command and control requirements directed at
large industrial facilities and automobile manufacturers. The CAA
the painting of private residences by professional painters is added to the do-it-yourselfer total,
but the former figure is not readily available, and it is unclear how much control individuals
exercise over paint selection and application by professional painters.
135. EPA, 2000 AIR TRENDS REPORT, supra note 6, at tbls. 3-2, 3-3.
136. In the Los Angeles area, car and truck use (178 tons per day) and consumer product use
(108 tons per day) are the top two sources of VOC emissions. Gary Polakovic, Chemicalsin Home
a Big Smog Source, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2003, at C1 (reporting on data from the South Coast Air
Quality Management District). The top industrial source, industrial paints and coatings (48 tons
per day), is a distant third. Id. The total VOCs from commercial paints and coatings (28 tons per
day) exceeds the total for petroleum marketing (22 tons per day). Id.; see also S. COAST AIR
QUALITY MGMT. DIST., 25 WAYS YOU CAN CLEAN THE AIR 2 (2003) (noting that the combined VOC
emissions for architectural coatings used by individual, commercial, and industrial sources is
equivalent to the emissions from 1.3 million new vehicles).
137. EPA, AIR INVENTORY PESTICIDES REPORT, supra note 120, at 9.2-2 (noting that solvents
comprise roughly half of the constituents of pesticides by weight); see also EPA, 2000 AIR TRENDS
REPORT, supra note 6, at tbls. 3-2, 3-3 (noting that all pesticide application accounted for 405,000
tons or approximately 1 percent of the national emissions of ozone precursors in 1998).
138. EPA, AIR INVENTORY PESTICIDES REPORT, supra note 120, at 9.2-2 (noting that home
pesticide use constitutes 7 to 8 percent of the total ozone precursor emissions by all pesticides).
139. Id. at tbls. 3-2, 3-3 (the figures indicate that the individual share of pesticide ozone
precursor emissions was 0.2 percent of the total VOCs emitted in 1998). For this study, it was
assumed that 7.5 percent of pesticide emissions could be attributed to individuals based on the
contribution from pesticide use in private homes and gardens. See id. The total pesticide
contribution was 405,000 tons of ozone precursors in 1998. Id. The amount attributable to
individuals may be higher if further data on non-commercial farming indicates a large individual
share. See EPA, AIR INVENTORY PESTICIDES REPORT, supra note 120, at 9.2-2 (noting that 68
percent-75 percent of pesticides are used on agricultural land or pastures).
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requires EPA to set and periodically update national ambient air
quality standards (NAAQS) for ozone and other criteria air pollutants
based on their human health and other effects. The CAA then uses a
complex mix of federal technology-based pollution controls imposed on
major industrial sources, tailpipe standards imposed on motor vehicle
manufacturers, and to a lesser extent, measures designed to induce
states to control other sources, such as dry cleaners and automotive
140
repair shops.
The technology-based requirements imposed on industry and
auto manufacturers are the centerpiece of the CAA ozone control
requirements. The stringency of the technology-based controls on
major industrial sources has increased over time and has reduced
4
emissions on a per-source basis by a substantial percentage.1 1
Similarly, the per-vehicle tailpipe emissions standards imposed on
auto manufacturers have become increasingly stringent and have
reduced per-vehicle emissions by up to 90 percent. 42 EPA and the
states also have imposed regulations on consumer product
manufacturers that limit the ozone precursors in some consumer

products. 143
Efforts to control individual behavior through command and
control regulation have been far more limited and far less successful.
For example, the CAA includes provisions (strengthened in the 1990
Clean Air Act Amendments) that require EPA to impose tough
inspection and maintenance (sometimes called "smog check")
140. Smaller sources, such as dry cleaners and automotive repair shops, are often identified
as "area sources" and are subject to controls in the State Implementation Plans (SIPs) adopted
by some states. See REITZE, supra note 94, at 58. The CAA requires each state to develop and
receive EPA approval of an SIP that outlines how the state will ensure that its air quality meets
federal standards. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1) (2000). If a state fails to submit an adequate SIP it
may be subject to sanctions such as the withholding of federal highway funds and ultimately
EPA may be required to promulgate a Federal Implementation Plan (FIP). Id. §§ 7410(c),
7509(b)(1).
141. Reductions in the per-facility release of ozone precursors from major industrial sources
have been in the range of 30 percent for NOx and 45 percent for VOCs. REITZE, supra note 94, at
33.
142. EPA tailpipe emissions standards for motor vehicles required by the 1990 Clean Air Act
Amendments (the 'Tier I" standards) reduced per-vehicle tailpipe emissions during the 1990s.
See REITZE, supra note 94, at 280. New tailpipe standards (the "Tier II" standards) are expected
to lead to further declines in per-vehicle NOx and VOC emissions beginning in 2004, but these
reductions are expected to be offset to some extent by further increases in the number of vehicles
and VMT per vehicle. EPA, 2000 AIR TRENDS REPORT, supra note 6, at 3-6 to 3-7 (noting that
under the Tier II standards, cars will be required to reduce NOx emissions by 77 percent and
trucks and SUVs will be required to reduce emissions by up to 95 percent).
143. See, e.g., Clean Air Act § 183(e), 42 U.S.C. § 7511b(e) (2000); National Volatile Organic
Compound Emission Standards for Consumer Products, 63 Fed. Reg. 48,819 (Sept. 11, 1998)
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9 & 59) (promulgating VOC emissions standards for consumer
products).

2004]

THE NEW ERA OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

555

requirements for automobile owners in air quality regions that fail to
meet the ozone NAAQS. 144 Although these programs have been shown
to reduce per-vehicle emissions by ensuring that tailpipe emissions
controls are functioning, they have been very unpopular and have
been rejected outright in some areas. 145 Perhaps the least popular
EPA efforts have been those that have imposed or have induced states
to impose transportation control measures that restrict the frequency
or speed of vehicle use. 146 For example, an EPA effort to require the
Los Angeles area to adopt vehicle use limitations in the early 1970s
produced an uproar and resulted in amendments to the Clean Air Act
47
barring EPA from further efforts to impose such requirements.
144. See, e.g., Clean Air Act § 182(c)(3)(C); Vehicle Inspection and Maintenance Program for
State Implementation Plans, 57 Fed. Reg. 52,950 (Nov. 5, 1992) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 51). The
inspection and maintenance requirements also are required for areas that are designated as
nonattainment for carbon monoxide. For an overview of the vehicle inspection and maintenance
program, see McGarity, supra note 36.
145. See Vehicle Inspection and Maintenance Program for State Implementation Plans, 57
Fed. Reg. 31,058, 31,059 (proposed July 13, 1992) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 51) (concluding that
inspection and maintenance programs may reduce auto emissions up to 24 percent); see also
McGarity, supra note 36, at 1578-1600 (describing the negative reactions by states to adoption of
enhanced inspection and maintenance programs). In addition, Section 182(d)(1)(B), which was
added in the 1990 CAA Amendments, required EPA to develop an employee trip reduction
program. 42 U.S.C. § 7511a(d)(1)(B). Although the program was directed at large employers, it
was very unpopular and Congress removed the provision from the CAA in 1995. See Pub. L. No.
104-70, 109 Stat. 773 (1995); Oren, supra note 123, at 143-44.
146. Clean Air Act § 108(f) requires EPA to publish information regarding transportation
control measures. 42 U.S.C. § 7408(0. Many control measures are designed to change behavior
by combining positive and negative incentives. Measures to make driving less appealing include
reducing the amount of parking available, increasing charges for parking, increasing bridge and
road tolls, and restricting certain lanes to high occupancy vehicles during peak hours. Other
measures create incentives to make carpooling and public transit more appealing. For example,
some cities pay owners of older cars to "scrap" their old, inefficient cars. See TRANSP. AIR
QUALITY CTR., EPA, TRANSPORTATION CONTROL MEASURES: ACCELERATED VEHICLE RETIREMENT

2 (1998), http://yosemite.epa.gov/aa/tcmsitei.nsf/9bd6f3b7217f8Oc28525652fO053el05/c2f7eld6
b69ece73852565d90075b889/$FILE/S98001.pdf. Approximately 8,400 pre-1971 cars were
scrapped in Los Angeles in the early 1990s. Id.
147. Section 110(a)(2)(B) of the 1970 CAA Amendments required that SIPs include control
measures "including but not limited to land use and transportation controls" if other measures
were inadequate to achieve the NAAQS. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604,
84 Stat. 1676, 1680 (amended by Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 108(a)(2), 91 Stat. 685, 693 (1977) (codified
as amended at 42 US.C. § 7410(a)(2)(B) (2000))); see also Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2689 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)) (prohibiting EPA from
interfering with local governments' authority "to plan or control land use"). For a discussion of
EPA's effort to impose transportation control measures on the Los Angeles area, see Eli
Chernow, Implementing the Clean Air Act in Los Angeles: The Duty to Achieve the Impossible, 4
ECOLOGY L. Q. 537, 548 (1975) (discussing the transportation control measures included in the
federal implementation plan for the Los Angeles area) and Craig Oren, How a Mandate Came
from Hell: The Makings of the FederalEmployee Trip Reduction Program, 28 ENVTL. LAW. 267,
278 (1998) (noting that the federal implementation plan drafted by EPA for the Los Angeles area
triggered such an adverse public reaction that according to one former EPA administrator "[tihe
foundations of EPA are still trembling"). The adverse reactions to EPA efforts to use
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Similarly, state and local efforts to reduce emissions by reducing speed
limits have been hugely unpopular. An effort in 2002 to reduce speed
limits to 55 miles per hour in the Houston area provoked outrage and
48
was ultimately withdrawn.I
Despite the promulgation of various emissions control
regulations following the enactment of the Cleari Air Act in 1970, and
improvements in ambient levels of ozone and other air pollutants,
there are indications that the requirements directed principally at
large industrial sources and motor vehicle tailpipe emissions have hit
a wall. 149 After improving during the 1970 to 1990 period, ambient
ozone levels leveled off and in some cases began to rise in the 1990s.
In the period between 1970 and 1998, ozone precursor emissions
nationally decreased by roughly 18 percent,1 50 and ambient levels
improved during the 1980-1999 period, with one-hour levels declining
by 20 percent and eight-hour levels decreasing by 12 percent. 5 1 These
transportation control measures to limit driving were not restricted to the Los Angeles area. For
example, EPA proposed a plan for Boston during the early 1970s that would have reduced the
number of cars on the road by 20 percent. See Thomas B. Bracken, Transportation Controls
Under the Clean Air Act:A LegalAnalysis, 15 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 749, 758 (1973-74). To
achieve this goal, the plan provided that each car would be issued a sticker in one of five possible
colors. Id. On each weekday, all cars with a specific color sticker would not be allowed on the
roads. This would have required commuters to arrange for alternate transportation on one day
each week, and the "intensity of public opposition" resulted in it never being implemented. Id.
148. See, e.g., Tony Freemantle, 55 MPH Begins Signing Off Freeways This Week, HouS.
CHRON., Nov. 5, 2002, at Al. The 55 mile per hour speed limit was announced in May 2002 but
was reversed on Monday, November 4, 2002. Id. Opponents of the speed limit increase criticized
the governor for using his office to gain a political advantage by announcing the return to higher
speed limits just before the election. Id.; see also Rad Sallee, Officials Push Pedal on Demise of
55 Limit, HOUS. CHRON., Nov. 2, 2002, at Ai (describing the 55 mile per hour speed limit as
"[diespised and ignored since it was imposed"). Reductions in speed limits can lead to substantial
reductions in vehicle emissions of ozone precursors. See OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING &
EVALUATION, EPA, THE EFFECTS OF RAISING SPEED LIMITS ON MOTOR VEHICLE EMISSIONS

(1997), http://www.epa.gov/otaq/invntory/spd2-rpt.pdf.
149. Total NOx emissions from all sources increased almost 17 percent between 1970 and
1998. EPA, 2000 AIR TRENDS REPORT, supra note 6, at 3-3 & tbls. 3-2, 3-3 (identifying total
emissions of NOx and VOCs by decade). During the same period, VOC emissions decreased by
almost 58 percent. Id
150. See id. at tbl. 3-3. As discussed above, an interesting trend is that NOx emissions over
this thirty year period have actually increased slightly, while VOC emissions have dropped
significantly. Id. (noting that 1970 NOx production was 20,928,000 tons as compared to
24,450,000 tons in 1998 and 1970 VOC production was 30,982,000 as compared to 17,920,000
tons in 1998).
151. See OFFICE OF AIR & RADIATION, EPA, NATIONAL AIR QUALITY & EMISSIONS TRENDS

REPORT 1999, at 30 (2001) [hereinafter EPA, 1999 AIR QUALITY REPORT] (noting that EPA uses
"the composite mean of the annual second-highest daily maximum 1-hour ozone concentration"
as the statistic to evaluate trends in one-hour ozone standard compliance and "the annual
fourth-highest 8-hour daily maximum ozone concentration" as the statistic to evaluate trends in
eight-hour standard compliance), http://www.epa.gov/air/aqtrnd99/toc.html. The report concludes
that the data must be interpreted with caution given changes in monitoring techniques over the
1980-1999 period, but it concludes that although one-hour ozone levels improved by 20 percent
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gains largely were accomplished before the 1990s, however. The onehour ozone levels demonstrated only modest improvement in the 19901999 period, and the eight-hour ozone levels did not improve. 15 2 An
analysis by geographic region demonstrates that although ozone levels
decreased in all regions of the country when the 1980-1999 period is
examined in the aggregate, over the last decade of that period (19901999), both one-hour and eight-hour ozone levels increased in the
Southeast, Mid-Atlantic, Midwest, and North Central regions.
Similarly, the eight-hour ozone concentrations in rural areas
increased nationwide, and concentrations in twenty-five national
153
parks increased by almost 8 percent during the 1990-1999 period.
The leveling off of ozone levels in recent years can be explained
in part by examining individuals as a source category. In particular,
the contribution of motor vehicles to low-level ozone demonstrates how
population growth, along with individuals' consumer product choices,
activity levels, and activity locations, has muted the environmental
On-road motor vehicles
effects of regulation in recent years.
contributed 35 percent of the NOx emissions and 42 percent of the
total VOC emissions in the United States in 1970. By 1998, on-road
motor vehicles contributed 33 percent of NOx emissions and 30
percent of VOC emissions. 154 The relatively stable percentage of total
NOx and VOC emissions contributed by on-road motor vehicles is the
result of the substantial reductions in per-vehicle tailpipe emissions
being offset by several factors. Shifts in consumer product choices
have occurred from smaller, less polluting vehicles to larger, more

over this period, they leveled off in the last decade, showing only a 4 percent decrease. Id,
National eight-hour ozone levels decreased 12 percent over the same 20-year period, but no
progress has been made over the last decade. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at ES-1, 29, 36 (identifying the increase in one-hour ozone levels in certain urban
and rural areas as a national trend "worth noting" and attributing the increases in one-hour and
eight-hour ozone levels to increases in NOx emissions and weather conditions favorable to ozone
formation). One-hour ozone levels decreased 15 percent between 1981 and 1994, and remained
between 0.10 ppm and 0.12 ppm from 1994 to 2000. See id. at 33.
154. EPA, 2000 AIR TRENDS REPORT, supra note 6, at 3-6 (reporting that VOC emissions from
on-road vehicles have declined by approximately 59 percent since 1970, and that NOx emissions
levels from on-road vehicles are slightly higher than they were in 1970 due to the more than
doubling in VMT during that period). The EPA also has concluded that in 1970 on road motor
vehicles contributed 35 percent of NOx emissions and 42 percent of VOC emissions. See id.EPA
data indicate that on-road motor vehicles contributed 32.7 percent of NOx emissions in 1998 and
30 percent of VOC emissions. See id.at tbls. 3-2, 3-3; see also EPA, NATIONAL AIR QUALITY AND
EMISSIONS

TRENDS

REPORT 16, 22,

30

(1997) (concluding that the transportation

sector

contributes a greater percentage of total NOx and carbon monoxide emissions, and a stable share
Note that in 1997 the
of VOC emissions), http://www.epa.gov/oar/aqtrnd97/brochure.
transportation sector overall accounted for approximately 76.6 percent of all carbon monoxide
emissions, 39.9 percent of VOC emissions and 49.2 percent of NOx emissions. Id.
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polluting pick-up trucks and SUVs. 155
In addition, increased
population levels, increased activity levels, and population dispersal
all have contributed to a more than doubling since 1970 of the number
of vehicles on the road and the vehicle miles traveled (VMT).156 Thus,
although per-vehicle tailpipe emissions have decreased by as much as
90 percent since 1970, VMT is doubling roughly every twenty years.1 57
The trends in VMT and per-vehicle tailpipe emissions are set forth in
158
Figure 1 below.
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155. For example, in the mid-1990s EPA estimated that SUVs release two-thirds more NOx
and VOCs on an annual basis than automobiles. See Oren, supra note 123, at 166 n.156
(comparing EPA, ANNUAL EMISSIONS AND FUEL CONSUMPTION FOR AN "AVERAGE" PASSENGER
CAR (1995) with EPA, ANNUAL EMISSIONS AND FUEL CONSUMPTION FOR AN "AVERAGE" LIGHT
TRUCK (1995)). The disparity between SUVs and automobiles will narrow after the Tier II
tailpipe standards are fully implemented in 2007, but SUVs and other heavier vehicles will
continue to have greater environmental effects than lighter passenger vehicles.
156. EPA, 2000 AIR TRENDS REPORT, supra note 6, at 3-6 (noting that VMT more than
doubled between 1970 and 2000). The stability in individuals' emissions relative to other sources
also is affected by the increasingly stringent emissions reduction requirements on industrial
point sources. See id.; see also OFFICE OF MOBILE SOURCES, EPA, AUTOMOBILE EMISSIONS: AN
OVERVIEW 1 (1994) [hereinafter EPA, AUTO EMISSIONS OVERVIEW], http://www.epa.gov/otaq/05autos.htm.
157. For a discussion of VMT trends, see EPA, 2000 AIR TRENDS REPORT, supra note 6, at 37; OFFICE OF MOBILE SOURCES, EPA, YOUR CAR AND CLEAN AIR: WHAT YOU CAN DO TO REDUCE
POLLUTION (EPA 400-F-93-002) 1 (1994), http://www.epa.gov/otaq/consumer/18-youdo.pdf. Clean
Air Act tailpipe standards for automobiles have required roughly 90 percent reductions in VOC
emissions, and 75 percent in NOx emissions. See Clean Air Act § 202(b)(1)(A)-(B), 42 U.S.C. §§
7521(b)(1)(A)-(B) (2000).
158. Figure 1 is reproduced from OFFICE OF MOBILE SOURCES, EPA, AUTOMOBILES AND
OZONE, FACT SHEET OMS-4 (1993), http://www.epa.gov/otaq/invntory/overview/vmt.htm.
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As a result of these trends, the reduction in the contribution of
automobiles to ozone precursor emissions has been modest, and EPA
has concluded that "in numerous cities across the country, the
personal automobile is the single greatest polluter, as emissions from
millions of vehicles on the road add up. '1 59
In sum, individuals play a major role in the production of ozone
precursors in the United States. Individuals contributed at least 30.6
percent of the total amount of ozone precursors produced in the United
States in 1998, and potentially more. 160 Yet although regulatory
measures in some cases have been directed at the manufacturers of
consumer products, they rarely have been directed at changing
individual behavior. Those that have been directed at individual
behavior have met with widespread resistance. Not surprisingly, a
large portion of the country continues to have air that does not meet
the NAAQS for ozone.
2. Mercury
EPA has identified mercury as a persistent, bioaccumulative
toxic (PBT) chemical. 161 PBT chemicals are of particular concern
159. See, e.g, EPA, AUTO EMISSIONS OVERVIEW, supra note 156, at 1, 4; see also OFFICE OF
MOBILE SOURCES, EPA, ENVIRONMENTAL FACT SHEET: TRANSPORTATION CONTROL MEASURES 2
(1997) (noting that "technology has reached a point where further refinements to emissions
controls would produce only minor reductions in emissions, and at large cost ....
If present
trends continue, the increase in vehicle emissions due to increases in the total number of vehicles
on the road, and the amount they are driven, will overwhelm the benefits gained from improved
emission controls on vehicles.").
160. Individuals also contribute to the production of ozone precursors through other
activities that were not included in the 30.6 percent estimate. The potential additional
contributions include the following: (1) household waste disposal; (2) consumer adhesive use; (3)
use of additional types of non-road motor vehicles, such as marine diesel vehicles and private
airplanes; (4) vehicle fires; (5) yard waste and backyard barrel burning; (6) residential wood
combustion; and (7) others. See, e.g., EPA, EMISSION INVENTORY IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM
DOCUMENT SERIES VOLUME III AREA SOURCES 2.2-1 (2001) (noting that residential wood
combustion generates NOx and hydrocarbons),
http://www.epa.gov/ttn/chief/eiip/techreport/
volume03.
161. Mercury is one of 16 PBT chemicals on the TRI list, and mercury compounds are one of
four PBT chemical categories. Persistent Bioaccumulative Toxic (PBT) Chemicals; Lowering of
Reporting Thresholds for Certain PBT Chemicals; Addition of Certain PBT Chemicals;
Community Right-to-Know Reporting, 64 Fed. Reg. 58,666 (Oct. 29, 1999) (codified at 40 C.F.R. §
372.65) [hereinafter EPA, PBT List] (adding PBT chemicals to the TRI list). Mercury also is one
of EPA's 30 Waste Minimization Priority Chemicals. EPA, WASTE MINIMIZATION PRIORITY
CHEMICALS & CHEMICAL FACT SHEETS [hereinafter EPA, WASTE MINIMIZATION LIST],
http://www.epa.gov/epaoswerlhazwaste/minimize/chemlist.htm (last modified Feb. 25, 2004). In
addition, "mercury compounds" are listed as hazardous air pollutants under Clean Air Act
Section 112(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1) (2000). EPA also has identified mercury as one of the 33
air toxics "that present the greatest threat to public health in the largest number of urban
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because they do not degrade quickly in the environment and
accumulate in the food chain. Human exposure to mercury may cause
acute and chronic health effects. Acute exposure at high levels results
in central nervous system effects such as tremors and slowed motor
nerve function. 162 Even at low levels, mercury exposure over long
periods of time can have several adverse effects, including central
nervous system disorders. 163 In recent years, elevated concentrations
of mercury have been detected in fresh and salt water fish, and 95
percent of all human exposure to mercury arises from fish
consumption. 164 In fact, California recently sued several restaurants
for failing to post warnings regarding the mercury concentrations in
several types of popular fish.165
a. Individual Contribution
For mercury and several other pollutants, sufficient data exist
to allow a comparison of individual contributions with the emissions
contributed by the large industrial facilities that are subject to TRI
reporting. 166 Table 2 provides a comparison of the releases of mercury
from individuals and households versus large industrial facilities.

areas." EPA, 2000 AIR TRENDS REPORT, supra note 6, at 7-2 & tbl. 7-1. Mercury and mercury
compounds also were included in the EPA 33/50 Program, a voluntary initiative announced in
1989 that selected 17 chemicals for voluntary industry reductions. OFFICE OF POLLUTION
PREVENTION & ToxIcs, EPA, 33/50 PROGRAM: THE FINAL RECORD 1 (1999) [hereinafter EPA,
33/50 PROGRAM], http://www.epa.gov/opptintr/3350/3350-fnl.pdf.
162. See OFFICE OF TRANSP. AND AIR QUALITY, EPA, TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT:
CONTROL OF EMISSIONS OF HAZARDOUS AIR POLLUTANTS FROM MOTOR VEHICLES AND MOTOR
VEHICLES FUELS 69 (2000) [hereinafter EPA, CONTROL OF MOBILE SOURCE HAPS] (noting that

inhaling high-levels of mercury also can result in kidney damage), http://www.epa.gov/otaq/regs/
toxics/r00O23.pdf.
163. Id.
164. MARQUITA K. HILL, UNDERSTANDING ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION 217 (1997).

165. See, e.g., California v. Bennigans, et al., No. bc293749 (Cal. Super Ct. filed Apr. 10,
2003); see also Pat Phibbs, Mercury: California Says Restaurants Failed to Warn Customers
About High Levels, DAILY ENV'T REP. (BNA), A-8 (Apr. 14, 2003).
166. For some substances, sources other than individuals and large industrial facilities are
responsible for substantial quantities of overall emissions as well. For example, for some air
pollutants, "area sources," consisting in large part of small businesses (such as dry cleaners and
auto repair shops) may emit small amounts of toxics per business, but large amounts in the
aggregate. The emissions from these types of sources are often not quantified, however, and with
several exceptions are not included in the comparisons. See EPA, 2000 AIR TRENDS REPORT,
supra note 6, at 7-1, 7-4 (noting that "smaller area sources" of air toxics include sources "such as
neighborhood dry cleaners" and that an "area source" of air toxics is "any stationary source ...
that does not qualify as a major source" under Clean Air Act Section 112(a)). EPA has read
"smaller area sources" to mean "smaller industrial sources," however. National Air Toxics
Program: The Integrated Urban Strategy, 64 FED. REG. 38,706 (July 19,1999) [hereinafter EPA,
Urban Air Toxics Strategy] (describing the strategy required by Clean Air Act Section 112(c)(3)
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Table 2:
Sources of Mercury (in pounds)

Large

Individual

Emissions
Tv e

Individual
Amount

Industries
Amount

Combined Percentage
Total
of Total

Air
Wastewater

33,538
1,749

117,743
1,805

151,281
3,554

22%
49%

Land

20000

228,283

248,283

8%

55,287

347,831

404,118

14%

Total

The relative contributions of individuals and large industrial
sources to mercury releases are difficult to establish because mercury
is released in many ways to air, water, and land, and estimates of
mercury releases vary widely. 167 Nevertheless, the contributions of
individuals from several types of activities can be quantified and
compared to the releases from large industrial facilities. As with
ozone, one individual activity that releases mercury is the residential
use of electricity that is generated by fossil fuel-fired electric utilities.
Coal-fired utilities are a primary source of air emissions of mercury in

and (k) as "including 30 [hazardous air pollutants] specifically identified as being emitted from
smaller industrial sources known as 'area sources' ").
167. See, e.g., EPA, MERCURY STUDY REPORT TO CONGRESS VOL. II: AN INVENTORY OF
ANTHROPOGENIC MERCURY EMISSIONS IN THE UNITED STATES ES-6 (1997) [hereinafter EPA,
1997 MERCURY REPORT] (estimating that during the 1994-1995 period annual mercury emissions
were 158 tons or 316,000 pounds, including 141 tons or 282,000 pounds from "point sources," a
category that includes large industrial facilities as well as other sources); OFFICE OF ENVTL.
INFO., EPA, 2001 TOXICS RELEASE INVENTORY PUBLIC DATA RELEASE REPORT tbl. 3-34 (1996)
[hereinafter EPA, 2001 TRI PUBLIC DATA RELEASE] (indicating that in 2001 all large industrial
facilities reported releasing 150,463 pounds of mercury). The mercury-emitting facilities that are
subject to TRI reporting changed significantly for the 1998 reporting year with the addition of
electric utilities and mining. See Addition of Facilities in Certain Industry Sectors; Revised
Interpretation of Otherwise Use; Toxic Release Inventory Reporting; Community Right-to-Know,
62 Fed. Reg. 23,834 (May 1, 1997). For example, metal mining contributed roughly 88 percent
and electric utilities contributed roughly 3 percent of all TRI-reported on-site and off-site
releases of mercury and mercury compounds in 2001. EPA, 2001 TRI PUBLIC DATA RELEASE,
supra, at 3-54, 3-57. Thus, prior to the addition of utilities and mining to the TRI database, TRI
emissions accounted for a small percentage of the overall mercury air emissions. OFFICE OF
ENVTL. INFO., EPA, TRI EXPLORER DATABASE (1996) [hereinafter EPA, 1996 TRI EXPLORER
DATABASE] (noting that the air releases from TRI facilities totaled approximately 8.6 tons of
mercury and mercury compounds in 1996); see also EPA, CONTROL OF MOBILE SOURCE HAPs,
supra note 162, at tbl. IV.A-1 (identifying mercury emissions from mobile sources).
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the United States,1 68 and approximately 35.7 percent of all electricity
generated from electric utilities is for residential use.' 69 As a result, if
the residential share of all electricity consumption is the same as the
residential share of all electricity generated by fossil fuel-fired units,
in 2001 individuals accounted for 32,538 pounds of the total mercury
170
released by utilities to the air.
Individuals also release mercury from the use of mobile
sources. 171 Although cars, light-duty trucks, and on-road motorcycles
do not contribute measurable amounts of mercury, mercury emissions
do occur from the two-stroke and four-stroke gasoline engines of nonroad motor vehicles. 172 Individuals contributed approximately 1,000
pounds of mercury through the use of these mobile sources. 73 When
added to the 32,720 pounds generated from electric utility use, the
resulting 33,538 pound total 174 is 22 percent of the combined total
releases to air by individuals and all large industrial facilities. 75
168. See EPA, 1997 MERCURY REPORT, supra note 167, at ES-10 (noting that coal-fired
utilities released roughly 33 percent of all anthropogenic mercury air emissions in the 1994-1995
period); Barry J. Goehler, Control ofMercury Emissions from Coal-FiredElectric Power Plants,
9 ENVTL. LAW. 119, 136 (1996) (noting that mercury air emissions from coal-fired electric utilities
in 1994 were 51.34 tons).
169. See sources cited supra note 118. In addition to coal, fossil fuel-fired utilities may burn
oil or natural gas.
170. EPA, 2001 TRI PUBLIC DATA RELEASE, supra note 167, at tbl. 3-41 (indicating that in
2001, the mercury air emissions from large industrial sources were 150,463 pounds, and that
electric utilities contributed 91,144 pounds of that amount).
171. Mobile sources as a whole only contributed 6.8 tons of mercury air emissions in 1996, or
4.2 percent of all air emissions of mercury in that year. OFFICE OF TRANSP. & AIR QUALITY, EPA,
THE PROJECTION OF MOBILE SOURCE AIR TOXICS FROM 1996 TO 2007: EMISSIONS AND
CONCENTRATIONS fig. 2 (2001)
[hereinafter
EPA, MOBILE SOURCE PROJECTION],
http://www.epa.gov/otaq/regs/toxics/rOlO38.pd, EPA, 2001 TRI PUBLIC DATA RELEASE, supra
note 167, at tbl. 3-46 (noting that in 2001, electric utilities reported 148,394 pounds (74.2 tons) of
mercury released both on-site and off-site, of which 91,144 pounds (45.4 tons) were released into
the air).
172. EPA, MOBILE SOURCE PROJECTION, supra note 171, at tbl. 6.
173. In 1996, individuals contributed 1,000 pounds of mercury from all mobile sources. Id. As
discussed below, individuals also contribute to mercury air emissions when mercury vapors are
released from fluorescent and certain other bulbs (e.g., if they are broken during use or when
they are discarded). Although the total quantity of mercury released to the air from all
fluorescent bulbs has been estimated to be 8,800 pounds per year, the share attributable to
individuals is unclear and this source was not included in the total. See EPA, 1997 MERCURY
REPORT, supra note 167, at fig. 3-1 (estimating 4.0 megagrams or metric tons per year released
to air from mercury in discarded lamps). A metric ton can be converted to a U.S. short ton by
multiplying by 1.1023. See EPA, 2000 AIR TRENDS REPORT, slupra note 6, at 1-4. Thus, a total of
4.4 U.S. short tons or 8,800 pounds were released to the air through lamp breakage.
174. The 0.5 ton figure is 0.3 percent of the total national mercury air emissions and 6
percent of the total releases reported in 1996 by all TRI facilities. EPA, MOBILE SOURCE
PROJECTION, supra note 171, at tbls. 6, 9. The individual contribution to mercury air emissions
from mobile sources is comprised solely of the emissions from gasoline powered 2-stroke and 4stroke engines of non-road motor vehicles. Id. at 25. Individuals were assumed to be responsible
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In addition, a rough estimate of the releases of mercury to
wastewater can be derived from the data in several reports. 176
According to a study conducted by the Association of Metropolitan
Sewerage Agencies (AMSA), the concentration of mercury in domestic
177
wastewater is 138 nanograms (ng) of mercury per liter (L) of water.
Remarkably, common household products and toiletries make up
approximately 15 percent of the total mercury found in domestic
wastewater. 178 Household products that may include trace amounts of
mercury include shaving cream, deodorants, soap, shampoo,
toothpaste, mouthwash, detergents, soft drinks, and some foods. 179
Based on an average water flow, the AMSA study suggests that an
average household contributes 20.6 ng/L of mercury in wastewater,

for all of these emissions because this category only includes lawn and garden equipment,
recreational marine equipment, all-terrain vehicles, off-highway motorcycles, and snowmobiles.
175. The 22 percent figure was arrived at by dividing the 33,538 pound total attributable to
individuals by 151,281 pounds. The 151,281 pound figure is the sum of the 117,743 pound total
air release figure from industry that is not attributable to individuals and the 33,538 pounds
that are attributable to individuals.
176. AMSA conducted the study to evaluate the contribution of domestic sources to mercury
contamination of wastewater. AMSA, DOMESTIC SOURCES OF MERCURY, supra note 99, at 7.
177. Id. at 3. A nanogram (ng) is a billionth of a gram.
178. Id. at 7. The source of the remaining 85 percent is unclear according to the AMSA
report, although the report concludes that mercury present in human waste may constitute as
much as 83 percent of the total quantity of mercury in domestic wastewater. Id. at 10-11. The
sources of the mercury in human waste in large part may arise from mercury in dental fillings.
Id. at 11. Silver dental amalgams include up to 50 percent mercury, and although they can be
placed on teeth, if removed they must be treated as a toxic substance. See Byron Swift, A Better,
Cheaper Way to Regulate Mercury, 29 ENVTL. REP. 1721, 1725 (1999). In addition, the AMSA
report notes that improper disposal of thermometers may contribute as much as an average of
six grams per day of mercury to domestic wastewater. AMSA, DOMESTIC SOURCES OF MERCURY,
supra note 99, at 12 (citing a study that estimated that on an annual basis approximately 1.6
percent of all households discarded a thermometer to the sewer and that each thermometer
released 0.5 grams of mercury). Other contributions identified in the AMSA study include
infiltration and inflow into the sewer system, mercury used in religious rituals and folk
medicine, and the use of thimerisol, a preservative, in some vaccines. Id. at 12-13.
179. For example, the AMSA study evaluated various products and found that mercury
concentrations in soap and shampoo ranged from 835 ng/L to 25,000 ng/L, shaving cream ranged
from 90 ng/L to 670 ng/L, soft drinks and drink mixes ranged from 25 ng/L to 6,070 ng/L, food
coloring ranged from 96 ng/L to 137,000 ng/L, and fruits and vegetables ranged from 116 ng/L to
874 ng/L. AMSA, DOMESTIC SOURCES OF MERCURY, supra note 99, at 7. The AMSA Study
concluded that household and toiletry items "were found to contain substantial concentrations of
mercury," but that "the feasibility of controlling these sources would require a national effort."
Id. at 13. Overall, the study concluded that "domestic waste contributes appreciable
concentrations of mercury to POTW influent waste streams and must be considered when
addressing mercury control strategies and the likelihood of virtual elimination of mercury.
Background mercury concentrations averaging more than 100 ng/L can be expected in POTW
wastewater influents, even if complete elimination of industrial point source discharges is
accomplished." Id. at 14.
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which amounts to 0.075 grams of mercury annually.1 80 Although this
is a minute amount, when the total is multiplied by the number of
households in the country, the total quantity released annually to
wastewater from all households in the United States is 1,749
pounds.18 1 In comparison, the total quantity released to surface water
from all large industrial facilities in 2001 was 1,805 pounds.18 2 The
quantity of mercury released to water by households thus is roughly
equivalent to the quantity released to surface water from all large
industrial facilities.
Individuals also release substantial quantities of mercury to
land. Household product use contributes to mercury concentrations in
landfills and other areas (e.g., through roadside and other dumping).
Individuals release mercury through the disposal of batteries,
fluorescent lighting, thermometers, discarded electrical equipment,
thermostats, and other household products.1 8 3 The amount of mercury
in household batteries has declined significantly in recent years, but
one projection in the mid-1990s estimated that at least 198,000
pounds of mercury would still be released annually as of 2000.184 In
180. AMSA, DOMESTIC SOURCES OF MERCURY, supra note 99, at 10. According to the AMSA
study, "average household flow" is 545,040 liters (144,000 gallons) per year. Id. When the
concentration of mercury in domestic wastewater (138 ng/L) is multiplied by the quantity of
wastewater generated per year (545,040 liters), a total quantity of mercury released per year per
household can be determined (0.075 grams).
181. To calculate the total quantity of mercury released to domestic wastewater, this profile
utilized the AMSA report figures (138 ng/L) for the domestic wastewater mercury concentration,
and household wastewater quantity (45,420 L/month or 545,040 Llyear). Id. at 3, 8. The 138 ng/L
was multiplied by 545,000 L/year of domestic wastewater to arrive at 75,215,520 nanograms.
The 75,215,520 nanograms figure was divided by 1,000,000,000 to arrive at .0752155 grams per
year. The .0752155 grams per year figure was then multiplied by 105,480,101 households to
arrive at 793,373.84 g/year released from all households. One pound includes approximately
453.6 grams. See WILLIAM L. MASTERTON & EMIL J. SLOWINSKI, CHEMICAL PRINCIPLES: USING
THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM OF UNITS 9 tbl. I (4th ed. 1977) (providing conversion tables). The
793,373.84 g/year figure divided by 453.6 grams per pound yields a total of 1749.1 pounds.
182. To compare the total releases of mercury to surface water from industry and the total in
wastewater from households, compare EPA, 2001 TRI PUBLIC DATA RELEASE, supra note 167, at
3-57, with AMSA, DOMESTIC SOURCES OF MERCURY, supra note 99, at 3, 7-10.
183. See EPA, 1997 MERCURY REPORT, supra note 167, at 4-18.
184. See HILL, ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION, supra note 164, at 215 tbl. 9.1. In addition, a
1992 study projected that although the mercury in consumer batteries would decline by the year
2000, consumer batteries would still comprise 56 percent of the total quantity of mercury in
municipal solid waste. David J. Hurd, Getting a Charge Out of the Waste Stream: The Status of
Consumer Battery Recovery, RESOURCE RECYCLING 42, 44 (1992). The current percentage of all
batteries containing mercury that are used by private individuals and the quantity of mercury
released through battery use and disposal are unclear. See, e.g., Jeremy Arling, Recycling &
Take-Back Opportunities for Batteries, With ParticularAttention to Household Alkaline
Batteries, 34 ENVTL. L. REP. 10347, 10359 (2004) (concluding that "[there is a severe lack of
public data regarding the composition of the battery market"). As of the late 1990s, however,
consumers used roughly four billion batteries per year, or roughly fifteen per individual in the
United States, and consumer batteries resulted in roughly 146,000 tons of waste per year. See
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addition, fluorescent bulbs in use in 2000 contained an estimated
82,000 pounds of mercury.18 5
The percentage of batteries and
fluorescent bulbs used and discarded by individuals, and the amount
of mercury in each battery and fluorescent bulb are unknown. As a
result, the quantity of mercury attributable to the disposal of batteries
and fluorescent bulbs by individuals and households is not possible
based on the available data. Even if only 5 percent of the mercury
from the projected 2000 battery disposal nationwide is attributed to
individuals (approximately 10,000 pounds), however, and a small
amount from fluorescent bulbs, thermometers and other consumer
products (10,000 pounds), then the individual total released to land is
20,000 pounds, as compared to a total of 228,283 pounds released to
off-site disposal by all large industrial facilities combined in 2001.186
b. Regulatory Response
Although mercury emissions from many large industrial
sources to air, water, and land are regulated, few restrictions have
been placed on individual behavior relating to mercury. For example,
an individual who disposes of mercury on the ground or in household
waste might be subject, at least in theory, to the federal statutes
governing the disposal of hazardous wastes (the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act)187 or the release of hazardous
Gary A. Davis, Catherine A. Wilt, Patricia S. Dillon & Bette K. Fishbein, Extended Product
Responsibility: A New Principle for Product-Oriented Pollution Prevention 6-5 (1997)
(unpublished report on file with the author). At the same time, the amount of mercury in
batteries has declined substantially, and the total quantity released from consumer battery use
and disposal may now be far less than the 198,000 pound estimate, which is based on a
projection published in 1997. In particular, the Mercury-Containing and Rechargeable Battery
Management Act, Pub. L. No. 104-142, became effective in 1996 and sharply restricts the
amount of mercury in batteries. See Swift, supra note 178, at 1724. According to EPA, as of the
late 1990s lead-acid batteries (e.g., automotive batteries) were the principal remaining batteries
used by private individuals with mercury levels of significant concern. EPA, 1997 MERCURY
REPORT, supra note 167, at 4-18.
185. HILL, supra note 164, at 219.
186. EPA, 2001 TRI PUBLIC DATA RELEASE 2001, supra note 167, at 3-57, tbl. 3-41.
187. The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) is silent on whether household
hazardous wastes are subject to regulation. To be a hazardous waste, a substance must first be a
solid waste. See RCRA Section 1004(5), (27), 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5), (27) (2000). The RCRA
definitions of solid waste and hazardous waste make no reference to household waste, id., but
EPA excluded household hazardous wastes from RCRA regulation in 1980. The regulatory
language states as follows: "(b) Solid wastes which are not hazardous wastes. The following solid
wastes are not hazardous wastes: (1) Household waste.. . . 'Household waste' means any
material (including garbage, trash, and sanitary wastes in septic tanks) derived from households
(including single and multiple residences ..
)". Hazardous Waste Management System:
Identification and Listing of Hazardous Waste, 45 Fed. Reg. 33,084, 33,120 (Nov. 13, 1980)
(emphasis in original) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 261.4(b)(1)) [hereinafter EPA, 1980 Household
Waste Exclusion]. EPA noted that this exclusion was not of a category of regulated entities, but
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substances
(the
Comprehensive
Environmental
Response,
Compensation and Liability Act or Superfund),188 but in practice the
behavior of private individuals has not been regulated under either
statute. 8 9
Similarly, many states and localities have imposed
rather a specific type of waste. Id. at 33,099. In excluding household hazardous wastes, the
Agency relied on the following statement from the RCRA legislative history: "[The hazardous
waste program] is not to be used to control the disposal of substances used in households or to
extend control over general municipal wastes based on the presence of such substances." Id.
(quoting S. Rep. No. 94-988, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess., at 16). EPA also stated that it "believes that
medicinal drugs and ointments, household cleaning agents and solvents, waste oils, paints and
pesticides purchased at grocery, drug, or hardware stores may be disposed of as part of a
consumer's household waste." Id. EPA expanded the exclusion in 1984 to include wastes from
campgrounds, picnic grounds and similar areas. Hazardous Waste Management System;
Identification and Listing of Hazardous Waste; Final Rule and Denial of Rulemaking Petition, 49
Fed. Reg. 44,978 (Nov. 13, 1984) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 261.4(b)(1)). According to EPA, the
household waste exclusion is limited by two criteria. First, the waste "must be generated by
individuals on the premises of a temporary or permanent residence." Id. Second, the "waste
stream must be composed primarily of materials found in the wastes generated by consumers in
their homes." Id. Congress amended RCRA in 1984 and did not add language addressing
hazardous wastes from individuals. See Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub.
L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221 (codified at scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
188. At least in theory, private individuals can be held liable under any of four categories
under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA):
owners and operators of a facility, former owners and operators, generators of hazardous
substances, and transporters of hazardous substances. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). For example, as
to generators, CERCLA states that "any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise
arranged for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person"
may be liable. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3). CERCLA defines a person as "an individual, firm,
corporation, association .
I..."
-d. § 9601(21). In the Small Business Liability Relief and
Brownfields Revitalization Act (SBLRBRA) Congress exempted residential property owners who
generate municipal solid waste from CERCLA liability. Small Business Liability Relief and
Brownfields Revitalization Act, Pub. L. 107-118, §§ 102, 221, 222, 115 Stat. 2356 (Jan. 11, 2002)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 107(p)(1)(a)).
189. As discussed above, although RCRA does not include an express exclusion for household
hazardous waste, the RCRA regulations do exclude hazardous wastes generated by homeowners.
See discussion supra note 187. Perhaps as a result, although more than seventy judicial
decisions have cited the provision stating that the EPA Administrator may assess a civil penalty
against any person, the defendant in nearly all these decisions has been a business or
government agency, or an individual acting as an employee or owner of one of these
organizations. See, e.g., United States v. Charles George Trucking, Inc., 34 F.3d 1081 (1st Cir.
1994); W.R. Grace & Co. v. EPA, 959 F.2d 360 (1st Cir. 1992). The few cases in which private
individuals have been a party generally have involved citizen suits brought against businesses
and have not been cases in which private individuals are alleged to have violated RCRA. See,
e.g., Potter v. Asarco Inc., No. 8:96CV555, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15763 (D. Neb. June 29, 1999);
Davis v. Sun Oil Co., 953 F. Supp. 890 (S.D. Ohio 1996). As to CERCLA, prior to the SBLRBRA
discussed above, a strict reading of the statute would have included private individuals in the
categories of parties liable for response costs. EPA generally has not attempted, however, to
impose CERCLA liability on individuals acting in a private capacity. See, e.g., OFFICE OF
ENFORCEMENT & COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE, EPA, ANNUAL REPORT ON ENFORCEMENT AND
COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN 1999 (2000) [hereinafter EPA, 1999
ENFORCEMENT ACCOMPLISHMENTS REPORT]. On rare occasions prior to the enactment of the
SBLRBRA, private litigants sought to impose response costs on homeowners, see, e.g., B.F.
Goodrich v. Murtha, 840 F. Supp. 180 (D. Conn. 1993) (declining to grant a motion for summary
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restrictions on the use of mercury by manufacturers in some consumer
products and on the disposal of certain household hazardous wastes,
but only rarely, if ever, have these provisions been enforced against
private individuals. 190 Instead, many local governments have had
more success by combining these restrictions with voluntary collection
stations for mercury-containing products and other household
hazardous wastes, and by implementing public information campaigns
regarding household hazardous waste disposal. 191
3. Air Toxics from Mobile Sources
EPA evaluates the releases of air toxics from two major
categories of mobile sources: on-road vehicles (e.g., cars, trucks, and
motorcycles) and non-road vehicles (e.g., recreational vehicles,
construction equipment, and aircraft).192 This section focuses on
individuals' contributions from mobile sources to emissions of three

judgment against homeowners who disposed of municipal solid waste), but the SBLRBRA
appears to foreclose most actions of this type in the future.
190. For a summary of state laws restricting the use of mercury in consumer products, see
EPA, PRODUCT STEWARDSHIP: MERCURY IN PRODUCTS: STATE/LOCAL INITIATIVES (2002),
http://www.epa.gov/epaoswer/non-hw/reduce/epr/products/mstate.html;
see also 42 U.S.C. §§
6942-43 (authorizing states to implement solid waste management plans upon EPA approval).
Using this authority, many states have increased fees for landfill disposal and banned disposal of
specific items. Increased disposal fees create an incentive to reduce the quantity of waste sent to
landfills, but this incentive is "at best indirect, affecting municipalities rather than individuals."
Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and EnvironmentalRegulation: A Public Choice Analysis, 115
HARV. L. REV. 553, 610 (2001). In contrast, disposal bans directly affect individuals by
prohibiting the disposal of specific items with the rest of their household trash. These bans have
become more common during the 1990s. For example, according to a 1992 survey, 33 out of 37
states had disposal bans on vehicle batteries, 22 on tires, and 12 on oil. Jim Glenn, The State of
Garbage in America, BIOCYCLE, May 1992, at 30, 33 tbl. 5. According to a 2000 survey, 32 out of
40 states had disposal bans on vehicle batteries, 30 on tires, and 19 on oil. Nora Goldstein &
Celeste Madtes, The State of Garbagein America, BIOCYCLE, Nov. 2000, at 40, 48 tbl. 5. Other
items banned include specific types of batteries (other than car batteries), antifreeze, and
products containing mercury. To enable consumers to dispose of these products, some states
require manufacturers to take them back and then dispose of them. Glenn, supra, at 32.
191. Many state and local governments provide educational information and try to make
disposal convenient to encourage residents to manage their hazardous waste disposal. See, e.g.,
Cal. Integrated Waste Mgmt. Bd., Household Hazardous Waste, at http://www.ciwmb.ca.gov/hhw
(last modified Apr. 16, 2004); Tenn. Dep't of Env't & Conservation, Household Hazardous Waste
Program http://www.state.tn.us/environmentldca/hhw (last visited May 10, 2004). Larger cities
often have permanent recycling centers that accept hazardous household wastes for no charge.
Smaller cities and rural areas often have a designated collection day on which products are
accepted at a specified location for no charge. Some programs offer free pick-up of hazardous
materials to farmers who may have difficulty transporting large quantities to a collection center.
See DIV. OF CMTY. ASSISTANCE, TENN. DEP'T OF ENV'T & CONSERVATION, GOT USED OIL?, THE
P2ALERT 1 (2002), http://www.state.tn.us/environment/dca/pdf/P2Alertsummer2.pdf.
192. See generally EPA, CONTROL OF MOBILE SOURCE HAPS, supra note 162 (identifying
vehicle types included in the on-road and non-road categories).
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substances that are TRI-listed toxic chemicals and are also classified
by EPA as Clean Air Act hazardous air pollutants: acetaldehyde,
benzene, and formaldehyde. 193
The effects of these and other
hazardous air pollutants on human health and the environment are
difficult to assess, but these three chemicals (as well as mercury) are
among the thirty-three chemicals that EPA has concluded present "the
greatest threat to public health in the largest number of urban
areas."1 94 Overall, EPA has estimated that mobile sources (including
all on-road and non-road vehicles, not just those operated by private
individuals) are responsible for roughly half of the cancer deaths
caused each year by hazardous air pollutants. 195 According to one
study, air toxics released from mobile sources (including benzene,
formaldehyde, and others) are the largest contributor to the total
carcinogenic risk in the Los Angeles area. 196 In addition, some results
suggest that living near high-traffic roadways is a risk factor in
childhood cancer and childhood leukemia, perhaps due to benzene
tailpipe emissions. 97 Furthermore, children living in central urban
areas have 71 percent higher blood benzene levels than those in more
rural areas. 98 Toxics from motor vehicles also may affect occupants of
other vehicles on the road. Measured levels of some air pollutants

193. In addition to the three profiled toxic chemicals, other TRI-listed toxic chemicals such as
acrolein and 1,2-butadiene also are released by individuals' motor vehicle use in larger quantities
than by all industrial facilities. See OFFICE OF ENVTL. INFO., EPA, TRI EXPLORER DATABASE
(2001) [hereinafter EPA, 2001 TRI EXPLORER DATABASE], http://www.epa.gov/triexplorer
chemical.htm; EPA, CONTROL OF MOBILE SOURCE HAPS, supra note 162, at tbl. IV.A-1.
194. See EPA, 2000 AIR TRENDS REPORT, supra note 6, at 7-5, tbl. 7-2 (discussing the
Integrated Urban Air Toxics Strategy under Clean Air Act § 112(c)(3), (k)); EPA, Urban Air
Toxics Strategy, 64 Fed. Reg. 38,706 (July 19, 1999). In recent litigation, plaintiffs attempting to
block highway construction have asserted that adverse health effects arise from living near
roadways. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. U.S. Dep't of Trans., 245 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1113 (D. Nev.
2003) (involving highway expansion in Las Vegas, Nevada).
195. See Oren, supra note 123, at 152 (citing Implementation and Enforcement of Clean Air
Act Amendments of 1990: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the
House Comm. on Commerce, 104th Cong. 209 (1995) (statement of Mary Nichols); H.R. REP. No.
101-490, pt. 1, at 152, 316 (1990)).
196. JACK BROADBENT ET AL., SOUTH COAST AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT DISTRICT FINAL
REPORT ON MATES-II PROGRAM 7.1 (2000) (on file with author).
197. Robert L. Pearson et al., Distance-Weighted Traffic Density in Proximity to a Home Is a
Risk Factorfor Leukemia and Other Childhood Cancers, 50 J. AIR & WASTE MGMT. ASS'N 175,
179 (2000); see also E.G. Knox & E.A. Gilman, Hazard Proximities of Childhood Cancers in
GreatBritainfrom 1953-80, 51 J. EPIDEMIOLOGY & COMMUNITY HEALTH 151, 156 (1997) (finding
an excess of childhood leukemia cases for children that lived within 4 kilometers of a motorway
and a significant deficit beyond 4 kilometers).
198. E. Jermann et al., Belastung von Kndern durch Benzol and andere verkehrsbedingte
Immissionen [Exposure to Benzene, Toluene, Lead and Carbon Monoxide of Children Living in
Central Urban Area with High TrafFic Density], 189 ZBL. HYG. 50 (1989) (in Dutch with an
abstract in English).
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inside automobiles have been shown to exceed ambient levels. 199 Of
course, motor vehicle emissions also include particulate matter, ozone
precursors, and other substances. Identifying which of these
substances, if any, causes specific health or environmental effects is a
daunting task.
a. Individual Contribution
Through the use of motor vehicles, individuals account for a
remarkably large proportion of the releases of several toxic chemicals
to the air. 20 0 The individual contribution to acetaldehyde, benzene,
and formaldehyde can be identified from data on emissions from cars
and light trucks in the United States. 20 1
The figures likely
underestimate the individual share of these toxic releases because
they do not include other individual activities that may produce
emissions of these chemicals, such as consumer product use, fossil fuel
burning, and other burning. 20 2
The relative contributions of
individuals and large industrial sources of these three air toxics are
identified in Table 3.

199. See Charles Rodes et al., Measuring Concentrations of Selected Air Pollutants Inside
California Vehicles, Final Report, ARB Contract No. 95-339 (Dec. 1998) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/research/indoor/in-vehsm.htm.
200. See EPA, Air Trends: Toxic Air Pollutants (stating that transportation generates more
than 50 percent of all hazardous air pollutants), http://www.epa.gov/airtrends/toxic.html (last
modified May 4, 2004).
201. For non-road vehicles, all vehicles likely to be used exclusively or predominantly by
private individuals were included (e.g., lawn and garden equipment, recreational marine
engines, off-highway motorcycles, snowmobiles, and ATVs were included, but not locomotives
and airplanes). EPA, MOBILE SOURCE PROJECTION, supra note 171, at tbls. 5, 8. The individual
component of these emissions was calculated by adding the total amount of emissions from lightduty gas vehicles (cars) to light-duty gas trucks, on-road motorcycles, and non-road 2- and 4stroke gasoline engines. See discussion supra note 116. As with the ozone precursor calculations,
the car emissions were multiplied by 76.3 percent, the total percentage of car usage by
individuals, and the light-duty truck emissions were multiplied by 82.5 percent. See discussion
supra note 116. All of the emissions from highway motorcycles and non-road gasoline engines
were attributed to individuals.
202. See generally Lernieux, supra note 100 (identifying the air pollutants emitted from
burning household waste in barrels). Overall, motor vehicles accounted for 21 percent of the
emissions of all hazardous air pollutants in 1997. EPA, 2000 AIR TRENDS REPORT, supra note 6,
at 20, fig. 3-6 (reporting that on-road motor vehicles, off-road motor vehicles and "area/other"
sources contribute 75 percent of air toxics emissions, and that major industrial point sources
contribute 25 percent). Area sources (e.g., small businesses and some individual releases) thus
account for 54 percent of air toxics emissions. Id. The 21 percent figure attributed to motor
vehicles by EPA does not exclude motor vehicles operated for industrial or other businesses, thus
the 21 percent figure cannot be allocated entirely to individuals. See id.
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Table 3:

Sources ofAir Toxics (in tons)
Individual

Large
Industries

Combined

Individual
Percentage

Amount

Amount

Total

Of Total

Acetaldehyde

20,598

6,410

27,008

76.3%

Benzene
Formaldehyde
Total

203,751
54,489
278,838

4,092
5,765
16,267

207,843
60,254
295,105

98.0%
90.4%
94.5%

Emissions
Tp

i. Acetaldehyde
Acetaldehyde has been identified as a probable human
carcinogen, indicating that animal testing has shown that humans
could develop cancer from exposure to acetaldehyde.20 3 Acetaldehyde
is formed as a result of incomplete combustion of both gasoline and
diesel fuel, and therefore can be found in vehicle exhaust. 20 4
Individuals comprise a very large share of acetaldehyde emissions and
emitted 20,598 tons of acetaldehyde in 1996 from mobile sources
alone. 20 5 The 20,598 ton individual total dwarfs the quantity released
by large industrial facilities. The air emissions of acetaldehyde from
large industrial facilities were 6,410 tons in 1996 or 6.5 percent of the
total national emissions of acetaldehyde in that year. 20 6 Thus,
individuals' mobile source use alone, excluding releases from other
individual and household activities, released over three times more
acetaldehyde than the total released by all large industrial facilities.

203. EPA, Integrated Risk Information System [hereinafter EPA, IRIS DATABASE],
http://www.epa.gov/iris (last modified Dec. 22, 2003); EPA, CONTROL OF MOBILE SOURCE HAPs,
supra note 162, at 50. According to EPA, acetaldehyde may have both chronic and acute human
health effects. EPA, CONTROL OF MOBILE SOURCE HAPS, supra note 162, at 50. The acute effects
on human health include irritation of the eyes, skin, and respiratory tract. Id.
204. EPA, CONTROL OF MOBILE SOURCE HAPS, supra note 162, at 49. Mobile sources are the
primary cause of acetaldehyde emissions and comprise approximately 70 percent of all
acetaldehyde emitted in the United States in 1996. Id. at tbl. IV.A-1.
205. EPA, MOBILE SOURCE PROJECTION, supra note 167, at tbls. 5, 8. The total constitutes
20.7 percent of the total national emissions of acetaldehyde. Id.
206. See EPA, CONTROL OF MOBILE SOURCE HAPS, supra note 162, at tbl. IV.A-1. See
generally EPA, 1996 TRI EXPLORER DATABASE, supra note 167 (providing overall and sectorspecific data for all toxics reported under in the TRI database).
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ii. Benzene
207
Benzene has also been identified as a human carcinogen.
Benzene emissions are formed from both vehicle exhaust and
evaporative processes, as well as by the burning of coal and oil.208
Mobile sources are the primary cause of benzene air emissions. 20 9 As a
result, individuals comprise a very large proportion of benzene

emissions, releasing 203,751 tons of benzene in 1996.210 Total air

emissions of benzene nationwide by large industrial facilities were
4,092 tons in 1996.211 Individuals thus released, simply through motor

vehicle use, almost fifty times more benzene to air than all large
industrial facilities combined.
iii. Formaldehyde
Formaldehyde has been identified as a probable human
carcinogen. 212 It is formed from incomplete combustion of gasoline
and diesel fuel, and is also emitted from some building materials,
home furnishings, and other consumer products. 213 Mobile sources are
the primary cause of all air emissions of formaldehyde, and, as a
result, individuals comprise a very large source of formaldehyde
emissions. 214 Individuals emitted 54,489 tons of formaldehyde in 1996

207. See EPA, CONTROL OF MOBILE SOURCE HAPs, supra note 162, at 53. Also, several blood
diseases have been linked to continuous exposure to benzene. Id. (noting that pre-leukemia and
aplastic anemia have been linked to benzene exposure).
208. See EPA, IRIS DATABASE, supra note 203; EPA, CONTROL OF MOBILE SOURCE HAPS,
supra note 162, at 52, 53.
209. Mobile sources comprised approximately 76 percent of all benzene emitted in the United
States in 1996. EPA, CONTROL OF MOBILE SOURCE HAPS, supranote 162, at tbl. IV.A-1. Releases
of benzene to indoor air occur through environmental tobacco smoke, paint supplies, stored
gasoline, and the automobile emissions that occur in attached garages. OFFICE OF RADIATION &
INDOOR AIR, EPA, THE INSIDE STORY: A GUIDE TO INDOOR AIR QUALITY 13 (1995) [hereinafter
EPA, THE INSIDE STORY], http://www.epa.gov/iaq/pubs/insidest.html#Look7.
210. The 203,751 tons constituted 58.0 percent of the total national air emissions of benzene
in that year. EPA, MOBILE SOURCE PROJECTION, supranote 167, at tbls. 5, 8.
211. The 4,092 tons constituted only 1.2 percent of the total national amount of benzene
emitted in that year. EPA, 1996 TRI EXPLORER DATABASE, supra note 167; EPA, CONTROL OF
MOBILE SOURCE HAPS, supra note 162, at tbl. IV.A-1.
212. See EPA, CONTROL OF MOBILE SOURCE HAPS, supra note 162, at 62 (noting human
health effects of formaldehyde).
213. Id. at 61.
214. Mobile sources comprised roughly 49 percent of all formaldehyde emitted in 1996. Id. at
tbl. IV.A-1. Other individual activities that release formaldehyde include tobacco smoking and
the use of some household products, building materials, gas stoves, and kerosene space heaters.
EPA, THE INSIDE STORY, supra note 209, at 13.
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from mobile sources, 2 15 as compared to large industrial facilities,
whose formaldehyde air emissions were only 5,765 tons. 216 As with
the other air toxics, the individual share thus is far larger than that of
all large industrial facilities combined.
b. Regulatory Response
EPA has regulated toxic air emissions from mobile sources
principally through tailpipe emissions standards imposed on motor
vehicle manufacturers. As discussed in connection with the ozone
profile, pursuant to the 1990 CAA Amendments, EPA has adopted
new Tier II motor vehicle emissions standards that will be phased in
over the 2005-2007 time period. As a result, the projections for all of
these toxics improve when looking at the data for 2007. Nevertheless,
mobile source emissions from individuals will remain a substantial
proportion of the total. After the new Tier II mobile emissions
standards are fully in place in 2007 for new motor vehicles, the
quantity of emissions of the three toxics from mobile sources is
expected to decrease by roughly one-third. 217 Reductions will occur in
acetaldehyde, 2 18 benzene, 219 and formaldehyde 220 emissions, but again
activity levels will be important: increases in the number of vehicles
and the VMT per vehicle will undercut much of the gains from the
215. The 54,489 tons constituted 15.8 percent of the total national air emissions of
formaldehyde in that year. EPA, MOBILE SOURCE PROJECTION, supranote 167, at tbls. 5, 8.
216. The 5,765 tons constituted 1.6 percent of the total national air emissions of
formaldehyde in that year. EPA, 1996 TRI EXPLORER DATABASE, supra note 167; EPA, CONTROL
OF MOBILE SOURCE HAPS, supra note 162, at tbl. IV.A-1.
217. See EPA, MOBILE SOURCE PROJECTION, supra note 167, at tbls. 4, 5. Older vehicles will
not be subject to the new standards, but will comprise a declining proportion of the inventory of
all vehicles on the road over time. Id. The Tier II standards are not designed to reduce hazardous
air pollutants but will have that effect. Id. at 3
218. After the Tier II standards have been phased in 2007, the volume of acetaldehyde
emitted from mobile sources is expected to decrease to 41,539 tons, a 40 percent reduction from
1996. See EPA, MOBILE SOURCE PROJECTION, supra note 167, at tbl. 4. Nevertheless, individuals
will still contribute a large share of all emissions. In 2007, individuals are expected to emit
10,090 tons of acetaldehyde from mobile sources alone, or 24 percent of acetaldehyde emissions
from all mobile sources in the United States. Id. at tbls. 5, 8. This 10,090 figure is almost twice
the 1996 releases to air from all TRI facilities. EPA, 1996 TRI EXPLORER DATABASE, supra note
167.

219. In 2007, the volume of benzene emitted from mobile sources is expected to decline to
147,060 tons, a decrease of 43 percent from 1996. EPA, MOBILE SOURCE PROJECTION, supra note
167, at tbl. 4. In 2007, individuals are expected to emit 116,279 tons of benzene from mobile
sources alone, or 79 percent of benzene emissions from all mobile sources in the United States.
Id. at tbls. 5, 8.
220. In 2007, the volume of formaldehyde emitted from mobile sources is expected to decline
to 96,201 tons, a decrease of 44 percent from 1996. Id. at tbl. 4. In 2007, individuals are expected
to emit 58,882.8 tons of formaldehyde from mobile sources alone, or 61 percent of formaldehyde
emissions from all mobile sources in the United States. Id. at tbls. 5, 8.
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Tier II tailpipe reductions imposed on auto manufacturers. As a
result, even after these reductions, individuals will remain a far larger
source of each of these chemicals than all large industrial facilities
combined.
4. Pesticides
Several pesticides are among EPA's 30 Waste Minimization
Priority Chemicals, a list that was developed through an intra-agency
analysis to identify the most important PBT substances. 221 No
comprehensive assessment has been conducted of the human health
and environmental impacts of individual and household pesticide use,
but a variety of sources give some indication of the potential
quantities released and their environmental effects. In addition to
contributing to low-level ozone as discussed above, household pesticide
use can have effects through human or animal exposure in the yard or
home, and can contaminate the surface water and ground water. This
profile will examine the presence of household pesticides in urban
runoff and indoor air.
Household pesticide and fertilizer use has been shown to lead
to the presence of toxics in urban and suburban runoff. 222 Pesticides
in runoff may be discharged either directly to storm sewers, which
typically flow untreated to rivers, lakes, and streams, or may be
washed directly into the receiving waters. Activity location is an
important factor in two ways. Proper application of pesticides away
from impervious surfaces may lead to lower concentrations in urban
runoff than applications that leave pesticides on or near sidewalks,
driveways or streets. In addition, the residential patterns of the
individuals using the pesticides matter. Urban and suburban runoff
arises in part because surfaces that might absorb polluted rainwater
are often paved or otherwise become impervious in developed areas.
For example, studies have estimated that in areas of medium density
single family homes, anywhere from 25 percent to 60 percent of the
221. EPA, WASTE MINIMIZATION LIST, supra note 161, at 1. In addition, several pesticides
are on the TRI list of toxic chemicals and have been classified by EPA as PBT chemicals. EPA,
PBT List, 64 Fed. Reg. 58,666 (Oct. 29, 1999). The human health and environmental effects of
household pesticide and fertilizer use are the subject of debate in the mass media. See, e.g.,
Thom Patterson, Does Green Grass Come with Health Risks CNN.COMHEALTH (July 17, 2002)
(suggesting that "[plediatricians say it is not uncommon for children to get sick after being
exposed to lawns recently sprayed with anti-insect chemicals" but also quoting a horticulture
professor for the proposition that "tihere shouldn't be a problem if consumers follow the
directions on the container. Most lawn chemical products are as safe as or safer than many
chemicals we use daily inside our homes."), http://www.cnn.com/2002/HEALTH/07/12/lawn.
chemicals/index.html.
222. See EPA, 2000 WATER QUALITY REPORT, supra note 6, at 52.
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surfaces are impervious. 223 Population dispersal, such as occurs with
suburban sprawl, thus may exacerbate runoff problems by increasing
the amount of impervious surfaces.
The impacts of household pesticides in runoff can be assessed
in several ways. Studies have concluded that urban runoff has
significant adverse effects on the flora and fauna of urban and
suburban water bodies. 224 EPA has concluded that urban runoff is
among the leading causes of impaired water quality across all types of
water bodies in the United States, and it is the leading cause of
impaired water quality in estuaries. 225 According to EPA, urban runoff
and storm sewers are a pollution source for 45 percent of impaired
estuaries in the country. 226 As with other areas of individual
environmentally significant behavior, government agencies do not
collect or report data on individuals and households as a source
category, so the extent to which household pesticide use is a cause of
water bodies not meeting water quality standards is unclear. The
relative usage rates of pesticides by households, discussed below,
suggests, however, that the quantities released are substantial. In
addition, the EPA Nationwide Urban Runoff Program did not detect
significant differences in pollutant concentrations between the urban
runoff from residential, commercial, and mixed urban areas. 227 A
further indication of the contribution of household pesticide and
fertilizer use to impaired water bodies is a model of Chesapeake Bay
water quality, which suggests that polluted urban runoff is at least as

223. Thomas R. Schueler, The Importance of Imperviousness, 1 WATERSHED PROTECTION
TECH. 3 (1994), cited in National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System-Regulations for
Revision of the Water Pollution Control Program Addressing Storm Water Discharges, 64 Fed.
Reg. 68,722, 68,725 (Dec. 8, 1999) [hereinafter EPA, Phase II Storm Water Regulations] (codified
at 40 C.F.R. §§ 9.122-9.124); see also Envtl. Def. Ctr., Inc. v. EPA, 344 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 2003),
petition for cert. filed sub nom. Tex. Cities Coalition on Stormwater v. EPA, 72 U.S.L.W. 3513
(U.S. Dec. 15, 2003) (No. 03-1125).
224. See EPA, Phase II Storm Water Regulations, 64 Fed. Reg. at 68,725 (citing studies).
225. See EPA, 2000 WATER QUALITY REPORT, supra note 6, at 29, 33-39, 50-51. Pesticides
also can interfere with the operation of publicly owned treatment works. EPA, CITIZEN'S GUIDE
TO PEST CONTROL AND PESTICIDE SAFETY 25 (1995).

226. Urban runoff and storm sewers also were a source of pollution in 21 percent of impaired
lakes, ponds and reservoirs, and 13 percent of impaired rivers. EPA, 2000 WATER QUALITY
REPORT, supra note 6, at 50.
227. EPA, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF STORMWATER DISCHARGES: A NATIONAL PROFILE 14
(1992); see also BARRY LEWIS, NONPOINT SOURCES, PART TWO: LIFESTYLE DECISIONS CAN HAVE

SERIOUS EFFECTS, KNOW YOUR ENVIRONMENT 2 (1996) ("Farmers are trained in pesticide and
fertilizer management and are aware how much of a particular chemical is sufficient for a
certain problem-and when is the most appropriate time to make an application to minimize
potentially harmful effects. One has to wonder how many homeowners are knowledgeable
enough to exercise the same standard of care."), http://www.acnatsci.org/research/kye/
lOnps2.html
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large a source of water pollution as all contamination from industrial
228
discharges and sewage sources combined.
Pesticides and other pollutants also may affect indoor air
quality. EPA estimates that on average 75 percent of homes use some
form of pesticide indoors each year and that 80 percent of an
individual's exposure to pesticides occurs within the home. 229 As
discussed above, pesticides and a variety of consumer products release
VOCs. An EPA study found the levels of a number of common VOCs
to be two to five times higher indoors than outdoors, and the
differences occurred without regard to whether the homes were
located in highly industrial or rural areas. 230 One study conducted for
the Consumer Product Safety Commission found that outdoor air
contained on average less than ten different VOCs, whereas indoor air
contained approximately 150.231 Although EPA has stated that indoor
air quality is "a serious issue," it has acknowledged that "[there is no
comprehensive monitoring of the quality of indoor air in the U.S., and
232
the actual levels for many pollutants are not well understood."
There is reason to believe, however, that pesticides and other
chemicals released in the home are worthy of closer scrutiny.

228. See, e.g., R. Cohn-Lee & D. Cameron, Urban Storm Water Runoff Contaminationof the
Chesapeake Bay: Sources and Mitigation,14 ENVTL. PROF. 10, 23 (1992).
229. EPA, THE INSIDE STORY, supra note 209, at 14.
230. Id. at 12.
231. ELLEN J. GREENFIELD, HOUSE DANGEROUS: INDOOR AIR POLLUTION IN YOUR HOME AND
OFFICE 4 (1991) (citing OAK RIDGE NAT'L LAB., STATUS REPORT ON INDOOR AIR QUALITY
MONITORING STUDY IN 40 HOMES (1984)). EPA has concluded that consumer solvents accounted
for 1,099,000 tons of VOCs in 1998, and although the extent to which the initial release of these
VOCs was to indoor air is unclear, the indoor air total is likely to be substantial. EPA, 2000 AIR
TRENDS REPORT, supra note 6, at tbl. 3-3. Not all solvent use occurs indoors, but if even a small
proportion of the 1,099,000 tons is emitted indoors, the emissions could have substantial effects.
In fact, indoor air risks were ranked fourth among cancer risks in EPA's 1990 landmark
"Regulating Risk" study, and indoor radon was first on the list. EPA, REDUCING RISK: SETTING
PRIORITIES AND STRATEGIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 8, 18 (1990). To date, the primary
areas of focus for those concerned with indoor air quality, however, have been radon and
environmental tobacco smoke (ETS or "secondhand smoke") rather than VOCs. See, e.g., EPA,
Air and Radiation: Why be Concerned 3 (listing only radon and second hand smoke as the
pollutants of interest for indoor air quality), http://www.epa.gov/air/concerns/#indoor (last
modified Aug. 19, 2003); EPA, ENVIRONMENT REPORT, supra note 9, at 1-10 (listing several
possible sources of indoor air pollution, but only offering statistics on ETS and radon).
232. EPA, ENVIRONMENT REPORT, supra note 9, at 1-10. Among the publicly available
sources of information on indoor air quality are the websites for the California Indoor Air Quality
Program, http:// www.cal-iaq.org, and for the Home Indoor Air Quality Knowledge Base,
http://dehs.umn.edu/homeiaq/homeiaq.html. See also DEP'T OF THE ENV'T & HERITAGE,
AUSTRALIAN GOV'T, STATE OF KNOWLEDGE REPORT: AIR ToxIcS AND INDOOR AIR QUALITY IN
AUSTRALIA tbl. 6-1 (2001), http://www.ea.gov.au/atmosphere/airtoxics/sok/chapter6.html (listing
chemicals detected in the home).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:2:515

a. Individual Contribution
Table 4 presents comparisons of pesticide use among different
sources. Given that pesticides are principally used for agriculture
rather than by large industrial facilities, the profile compares three
categories of pesticide users: individual, agricultural, and a combined
2 33
category including industrial, commercial, and governmental users.
Table 4:
Sources of Pesticide Releases (in million pounds)

Estimate
1999 EPA Estimate
2001 EPA Estimate

Individual
Amount

Com./Gov't
Amount

Agriculture
Amount

Individual
Percentage

140
N/A

148
N/A

985
N/A

11%
7%-8%

EPA estimated home and garden pesticide use to be 140 million
pounds in 1997.234 In comparison, approximately 985 million pounds
were used for agriculture, a substantial increase over the 1992 level of
892 million pounds.2 35 Finally, 148 million pounds were used for
industrial, commercial, and governmental applications (such as on
rights-of-way and for landscaping around businesses).236 Individuals
thus accounted for 11 percent of total pesticide use.
Other EPA estimates differ to some extent. 237 For example,
EPA also has estimated that approximately 67 million pounds of
"active ingredient pesticides" are applied to private lawns every year,

233. The 1999 EPA estimate in the table is drawn from a report by the National Center for
Food and Agricultural Policy. See NAT'L CTR. FOR FOOD & AGRIC. POLICY, PESTICIDE USE IN U.S.

CROP PRODUCTION: 1997 NATIONAL SUMMARY REPORT (2000). The 2001 EPA estimate is drawn
from an EPA air emissions inventory. See EPA, AIR INVENTORY PESTICIDES REPORT, supra note
120, at 9.2-2. Although pesticide manufacturers are subject to TRI reporting requirements, the
agriculture sector is not subject to TRI reporting generally. Thus, TRI estimates are of limited
use in profiling the sources of pesticide releases. See EPA, 2001 TRI PUBLIC DATA RELEASE,
supra note 167. "N/A" denotes not applicable.
234. EPA, ENVIRONMENT REPORT, supra note 9, at 3-10.
235. Id. (citing NAT'L CTR. FOR FOOD & AGRIC. POLICY, supra note 233).
236. Id.
237. See Lewis, supra note 227, at 2 (noting that EPA has estimated that approximately 67
million pounds of active ingredient pesticides are applied to 67 million private lawns every year).
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or an average of roughly one pound per private lawn. 2 38 As discussed
in the analysis of low-level ozone, an EPA assessment of the VOC air
emissions from pesticides estimated that between 7 percent and 8
percent of all pesticides used in the United States are used for
exterminating home and garden pests. 239 As a result, as identified in
Table 1 above, home pesticide use also contributes a notable
percentage of the total volume of ozone precursors released to the air
240
on a nationwide basis.
Assessing the relative human health and environmental effects
of individual and household pesticide use is even more difficult than
assessing the relative quantities used. EPA has not published data
that would allow a complete profile of the quantities of pesticides
released by private individuals to all media, much less an assessment
of the human health and environmental effects. EPA has estimated,
however, that one third of all pesticide application occurs in urban
environments. 24 1
This estimate is roughly consistent with the
combined total of home and garden pesticide use (140 million pounds)
and industrial, commercial, and governmental use (148 million
pounds), or a total of 288 million pounds, as compared to the 892 to
985 million pounds used for agricultural applications. Home and
garden use thus may comprise roughly half of the pesticide use in
urban areas, and it may be expected to comprise a similar share of the
242
pesticides in urban runoff.
b. Regulatory Response
As with household hazardous waste disposal, little, if any,
effective regulation of private individuals' use and disposal of
pesticides occurs at the federal, state, or local levels. For example,
EPA has indicated that it lacks authority to regulate indoor air. 243 In
addition, although the federal statute that regulates pesticides, the

238. The disparity between the 67 million pound estimate of "active ingredients" and the 140
million pound estimate may arise because the former estimate does not include non-active
ingredients, which can comprise a large proportion of the total weight of a pesticide.
239. EPA, AIR INVENTORY PESTICIDE REPORT, supra note 120, at 9.2-2 (noting that home
pesticide use constitutes 7 percent to 8 percent of the total ozone precursor emissions by all
pesticides).
240. See id.
241. See Lewis, supra note 227, at 2.
242. Pesticides are one of the principal components of contaminated urban runoff, along with
runoff of air deposition from car emissions, car maintenance wastes, pet wastes, litter and
household hazardous wastes. See EPA, Phase II Storm Water Regulations, 64 Fed. Reg. 68,722,
68,725 (Dec. 8, 1999).
243. EPA, ENVIRONMENT REPORT, supra note 9, at 3-10.
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Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA),244 by its
terms is applicable to individuals' use of pesticides, in practice the
statute has been interpreted and enforced in ways that exclude
private individuals from its requirements. In theory, an individual
can be in violation of FIFRA in several ways. For example, it is
unlawful for any person "to detach, alter, deface, or destroy... any
labeling required under" FIFRA or "to use any registered pesticide in
a manner inconsistent with its labeling. ' 24 5 A review of reported
decisions under FIFRA and EPA enforcement reports suggests that in
practice the FIFRA requirements typically are enforced against
agribusinesses, industrial pesticide manufacturers and their owners
246
or employees, and rarely, if ever, against private individuals.

244. At least in theory, a private individual's ability to use a registered pesticide is limited by
its classification and labeling. A registered pesticide may be classified for restricted use, general
use, or both. A pesticide labeled for restricted use may only be applied by or under the
supervision of a certified applicator. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(d)(1)(B)-(C) (2000). A pesticide labeled for
general use can be applied by private individuals, but the use must be consistent with its label
and labeling. Id.; id § 136j(a)(2)(G). FIFRA uses the terms "label and labeling" broadly. They
include all written, printed, or graphic material directly on, attached to, or in anyway included
with the pesticide, its containers, or wrappers. Id. § 136(p).
245. Id. § 136j(a)(2)(A), (G).
246. For example, at least thirty-three cases have cited 7 U.S.C. § 136j(a)(2)(G), the provision
making it unlawful to use a pesticide inconsistent with its labeling. None of these cases allege
misuse by a private individual. Instead, in each case the alleged misuse was by an entity such as
a pesticide manufacturer or formulator, an exterminator, a lawn care company, a city, a park
service, or other firm or organization, or an owner or employee of one of these types of entities.
See, e.g., Or. Envtl. Council v. Kunzman, 714 F.2d 901 (9th Cir. 1983); George's Pest Control
Serv. v. EPA, 572 F.2d 204 (9th Cir. 1977); Bradley v. Brown, 852 F. Supp. 690 (N.D. Ind. 1994).
Of course, these cases only represent those cases in which a party sought judicial review of the
agency's action and the judicial review resulted in a reported decision. EPA can impose civil
penalties for FIFRA violations in administrative actions, and often judicial actions do not result
in a reported decision. As a result, it is possible that private individuals have been fined in
administrative proceedings or in enforcement actions that did not result in a reported decision.

Recent EPA enforcement reports do not reveal any actions, however, against private individuals.
See, e.g., EPA, 1999 ENFORCEMENT ACCOMPLISHMENTS REPORT, supra note 189, at 27. In

addition, the FIFRA statutory language suggests that although private individuals are within
the scope of the regulated behavior, the primary targets for violations are industry and its
managers and employees. For example, a private individual may not be subjected to a civil fine of
more than $1,000, but a registrant, commercial applicator, wholesaler, dealer, retailer, or other
distributor may be fined up to $5,000. 7 U.S.C. § 136Aa)(1)-(2). In addition, focus on industry is
evident in the civil penalty provisions, which identify three factors for calculation of the penalty
amount, "the size of the business of the person charged, the effect on the person's ability to
continue in business, and the gravity of the violation." Id.§ 136Aa)(4). Individuals and industry
also are treated much differently for criminal penalties. The maximum criminal penalty is
$1,000 for a private individual but $50,000 for a registrant, applicant for a registration, or
producer. Id.§ 136Ab)(1)-(2). A registrant, applicant, or producer may be imprisoned for up to
one year; the maximum length of imprisonment for a private individual is thirty days. Id. The
only exception to these provisions is for violations in which there is intent to defraud, where all
people are subject to the same fines and length of imprisonment. Id. § 136,(b)(3).
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To address pesticides and other pollutants in urban runoff, the
Clean Water Act requires EPA to promulgate storm water regulations,
and EPA has done so in two parts. EPA promulgated the Phase I
storm water regulations in 1990. The Phase I regulations apply to
247
large industrial sources, construction sites, and municipalities.
EPA promulgated the Phase II regulations in 1999, and they apply to
smaller municipalities and construction sites. 248 The Phase I and
Phase II regulations do not impose requirements on individual
behavior or require state or local governments to do so, but the Phase
II regulations do require local governments to conduct public
information campaigns to reduce contaminants in storm water. 249 The
effective date for the Phase II regulations was March 2003, and it
remains to be seen whether the public information campaigns
conducted in response to the regulations will reduce individuals'
contributions to pollutants in storm water discharges.
5. Petroleum
Petroleum and its constituents also can have adverse human
health and environmental effects. 250 Over the last thirty years, the
quantity, fate, and effects of petroleum released to oceans in North
America have been the subject of three landmark studies by panels of
scientists assembled by the National Research Council of the National
Academy of Sciences.
Although the 2003 NRC report does not
specifically address individuals as a source category, it includes data
that suggest that the petroleum released by individuals may have
substantial environmental effects.
In particular, the report
demonstrates the importance of activity location in evaluating
individual pollutant releases. The report concludes that although not
all petroleum releases are likely to have adverse effects, the petroleum
released from two sources with large individual and household
contributions, land runoff and two-stroke engines, "is particularly
significant because, by their very nature, these activities are almost
247. See National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit Application Regulations
for Storm Water Discharges, 55 Fed. Reg. 47,990 (Nov. 16, 1990) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 122124).
248. EPA, Phase II Storm Water Regulations, 64 Fed. Reg. 68,722, 68,723 (Dec. 8,1999).
249. See id. at 68,754-55.
250. Petroleum contains a number of constituents that are on the TRI list of toxic chemicals.
Examples of TRI-listed toxic chemicals that are constituents of petroleum include aromatic
compounds such as benzene, ethylbenzene, xylene, and toluene. 2003 NRC REPORT, supra note
83, at 19-20. Aromatic compounds may comprise 1 percent to 20 percent of the total
hydrocarbons in crude oil, and polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) may comprise 0.2
percent to 7 percent. PAHs may be the constituent that is most toxic to the environment. Id at
20.
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exclusively restricted to coastal waters. In fact, the estuaries and bays
that receive the bulk of the load are often some of the most sensitive
ecological areas along the coast."25 1 Similarly, EPA has noted that
used oil and other petroleum products are a significant constituent of
252
polluted urban and suburban runoff.
a. Individual Contribution
The data on petroleum releases attributable to individuals and
other sources are not sufficient to profile the individual share fully.
Nevertheless, the 2003 NRC report provides several important
The report
insights about the contributions of individuals. 253
identifies three anthropogenic sources of petroleum releases to the
oceans: petroleum extraction, transportation of petroleum, and
petroleum consumption. 254 The report estimates that the total amount
of petroleum that enters the waters off of North America annually
from these three sources is 29 million gallons, of which 25 million
gallons are released by petroleum consumption, 2.7 million gallons by
petroleum transportation, and 880,000 gallons by petroleum
251. Id. at 4. According to the 2003 NRC report:
No spill is entirely benign. Even a small spill at the wrong place, at the wrong time,
can result in significant damage to individual organisms or entire populations ....
Despite the significant progress made in understanding the behavior and effect of
petroleum spills on the marine environment and on preventing their occurrence in the
first place, relatively little work has progressed on understanding the threat posed by
small, chronic releases of petroleum from all sources. Insights have been made from
long-term studies of sites of major spills or polluted harbors, but to a large degree, the
significance (in terms of environmental damage) of the large inputs from land-based
or other chronic releases is not known. Recent studies, however, suggest that PAH,
even in low concentrations, can have a deleterious effect on marine biota.
Id.
252. EPA has concluded that the pollutants discharged through runoff and storm sewers
"contribute high levels of pollutants, including heavy metals, toxics, oil and grease, solvents,
nutrients, viruses and bacteria into receiving waterbodies." EPA, Phase II Storm Water
Regulations, 64 Fed. Reg. at 68,727-28. Among the pollutants discharged by individuals to
waterbodies are "used motor oil, household toxic materials, radiator fluids, and litter." Id. at
68,729.
253. 2003 NRC REPORT, supra note 83, at 2-3. The study reviewed releases of petroleum to
the ocean from North America, not just the United States. Id. According to the study, natural
seepage releases off of North America amount to 47 million gallons per year, petroleum
extraction (oil and gas exploration or production) releases amount to 880,000 gallons, petroleum
transportation (refining and distribution) releases amount to 2.7 million gallons, and petroleum
consumption releases amount to 25 million gallons. Id. Petroleum consumption includes
"[rieleases that occur during the consumption of petroleum, whether by individual car and boat
owners, non-tank vessels, or runoff from increasingly paved urban areas .. " Id. at 3.
According to the study, a ton of oil may be converted to 294 U.S. gallons. Id. at 189, app. B.
254. A fourth category, natural seeps, accounts for 47 million gallons. Id. at 2. Although it is
a surprisingly large figure, the seepage is a natural phenomenon not under human control and is
not the subject of this profile. See id. at 2-3 (discussing the effect of natural seeps).
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extraction. 255 Thus, on average, petroleum consumption during the
1990-1999 period was responsible for almost 85 percent of the
petroleum released from anthropogenic sources to North American
marine waters, and 32.8 percent of all the petroleum released into
256
these waters from all sources.
Petroleum consumption emissions occur from several different
sources, including land-based petroleum use that enters the ocean
through rivers and runoff, as well as recreational marine vessel use,
oil spills, operational discharges, atmospheric deposition, and
jettisoned aircraft fuel. The 2003 NRC report suggests that "these
typically small but frequent and widespread releases contribute the
overwhelming majority of the petroleum that enters the sea due to
human activity." 257 According to the report, the runoff from on-land
petroleum consumption to rivers, wastewater systems, and storm
water systems is the most significant source of petroleum consumption
emissions. Two-stroke engines in recreational marine vehicles, such
as boats with two-stroke outboard motors and personal watercraft
(almost all of which are operated by private individuals), are also a
significant source. 258
Of the petroleum consumption categories,
individuals play a role in land-based runoff, recreational marine vessel
use, and atmospheric deposition. These three categories contribute
23.7 million gallons of petroleum each year or 96 percent of the
259
emissions caused by petroleum consumption.
255. Id.at 2-3, 86.
256. Id. at 3, tbl. 2-2. The "best estimate" of the total quantity of releases from petroleum
consumption is 84,000 tons. The contributions to the 84,000 total from the subcategories of
petroleum consumption are as follows: (1) land-based petroleum use that enters the ocean
through rivers and runoff, 54,000 tons (64 percent); (2) recreational marine vessel use, 5,600 tons
(6.7 percent); (3) oil spills from non-tank vessels, 1,200 tons (1.4 percent); (4) operational
discharges from vessels 100 gross tons or larger, 100 tons (0.12 percent); (5) operational
discharges from vessels under 100 gross tons, 120 tons (0.14 percent); (6) atmospheric deposition,
21,000 tons (25 percent); and (7) jettisoned aircraft fuel, 1,500 tons (1.8 percent). Id. at tbl. 2-2.
257. Id.at 2.
258. Id. at tbl. 2-2. These two sources combined comprise two-thirds of all releases from
petroleum consumption. Id. at 3. Recreational marine engines release petroleum to waterbodies
because up to 30 percent of fuel passes through the combustion chamber unburned or partially
burned and is released to the air or water. See discussion supra note 128. Reductions in these
emissions should begin with the implementation of new regulations effective in 2006, although
the new regulations only apply to new, not existing recreational marine engines. 2003 NRC
REPORT, supra note 83, at 81. Many local governments are aware of these impacts and have
attempted to use public information campaigns to address them. For example, agencies in the
Los Angeles area ran television advertisements designed to discourage people from pouring
motor oil down storm sewers and informing them that storm sewers lead to local waterbodies.
Ann E. Carlson, Recycling Norms, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1231, 1282 n.202 (2001).
259. 2003 NRC REPORT, supra note 83, at tbl. 2-2 (noting that land-based river and runoff
contributes 54,000 tons of hydrocarbons per year, recreational marine vessels contribute 5,600
tons of hydrocarbons per year, and atmospheric deposition is responsible for an average of 21,000
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Although individuals certainly play a major role in the
emissions from these three categories, it is difficult to determine the
individual portion from these raw numbers. The report identifies
recreational marine vehicles as a growing source that was not
According to the report,
included in an earlier 1985 study. 260
recreational marine vehicles release 1.47 million gallons of petroleum
annually, a total that comprises approximately 5 percent of the total
261
releases of petroleum from all human-related activities.
The report also concludes that 15.9 million gallons of petroleum
were released annually through land-based inputs. 262 The total
represents 56.2 percent of the total releases from human-related
activities. The sources of land-based releases include municipal
wastewaters, non-refinery industrial discharges, refinery discharges,
urban runoff, river discharges, and ocean dumping. 263 The report
describes land-based sources as "the most poorly documented" of the
sources of releases from petroleum consumption and does not identify
the extent to which individuals and households contribute to landbased sources of petroleum releases. 264 Nevertheless, the discussion
makes it clear that individuals are likely to contribute in several ways,
including urban runoff (both through direct dumping and runoff of
chemicals that are present on the ground as a result of atmospheric
deposition arising from petroleum combustion), municipal wastewater
(through discharges to storm water and wastewater systems), and
river discharges. 265 Other reports provide a more anecdotal snapshot

tons of hydrocarbon emissions from petroleum use each year). The total thus was 80,600 tons of
hydrocarbons, at 294 gallons per ton.
260. Id. at 81.
261. Id. at tbl. 2-2. The total figure reported was 5,000 tons, which was converted to gallons
using 294 gallons per ton. See id. at 219-20, app. F (noting that only emissions from two-stroke
engines were included in the estimate and that total emissions of all recreational marine vehicles
were reduced by 50 percent to account for the total quantity released to fresh water that "either
did not connect to the coastal water or was included in [the section in the report] on petroleum
hydrocarbon inputs from nonpoint sources"). Reductions in the releases to surface water will
occur with new EPA regulations on recreational marine vehicles. See id. at 81 (noting that new
EPA regulations will reduce air emissions by 75 percent).
262. Id. at 80-81.
263. Id. at 233. Note that one estimate of gasoline consumption in North America in 2000
was 428.8 million tons. Id. at 247. Individuals contribute to PAHs in storm water runoff through
the air deposition of automobile exhaust. Id at 247, 250.
264. Id.
265. The study estimated the land-based releases from the inland and coastal basins of the
United States and Canada. Id. The study used oil and grease as a surrogate for petroleum
because of the availability of oil and grease data in urban runoff, wastewater discharges and
rivers. Id. at 78. According to the study, "although individual releases may be very small, the
cumulative load from all land-based sources accounts for about half of the total average, annual
load of petroleum to the marine environment from human related activities." Id. at 79.
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of the potential magnitude of the individual contribution to land-based
For example, one state has estimated that private
releases.
individuals in the state generate more than one million gallons of used
266
oil per year.
The 2003 NRC report concludes that atmospheric deposition
accounts for 6.2 million gallons or 22 percent of all petroleum released
annually to oceans in North America. 267 The individual share of
atmospheric deposition at this point cannot be calculated based on the
available data, but given the substantial contribution of on-road and
non-road motor vehicle use to petroleum releases, the individual share
is likely to be large. In short, although it is clear that individuals
comprise a source of petroleum emissions via their use of on-road and
non-road motor vehicles, this is an area in which individual releases
have not been studied sufficiently to allow comparisons to be made.
b. Regulatory Response
As with the other pollutants profiled, few regulatory
New
requirements have been directed at individual behavior.
standards have been imposed on manufacturers of recreational marine
vehicles to address air emissions, and those standards also are
projected to reduce the vehicles' contribution to petroleum releases to
water. 268 After struggling for years with the appropriate regulatory
approach for regulation of used motor oil, EPA has concluded that not
subjecting used motor oil to regulation as a hazardous waste will be
more likely to induce proper disposal than would a more stringent
regulatory regime. 269 Similarly, the Phase I and Phase II storm water
regulations discussed above do not have requirements directed at
individuals' disposal of petroleum products, but the storm water
regulations do require local governments to take steps to inform the
public and induce voluntary reductions in petroleum and other storm
In addition, state, local, and private public
water releases. 270
266. Tenn. Dep't of Env't & Conservation, Used Oil Collection Act of 1993: Fact Sheet,
http://www.state.tn.us/environmentldca/oil/oilfactsheet/php (last visited May 10, 2004).
267. NRC 2003 REPORT, supra note 83, at tbl. 2-2. The percentage was calculated by dividing
21 tons by 96 tons, the total from all anthropogenic sources.
268. See discussion supra note 117.
269. Studies suggest that regulating used oil as a hazardous waste may lead to increased
illegal dumping and more substantial overall environmental quality impacts. See Mark A.
Cohen, Monitoringand Enforcement of EnvironmentalPolicy, in INTERNATIONAL YEARBOOK OF
ENVIRONMENTAL AND RESOURCE ECONOMICS 1998/1999 1 (Tom Tietenberg & Henk Folmer eds.,
1999) (citing H. Sigman, Midnight Dumping:Public Policies and Illegal Disposalof Used Oil, 29
RAND. J. ECON. 157 (1998)).
270. See EPA, Phase II Storm Water Regulations, 64 Fed. Reg. 68,722, 68,754-55 (Dec. 8,
1999) (discussing requirements for municipal public information campaigns).
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information campaigns, including efforts to stencil storm drains with
information that informs potential dumpers that the drain leads to a
local water body, have been directed at individual used oil and other
271
disposal.
C. Implications of the Source Profile
The profile provides an initial assessment of the quantities of
several types of pollutants released by individuals as well as
individuals' relative contribution in comparison with large industrial
facilities and other sources. The profile suggests, at a minimum, that
a comprehensive analysis of the quantities of the most important
pollutants released by individuals, as well as their fate and effects, is
overdue. The 2003 NRC report on petroleum releases may serve as a
valuable model for such an approach. The effort is necessary to
provide policymakers with a more complete understanding of the
pollution problem in this country, and the trends in contributions from
source types, as well as the appropriate allocation of societal resources
toward reducing their emissions. Rational policy making in the
absence of this information will be difficult at best.
More provocatively, the profile indicates that both in the
aggregate and with regard to specific types of pollutants and specific
media, the releases by individuals and households pose significant
challenges to the existing regulatory regime. In some cases new
requirements on consumer product manufacturers will reduce the
pollutant emissions from each product, but the increases in
population, dispersal of population, activity levels, and consumption
and disposal rates discussed above often will lead to greater
contributions by individuals in absolute terms. As regulatory controls
continue to clamp down on industrial sources, the relative
contributions from individuals also will increase.
In short, the
absolute and relative contributions of individuals to many types of
pollution will increase absent changes in the application of existing
regulatory instruments or the use of new instruments. The next Part
discusses the changes that may be necessary to avoid this result.

271. See id.; see also PAMELA PACKER & ROBIN SHEPARD, WATER ACTION VOLUNTEERS
PROGRAM, STORM DRAIN STENCILING: IMPACTS ON URBAN WATER QUALITY 1, 4 (1999) (concluding
that storm drain stenciling program in Wisconsin communities increased awareness of "basic
storm water facts").
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IV. THE ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATORY DEBATE REVISITED

Although the instrument choice debate has assigned the
central role to industrial polluters, the profile presented above
suggests that this is often an incorrect premise. Part IV explores the
implications of taking individuals seriously. It first identifies the
distinctive characteristics of individuals and the environmental harms
they cause. It then suggests that these characteristics will require
new thinking about the optimal mix of environmental regulatory
instruments. In addition, empirical studies and recent experience with
efforts to use combinations of regulatory instruments suggest that
individual behavior is more malleable than once believed. As a result,
legal scholars and regulators should reconsider the role of individuals
in creating harms and the ability of government to steer individual
behavior. In particular, greater use of informational regulation and
norm management, alone or in combination with other instruments,
27 2
may induce changes in many environmentally significant behaviors.

A. The Characteristicsof Individuals as a Source Category
Individuals differ from large industrial firms in a variety of
ways that have important implications for regulatory instrument
choice. The discussion below begins with an examination of the
differences in the alignments of potential parties and interests that
arise when individuals create environmental harms. It then explores
the differences in the types of harms created and the differences in
risk perception and decision making.
1. Alignments of Potential Parties and Interests
Private individuals are the source of environmental harms in
several scenarios, with alignments of potential parties and interests
that are significantly different from the single polluter-multiple victim
assumption that underlies much of the instrument choice debate.
Three of these scenarios are presented below. For each scenario, in
addition to individuals, industrial or other sources may also contribute
to the same environmental harms.

272. In some cases, the analysis also leads to new perspectives on the instrument choice
debate regarding industrialsources as well. See discussion infra notes 365-366.
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a. Single Individual, Internalized Harm
In the first scenario, an individual engages in behavior that
causes harm to that individual (e.g., A v. A). For example, the user of
a lawn mower may breath its fumes or the user of a household
pesticide or consumer solvent may inadvertently ingest some of the
chemical. A variation of this scenario occurs when a single individual
causes harm to other members of a household, who will often be
related to, or otherwise important to, the individual creating the harm
(e.g., A v. A'). 273 Variants of this scenario may exist where individuals
differ in the extent to which they value the polluting activity or the
resource polluted. To the extent the same individual causes and bears
the full costs of the harm, however, there is no externality. Assuming
the individual is utility maximizing, the harm should only occur
because the individual is unaware of the potential for harm, prefers
the harm to the cost of avoidance, or is unable to refrain from creating
the harm because of physical, economic, social, or psychological
constraints.2 7 4 In contrast to most industrial pollution, many of the
273. Harms to other members of the same household could be treated as a distinct scenario
but are not treated as such here. To the extent other household members are either closely
related to the individual causing the harm or are important for emotional or other reasons,
harms to other members of the household may be presumed to provoke many of the same
behaviors as harms to the individual. The validity of this assumption will vary with the type of
relationship between the polluting individual and the member of the household who is exposed to
the pollution.
274. Of course, some of the harms caused by individual behavior are analogous to industrial
emissions in that the harms are externalized. Examples include the harms caused by most
automotive emissions, which are not borne by the automobile driver but by those who breathe
the ambient air, and the runoff of household pesticides, which in some cases are borne by the
ecosystems of the receiving waters and those who use them, and only very indirectly by the
pesticide-using individuals.
In addition, as with individuals' environmentally harmful behavior, industrial pollution is
often not in the rational interest of the polluter. Much has been written about how firms have
used data on toxic chemical emissions to identify inefficiencies in manufacturing and chemical
handling. See, e.g., Karkkainen, supra note 37, at 260-63. For individuals, the parallel is that
many environmentally harmful behaviors are the product of habits or a lack of information, and
are not in the individual's interest. For example, studies suggest that vehicle idling for more
than fifteen seconds produces excess emissions of ozone precursors as compared to turning off
the engine and restarting it.

OFFICE OF MOBILE SOURCES, EPA, EMISSION FACTS: IDLING

VEHICLE EMISSIONS 3 (1998) (providing factors for estimating idling emissions of nitrogen oxides
and hydrocarbons for various vehicle types while idling), http://www.epa.gov/OMSWWW. Idling
also uses gasoline. In some cases, such as where the idling enables air conditioner use, or where
turning the vehicle on or off has safety implications, increases wear and tear on the vehicle, or
requires a meaningful amount of effort, idling a vehicle may be in an individual's self-interest.
But in many cases, idling not only has harmful effects on the ambient air, it also is not in the
individual's interest. For example, in some situations the cost of the gas consumed during idling
may exceed the wear and tear costs that arise from restarting the car. Similarly, use of
quantities of pesticides in excess of those required to achieve a particular goal often will not be in
the individual's interest. Thus, many of the environmentally harmful activities engaged in by
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harms caused by individuals are borne by the same individuals or the
members of their households. 275 Thus, the alignment of the parties in
this scenario is quite different from the traditional single industrial
polluter-multiple victim assumption.
In two other scenarios, the environmental harms only occur
because numerous individuals all engage in one or more activities that
result in pollution that is externalized to some extent. 276 The
scenarios involving multiple individuals are discussed below.
b. Multiple Individuals,Internalized Harm
In the second scenario, the behavior of numerous individuals
causes harm to the same or essentially the same group of individuals
(e.g., 10,000 As v. 10,000 As). For example, multiple individuals may
release air toxics that remain within the airshed in which the
individuals live. Similarly, the activity of multiple individuals may
contaminate urban runoff that leads to an estuary that the same
individuals use for fish consumption and recreation. As with the selfexposure scenario, variants of this scenario may exist where
individuals differ in the extent to which they value the polluting
activity or the resource polluted. Although the group as a whole may
benefit if the polluting behavior is reduced, for a variety of reasons the
individuals may not organize to enforce limits on the behavior. 2 77 For

individuals are not the product of rational, self-interested behaviors. The implication for
instrument choice is that appeals to altruism may not be necessary to induce changes in some
behaviors. Instead, simple provision of information about the consequences to the individual of
the behavior may be effective, assuming the individual is functioning as a rational actor and is
not subject to external constraints (whether physical, economic, psychological, or social).

275. Government intervention cannot be based on the existence of an externality (since none
exists), distributional justice grounds, or on what Calabresi and Melamed termed "other justice"
grounds. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 22, at 1100; see Richard L. Revesz, The Race to the
Bottom and Federal EnvironmentalRegulations: A Response to Critics, 82 MINN. L. REV. 535,
536 (1997) (noting the importance of "protection of a minimum level of public health" as a goal
for environmental law). In short, we may opt to intervene to protect an individual's health from
falling below some societally determined minimum threshold, even if that requires intervening
in the types of individual household behaviors that do not cause human health or environmental
harms to others. These efforts tend to be very unpopular, however. See J. CLARENCE DAVIEs &
JAN MAZUREK, POLLUTION CONTROL IN THE UNITED STATES: EVALUATING THE SYSTEM 169-75

(1998) (discussing the importance of intrusiveness in environmental law).
276. This Article refers to numerous individuals because in many cases harm will occur only
when numerous individuals' small releases exceed the assimilative capacity of the environment
in some way or create exposure that exceeds the dose necessary to trigger a particular adverse
health effect. For any one individual, the particular behavior that causes the pollution may or
may not be utility maximizing.
277. As with the first scenario, the behavior also may occur because the individuals are
unaware of the potential for harm, or are unable to refrain from creating the harm because of
physical, economic, psychological, or social constraints.
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example, although the harm caused by the group members may
remain within the group as a whole, any one individual may incur less
of the costs of the polluting activity or capture more of the benefits
than another. In this scenario, utility-maximizing individuals thus
may prefer the harm to the cost of avoidance. In addition, free rider
problems may provide disincentives to those group members who
might benefit from collective action.
The alignment of the parties in this scenario is distinct from
the traditional single industrial polluter-many victim scenario in two
important ways. First, there are multiple sources of pollution as well
as multiple victims. Second, the interests of the sources and the
victims overlap to a significant extent. Although each individual
member of the group has a personal interest in engaging in a
particular activity, the individual also suffers harm from the
aggregate effect of her actions and many other similar ones. The
environmental harm of the activity is thus externalized to a more
limited extent than occurs with the more traditional single industrial
polluter-multiple victim alignment.
c. Multiple Individuals,Externalized Harm
The third scenario resembles the second in that the behavior of
numerous individuals causes harm, but in this case the harm is
externalized to another group of individuals (e.g., 10,000 As v. 10,000
Bs). The others who are harmed may be different individuals in the
same geographic area, individuals in a different geographic area, or
individuals in future generations. 27 8 Examples that fit this scenario
are those in which multiple individuals create low-level ozone
precursors that form smog in one airshed that drifts to another
airshed, or in which the urban runoff from one city damages an
estuary that individuals in another city use for fishing and recreation.
As with the self-exposure scenario, variants of this scenario may exist
where individuals differ in the extent to which they value the
polluting activity or the resource that is polluted. Here, however, the
group is causing harm to another group, and the pollution costs are
entirely externalized for all the individuals. In this scenario, a utility278. An example of an intergenerational effect scenario is one in which the urban runoff from
a city leads to damage to an estuary that is not immediately apparent, but that sets in motion
irreversible ecological damage (e.g., depletion of fish stocks or the inability to use the estuary for
recreation) that only manifests itself after several generations. For a discussion of the
importance of inter-generational effects, see Kysar, supra note 75, at 688-91; DISCOUNTING &
INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY (Paul R. Portney & John P. Weyent eds., 1999); Daniel A. Farber &
Paul A. Hemmersbaugh, The Shadow of the Future: DiscountRates, Later Generations,and the
Environment, 46 VAND. L. REV. 267 (1993).
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maximizing individual is likely to prefer the harm to the cost of
avoidance. 279 Absent extraordinary circumstances, at the group level
the preferred option will not be to reduce the polluting behavior. At
the individual level, even if some individuals do favor reductions in
the polluting behavior, collective action problems may prevent the
individuals from organizing to enforce limits on the behavior.
The alignment of the parties in this third scenario is similar to
the traditional single industrial polluter-multiple victim alignment in
that in both cases the environmental harms are externalized. In
addition, the interests of the sources and the victims do not overlap in
this scenario. The scenario differs, however, in that there are many
sources of pollution as well as many victims.
2. Environmental Harms
In addition to distinctive alignments of parties, the releases of
pollutants and the environmental harms caused by individuals have
several features that are important for environmental instrument
choice. The typical releases of pollutants by individuals differ from
those of industrial firms in a variety of ways. First, as noted in the
second and third scenarios above, with individuals there are often
many sources of the pollutant. 28 0 In contrast, for industrial emissions,
the source is often only one or a handful of facilities in a particular
area or industry sector. Second, with individuals each release is often
of a small quantity over any given time period and will only comprise
a large quantity when aggregated with numerous other individual
releases or when measured over a long time period. In contrast, single
releases from industrial firms are often of substantial size and are
more likely to occur in concentrated pulses. Third, the release or other
activity that causes the environmental harm is often not visible when
caused by individuals. 28 1 There are few analogues in individual

279. As with the first scenario, the behavior also may occur because the individuals are
unaware of the potential for harm, or are unable to refrain from creating the harm because of
other constraints.
280. The importance of the widespread, diffuse nature of sources for environmental law and
policy has been widely noted, although it has not been tied to the importance of individuals as a
source category. See, e.g., Allen V. Kneese, Confronting Future Environmental Challenges,
RESOURCES, Summer 2002, at I (noting that among the three factors that characterize the
"emerging environmental problems" is the fact that "sources of pollution are widespread and
sometimes diffuse").
281. See, e.g., Office of Solid Waste, EPA, Municipal Solid Waste: Household Hazardous
Waste ("Improper disposal of household hazardous wastes can include pouring them down the
drain, on the ground, into storm sewers, or in some cases putting them out with the trash. The
dangers of such disposal methods might not be immediately obvious, but improper disposal of
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behavior to the industrial smokestack. Auto emissions for all but the
most heavily polluting cars are not visible. The differences in tailpipe
emissions between a compact car and an SUV are not immediately
apparent.
Similarly, applying home and garden fertilizers or
pesticides does not appear to be a polluting activity by itself. The
presence of nutrients or pesticides in the runoff that occurs during the
next rainstorm is for all intents and purposes invisible to the user and
her neighbors.
In contrast, many (although certainly not all)
industrial emissions are more visible.
In addition, the harms caused by individuals' releases of
pollutants or other behavior are often distinct from those caused by
industrial releases. Not only are the releases from any one individual
smaller and less visible, but the harms arising from individual
behavior in many cases are less visible as well. In fact, environmental
harm may only arise from individual behavior when many sources are
aggregated. In addition, the low concentrations and long time periods
involved in many releases from individuals make it more likely that
these releases will generate gradual, and in some cases almost
imperceptible, changes in ecosystem health, as compared to the
sometimes dramatic die-offs of flora and fauna that occur from pulses
of industrial pollution. Individuals may release more petroleum to
surface water than oil tanker spills, but the immediate result of dead
otters and oily coastlines is less likely to occur, even though in some
cases the releases from individuals may be quite damaging over the
long run. Similarly, the human health effects of many types of
28 2
individual behavior are more likely to be chronic than acute.
Individuals release over a million tons of solvents to the atmosphere
each year, but because the releases from each of 281 million
Americans are small, they often do not cause immediate, acute health
effects. Nevertheless, they may increase the risks of cardiopulmonary
disease and certain cancers to the population as a whole. Industrial
releases are more likely to result in dramatic, acute human health

these wastes can pollute the environment and pose a threat to human health."),
http://www.epa.gov/epaoswer/non-hw/muncpl/hhw.htm (last modified June 6, 2003).
Although this Article refers to pollutant releases, the analysis also is applicable to behaviors
that do not involve pollutant releases but cause environmental harms, such as habitat
destruction. See, e.g., Anthony DePalma, Crossing Their (Flight)Path- Development and Sprawl
Replace DDTas Top Threat to Bald Eagles, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2004, at A12.
282. The characteristics of the harms caused by individuals often will make causation
difficult to establish. The same characteristics often will make it difficult to establish the
magnitude of the harm when individuals are the polluters. In addition, long latency periods and
the resulting inter-generational risk-shifting may be greater for individual harms, thus
exacerbating collective action problems. See discussion infra notes 334-336.
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effects, such as the thousands of deaths caused by the release of
methyl isocyanate at Bhopal, India in 1984.
3. Influences on Individual Behavior
The influences on individual behavior differ from the influences
on the behavior of large industrial firms in several ways that are
important for environmental instrument choice.
In particular,
inadequate information, cognitive limitations, and social influences all
may have a greater effect on the environmentally significant behavior
of individuals than they do on firms. Several of these phenomena may
lead the general public, regulators, and courts to underestimate
systematically the human health and environmental harms of
individual behavior and thus may influence not only the types of
instruments available to steer individual behavior, but also the
decision to regulate in the first place.
a. Information
Information is widely regarded as a choke point for
28 3
environmental decision making by policymakers and by industry.
Although policymakers and industrial firms struggle to gather and
process sufficient information about environmental harms and the
costs of avoidance, they likely have far more information than private
individuals. This conclusion is supported by the limited available
empirical studies. For example, surveys demonstrate that individuals'
understanding of basic human health and ecological processes is
minimal. 284 Similarly, private individuals' understanding of their role
in causing pollution is remarkably low. Although pollsters and social
scientists rarely ask individuals to identify the sources of
environmental harms, the available data suggest that individuals
285
systematically underestimate their role.

283. See, e.g., Karkkainen, supra note 37, at 263; see also Richard S. Murphy & Erin A.
O'Hara, Mistake of Federal CriminalLaw: A Study of Coalitions and Costly Information, 5 SuP.
CT. ECON. REV. 217, 218 (1997) (discussing the importance of information costs and their impact
on mistake of law excuses in federal criminal statutes).
284. See, e.g., Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Social Meaning of Environmental Command
and Control, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 191, 197-99 (2001) (discussing results of National Environmental
Education and Training Foundation survey).
285. Questions about the causes of pollution are not commonly included in public opinion
polls and appear to be included less often now than in the 1960s. See The Odum Institute, Public
Opinion Poll Question Data Base, at http://www2.irss.unc.edu/dataarchive/pollsearch.html (last
visited May 10, 2004). When the question has been asked, industry has received more blame for
environmental problems than individuals by respondents in both national and regional surveys.
For example, according to a nationwide Roper poll published in 1990, 50 percent of the national
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b. Cognitive Limitations
Even if individuals are exposed to information about the harms
caused by their behavior, cognitive limitations may influence how they
respond to that information, and thus the prospects of regulatory
instruments for making behavioral change. The influence of cognitive
limitations on decision making under uncertainty has spawned a vast
literature in the last decade.2 8 6
Examples of these cognitive
limitations include the difficulty many people have in evaluating low
probability events, and an "alarmist bias" that arises from the fact
that "frightening information is more salient and potent than
27
comforting information."
Although many of the cognitive limitations discussed in the
legal literature to date emphasize the likelihood that individuals will
over-react to information about the risks arising from industrial
pollution, the characteristics of releases from individuals may cause
the opposite effect. For example, people also suffer from "optimistic
bias," which leads them to underestimate their likelihood of having
accidents or contracting diseases. 28 8 This may influence individuals'
population cited industrial waste and 42 percent accidental oil spills as causes of water pollution
problems. THE ROPER ORG., THE ENVIRONMENT: PUBLIC ATTITUDES AND INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR 6
(1990). In contrast, only 24 percent cited trash and litter thrown into streams and 9 percent cited
run-off from city streets and parking lots. Id. The same pattern occurs for the perceived causes of
air pollution. A majority of Americans (55 percent) cited smoke from factories and mills and 34
percent cited smoke from power plants as causes of air pollution. Id. at 8. In contrast, only 12
percent cited fumes that evaporate from paints, gasoline, and dry cleaners and 6 percent cited
household cleaners and other chemicals in the home. Id.
286. See, e.g., Jolls et al., supra note 56, 1524-27 (giving examples such as unrealistic
optimism and hindsight reasoning). More recently, Gregory Mitchell has suggested that
individuals are not uniformly irrational, and that cognitive limits are quite context-dependent.
See Gregory Mitchell, Why Law & Economics' Perfect Rationality Should Not Be Traded for
Behavioral Law& Economics'EqualIncompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67, 69-77 (2002).
287. Sunstein, supra note 53, at 627. Studies of risk perceptions by individuals who have
reviewed the warning labels required under California Proposition 65 provide an example. As
Sunstein has noted,
Consumers appear to think that twelve of every 100 users of a product with the
required warning will die from cancer, an estimate that exceeds reality by a factor of
1000 or more. With respect to information, less may be more. If information is not
provided in a clear and usable form, it may actually make people less knowledgeable
than they were before, producing overreactions, or underreactions, based on an ability
to understand what the information actually means.
Id. at 627 (citing W. KIP VISCUSI, PRODUCT-RISK LABELING: A FEDERAL RESPONSIBILITY 11-16
(1993) [hereinafter VISCUSI, PRODUCT-RISK LABELING]; W. KIP VISCUSI, RATIONAL RISK POLICY 5
(1998)); W. Kip Viscusi, Predictingthe Effects of Food Cancer Risk Warnings on Consumers,43
FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 283, 288 (1988)).
288. Sunstein, supra note 53, at 628 (citing Jolls et al., supra note 56, at 1524-27). Examples
include the findings that roughly 90 percent of people surveyed believe that they are above
average drivers (and therefore believe that they are less likely to have an automobile accident)
and that 97 percent believe themselves to be either average or above average in ability to avoid
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use of pesticides and other toxics around the home. People also have
excessively steep discount rates, which induce them to under-value
the benefits of changes in behavior that will not accrue for several
years. 28 9 This may affect a wide variety of environmentally significant
behaviors such as investments in energy efficient (hence generally less
polluting) cars, furnaces, and other equipment. Although the role of
cognitive limitations in creating an "alarmist bias" has been discussed
at length elsewhere, the potential for cognitive limitations to lead to
an underestimation of harms generally has been less of a focus. 290 The
cognitive limits on the ways in which individuals think about the
types of environmental harms they cause thus may have important
implications for instrument choice.
Two other cognitive phenomena have received less attention in
the legal literature but are potentially important to instrument choice
regarding individual environmentally significant behavior.
First,
cognitive dissonance may play a role by affecting individuals'
291
conceptions of the sources of pollution and estimation of harms.
Individuals have a desire to make their attitudes, beliefs, cognitions,
and behaviors as consistent as possible. 292 If a person experiences
inconsistency among different thoughts or between thoughts and
actions, the person generally will take steps to reduce the
inconsistency. 2 93
Alternatively, a person may simply avoid
information that is inconsistent with her beliefs. 294 In the case of
environmental behavior, people are likely to avoid information that
would make them feel bad about themselves or their actions. If they
are told that their actions are environmentally unsound, rather than
weighing the costs and benefits of their actions, they may try to reduce

power mower and bicycle accidents. Id. (citing SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, POSITIVE ILLUSIONS:
CREATIVE SELF-DECEPTION AND THE HEALTHY MIND 10-11, 116 (1993)).
289. See, e.g., Jerry A. Hausman, Individual Discount Rates and the Purchase and
Utilization ofEnergy-Using Durables,10 BELL J. ECON. 33, 50-53 (1979).

290. For work identifying the concerns about overestimating and underestimating risks, see
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON 49 (2002); VISCUSI, PRODUCT-RISK LABELING, supra note

287, at 61-65 (focusing in particular on the over-estimation problem); Kuran & Sunstein, supra
note 81, at 757.
291. Festinger proposed the theory of cognitive dissonance in 1957. See LEON FESTINGER, A
THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957). For a discussion of cognitive dissonance in the legal
literature, see Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence,83 VA. L. REV.
349, 358 (1997).
292. See SHARON S. BREHM ET AL., SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 199 (4th ed. 1999). Festinger
believed this desire was as basic as the need for food. FESTINGER, supra note 291, at 3-4.
293. BREHM ETAL., supra note 291, at 199-200.
294. FESTINGER, supra note 291, at 30.
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dissonance by adding consonant cognitions. 295 Identifying corporate
polluters as the only important sources of environmental harms may
296
reinforce this process by giving individuals someone else to blame.
Second, the environmentally significant behavior of individuals
also may be influenced to a surprisingly large extent by habits.
Habits are remarkably important exceptions to the assumption that
individuals make ongoing utility calculations, and habits are resistant
to change. 297 Research has shown that habits tend to truncate the
traditional subjective expected utility calculation by creating a
"habitual mindset. 298 When individuals are in this habitual mindset,
they do not take into account all of the necessary factors for making a
logical calculation. 299 Thus, models of thinking and choice that rely on
logical or reasoned calculations are most predictive only in the absence
of a strong habit.30 0 For instance, when deciding on a mode of transit

295. Consonant cognitions are one of the mechanisms used to reduce cognitive dissonance.
For instance, if a person had resolved to go on a diet, but had just consumed a substantial
chocolate mousse, she might think to herself, "Chocolate mousse is very nutritious." BREHM ET
AL., supranote 292, at 200, tbl. 6.5.
296. This thought process may give rise to a different kind of consonant cognition: "Sure I'm
not the most pro-environmental individual in my neighborhood, but I'm not as bad as the
chemical plant down the road." See also Bradley Bobertz, Legitimizing Pollution Through
Pollution Control Laws: Reflections on Scapegoating Theory, 73 TEX. L. REV. 711, 718 (1997)
(describing the "scapegoating" phenomenon in environmental law); Kenneth A. Manaster, Ten
Paradoxes of Environmental Law, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 917, 931 (1994) (noting the common
approach of "labeling different categories of participants as good guys or bad guys-the cowboyhero environmental protection types wearing the white hats versus the sinister despoilers of
nature and public health wearing the black hats."); Oren, supra note 123, at 148 (noting the
inability to blame industry for pollution arising from increases in motor vehicle use);
Vandenbergh, supra note 284, at 208 (noting the social meaning effects of command and control
statutes)..
297. See Bas Verplanken & Henk Aarts, Habit,Attitude, and PlannedBehavior Is Habit an
Empty Construct or an Interesting Case of Goal-directedAutomaticity in EUROPEAN REVIEW OF
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 101, 111 (Wolfgang Stroebe & Miles Hewstone eds., 1999). When an
individual is functioning in this "habitual mindset," not all of the necessary factors for making a
logical calculation are taken into account. Id. The authors contend that habits save cognitive
time and energy by circumventing the stages in the decision-making process, id. at 119, and that
individuals with a strong habit use fewer facts to reach a travel mode decision, suggesting that
rational deliberation over a range of choices may only occur in the absence of a habit. Id. at 124.
Although forcing individuals to attend to the circumstances surrounding their choice may induce
individuals to consider more information than they would under the habitual mindset, id. at 121-

22, such processing may not be sufficient to induce behavioral change. Id
298. See id.; see also Ulf Dahlstrand & Anders Biel, Pro-EnvironmentalHabits: Propensity
Levels in Behavioral Change, 27 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 588, 588 (1997) (noting that "[tihe
advantage of having a habit is that you do not have to think and consider different alternatives
each time you act in a certain situation"); Bas Verplanken et al., Habit,InformationAcquisition,
and the Process of Making Travel Mode Choices, 27 EURO. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 539, 540-42 (1997)
(reporting on the results of three studies of the effects of habit on decision making).
299. Verplanken & Aarts, supra note 297, at 111.
300. Id.at 124.
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for a particular trip, individuals who have a strong habit of using a
particular mode tend to consider fewer trip factors (e.g., weather and
distance) than those with a weak habit. 30' In fact, individuals with a
strong travel mode habit specifically ignore information about
alternatives to that habit. 30 2 Strong habits also may impede the
influence of personal norms. 30 3 Furthermore, habits may be at least
as good a predictor of future behavior as intentions or attitudes. 30 4
By circumventing decisional processes, habits save cognitive
time and energy.3 0 5 Because all of the necessary factors for a rational
decision are not taken into account, however, habits that formed
because they were efficient at one time may not be efficient when
circumstances change.3 0 6 A general habit of car use, for instance, may
lead to inefficient outcomes in individual situations (e.g., when
walking would have been more efficient because of a short travel
distance and an absence of parking).37 Research suggests that forcing
individuals to attend to the circumstances surrounding their choice
will encourage them to consider more information than they would
under the habitual mindset.30 8 Increased information or information

301. Henk Aarts et al., Habit and Information Use in Travel Mode Choices, 96 ACTA
PSYCHOLOGICA 10-11 (1997); see also Verplanken & Aarts, supra note 297, at 124 (concluding
that the cognitive orientation accompanying habitual behavior limits attentiveness to new
information).
302. Verplanken et al., supra note 298, at 546-47, 549. This effect still exists even when
attitude toward the travel mode is taken into account. Id.
303. See Judith A. Ouellette & Wendy Wood, Habit and Intention in Everyday Life: The
Multiple Processes by Which Past Behavior PredictsFuture Behavior, 124 PSYCHOL. BULL. 54,
62 (1998) (finding that the influence of subjective norms is greater in contexts that encourage
deliberative thought and less in contexts that facilitate habit formation).
304. Id. at 61.
305. Verplanken & Aarts, supra note 297, at 119; see also Ouellette & Wood, supra note 303,
at 61, 63-64 (finding that stable contexts are most conducive to habit formation and that in those
contexts, habits are most predictive of behavior); Verplanken et al., supra note 298, at 555
(finding that individuals with a strong travel mode habit acquire less information than those
with a weak habit).
306. Ouellette & Wood, supranote 303, at 57; Verplanken & Aarts, supra note 297, at 111.
307. Verplanken et al., supra note 298, at 558. In addition, a rational individual would likely
take into account the exercise benefits of walking or biking.
308. Verplanken & Aarts, supra note 297, at 121-22. For instance, holding participants
accountable for their travel mode choices increases the amount of information they acquire.
Verplanken et al., supra note 298, at 557. At the same time, accountability does not seem to
change the decision strategy that individuals use, suggesting that they are merely seeking out
more information to justify their choice. Id. Alternatively, asking people to attend to the decision
process changes both the depth of information required and the complexity of the decision
process used. Id. But see id. at 555 (finding that asking those with a strong habit to attend to
their decision process results in an initial increase in decisional complexity, but over time those
individuals revert back to the habitual mindset).
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processing may lead some to try an alternative to their habit. 30 9 To
effectuate behavior change, however, a mere increase in information
acquisition or processing may not be enough. 310 For the new behavior
to become a new habit, 3 11 additional measures may be necessary to
ensure that the alternative is at least as useful or attractive as the old
habit. 312 Once a new habit (e.g., recycling) is acquired, however, it
may be continued even if the costs of doing so are high.
c. Social Influences
Individuals also may be more influenced by informal social
control than are industrial firms. Studies suggest that personal
norms-the belief that one has a personal obligation to act even where
others will not reward the act-and social norms-the belief that
others value an act and will informally reward it or sanction
noncompliance-play a large role in individual environmentally
313
significant behavior.
Although the personal and social norms of business managers
also have a substantial (and largely overlooked) influence on corporate
environmental performance, the effects of social influences are likely
to have more pronounced effects on individuals than on large
industrial firms. 3 14 Social influences may affect corporate managers'

309. Dahlstrand & Biel, supra note 298, at 599. Dahlstrand and Biel propose a seven step
model by which old habits can be broken and new habits can be formed. In the study cited here,
however, they only examine three general levels of habit change. Id. at 589-91. They examine
pro-environmental consumer behavior, but their insights are valuable for driving habits as well.
See Jorgen Garvill et al., Effects of IncreasedAwareness on Choice of Travel Mode, 30 TRANSP.
63, 75-78 (2003) (indicating that individuals with a strong habit of using a car for transport can
be made to drive less).
310. Verplanken & Aarts, supra note 297, at 121-22; see Aarts et al., supra note 301, at 1014.
311. Dahlstrand & Biel, supra note 298, at 599 (noting a correlation between the viability of
an alternative and its propensity for becoming a new habit); see also Ouellette & Wood, supra
note 303, at 70. Of course, once a desired behavior has become habitual, regulators may need to
intervene less to sustain it.
312. Dahlstrand and Biel offer one explanation by which habits may be changed. Dahlstrand
& Biel, supra note 298, at 588. They studied a simplified version of their proposed 7-stage
process for habit change, id. at 591-92, and posited that the attitude-behavior link is strongest
when there is no habit and weakest when a habit is in place. Id. at 588. In particular, they
examined how to convince individuals to buy environmentally friendly (EF) products and found
that information alone might be enough to get people to at least consider buying EF products,
but for a habit of buying EF products to develop, the specific characteristics of the EF products
(e.g., price) were more relevant than the information provided about the products' environmental
effects. Id. at 599.
313. See, e.g., Stern, supranote 17, at 461-63.
314. See Michael P. Vandenbergh, Beyond Elegance: A Testable Typology of Norms in
Environmental Compliance,22 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 55, 63, 76-78 (2003).
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decisions, employee morale, or shareholder, customer, or supplier
decision making. 315 Yet firms have a reasonably clear principal
objective: to maximize shareholder value in pecuniary terms. Firms
also are influenced by various internal and external governance
mechanisms designed to ensure that the pecuniary objective is
achieved. Even outside formal governance rules, studies suggest that
firm employees use a "desiccated language" that frames moral or other
non-pecuniary issues in a way that may lessen their influence on
managers' decision making.3 16
Thus, to the extent the firm
governance structure functions properly, social influences on
managers that do not maximize shareholder value will be limited.
Although this is an area worthy of further study, at least for large,
publicly traded firms whose performance is defined by the market in
pecuniary terms, it is fair to assume that social influences will have
less effect on firm behavior than on the behavior of private
individuals.
B. Implications of Individualsfor EnvironmentalRegulation
In light of the distinctive characteristics discussed above, reconceptualizing individuals as a source category will require a
fundamental reexamination of the theories and methods of
environmental regulation. In particular, adding individuals to the
target list for potential environmental regulation will require
reconsideration of the strengths and weaknesses of existing
instruments and development of new instruments or combinations of
instruments. This Part provides an initial examination of the effects
of treating individuals as regulated entities on environmental
regulatory instrument choice.
1. Command and Control Regulation
Command and control regulations that seek to lessen the
environmental harms caused by individuals may be directed at the
firms that produce consumer products or at individual behavior
directly. As discussed above, the vast majority of the command and
control regulations that seek to reduce environmental harms from
individuals take the form of emissions controls directed at the
industrial facilities that produce consumer products or restrictions on
315. See Mark A. Cohen & Sally S. Simpson, The Origins of Corporate Criminality.Rational
Individual and Organizational Actors, in DEBATING CORPORATE CRIME 33, 35 (William S.
Lofquist et al. eds., 1997); Karkkainen, supra note 37, at 294-327.
316. See ROBERT JACKALL, MORAL MAZES 104 (1990).
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the environmentally harmful characteristics of consumer products,
whether automobiles, thermostats, or home cleansers. This regulatory
approach is responsible for many of the gains that have been made in
reducing the impacts of individuals on the environment. In addition,
there may be substantial additional room for cost-effective restrictions
on the manufacturers of consumer products. 3 17 This approach will
continue to face diminishing returns, however, as the most significant
products are regulated and as increasing population and activity
levels continue to overwhelm product-based restrictions.
The use of command and control requirements to change
individual environmentally significant behavior has been less
successful and, at least in the near term, is unlikely to be effective,
efficient, or politically feasible. The thousands or millions of potential
regulatory targets for any given environmental problem, the
widespread belief that individuals are not significant pollution
sources, and the cognitive barriers to changing that belief all make
individual behavior extremely difficult to regulate through command
and control instruments, particularly at the federal level. As the
discussion of regulatory measures in Part III suggests, past attempts
to do so generally have failed miserably. 318 Even at the state and local
level, the experience with command and control regulation as the sole
regulatory instrument has been mixed. In particular, the cost of
enforcement against large numbers of individuals makes behavior
change based solely on the threat of formal legal sanctions unlikely.
To the extent environmental harms caused by individuals are difficult
to detect, enforcement is expensive and intrusive. Even if sufficient
resources were devoted to the effort, the intrusiveness of enforcing
these regulations may undermine compliance or produce a political
backlash. Empirical studies suggest that the difficulties of fully
enforcing command and control approaches against individual
behavior present the risk of increasing, rather than decreasing,
environmental harms. For example, a study of the effects of a
proposed increase in regulatory requirements on used motor oil
suggested that noncompliance would be widespread and that the net
impact of the new requirement would be increased releases of used

317. In some cases, regulations that focus on changing the products used by individuals may
be more cost-effective than regulations on other sources. For example, portable gas can and gas
can spout standards promulgated by the California Air Resources Board were expected to cost
between $6 and $11 per can, or $2.01 per pound of ozone precursors. CARB, GAS CAN
REGULATIONS, supra note 127, at 2. In contrast, other emissions control strategies for sources of
ozone precursors in California were estimated to cost approximately $5 per pound. Id.
318. See discussion supra notes 144-148 (discussing driving restrictions).
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oil.319
Similar conclusions have been reached about volumetric
charges for household garbage: studies suggest that although they
may reduce the volume of garbage disposed of at a landfill, they also
320
may increase illegal dumping.
When combined with informational regulation and economic
incentives, however, some types of direct command and control
regulations on individuals, such as restrictions on the disposal of
household hazardous waste and motor oil, appear to have been
successful. Some states and local governments have combined laws
limiting the disposal of household hazardous waste in landfills with
321
investments in free or low-cost waste collection or drop-off options.
Others have combined laws requiring individuals to recycle with
investments in the infrastructure necessary to make recycling
convenient. 322 Some extension of local government controls over
individual behavior, where combined with other regulatory
323
instruments, thus may be effective.
To date, the experience with pure command and control
approaches suggests that, at least as a first order measure, such
approaches are not a viable option on their own for changing
individual environmentally significant behavior. They may be more
effective when combined with other regulatory instruments, or when

319. See discussion supra note 269.
320. See Carlson, supra note 258, at 1244, 1292-93 (discussing studies of garbage reduction
programs).
321. More than 3,000 local governments have developed household hazardous waste
collection programs. See Office of Solid Waste, supra note 281; see also EPA, PESTICIDE
REGISTRATION NOTICE 2001 3 (Sept. 7, 2001). Local governments have attempted to regulate
individual environmentally significant behavior for years in the form of restrictions on disposal
of household hazardous wastes and air pollution ordinances. See Nash & Revesz, supra note 43,
at 579 (noting the early use of smoke ordinances directed at coal as a heating fuel by
municipalities). Some local governments even have "environmental courts" to adjudicate health
code violations and other environmentally significant violations, including littering and illegal
dumping, local air and water quality violations and asbestos removal violations. See, e.g., Shelby
County Environmental Court, at http://www.co.shelby.tn.us/county-gov/courtLclerks/gensession.courtlenvirocourt.
322. See Carlson, supra note 258, at 1243-45.
323. The efforts underway to achieve the new EPA eight hour ozone NAAQS may provide an
example of an area in which local governments may have success using command and control
measures directed at individuals. See supra text accompanying note 112. The combination of a
federal standard for ozone, federal support for state and local public information campaigns, and
some local, time-limited restrictions on backyard burning, lawn mowing, or other ozone
precursor-emitting activities may be both politically feasible and effective at reducing the
individual share of ozone precursor emissions. The prospects for federal command and control
regulation of individual behavior are less rosy. Even when statutory or regulatory authority has
existed, it typically has not been exercised by EPA, an outcome that is not surprising given the
negative reactions to the rare attempts to regulate individual behavior. See discussion supra
notes 144-148.
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used as a second order measure after information and other regulatory
instruments have had an influence on beliefs and norms. In addition,
the expressive effects of command and control measures may play an
important role in the regulation of individual behavior. Enactment of
command and control measures may signal a social consensus
regarding a particular behavior, and thus may influence personal or
social norms. 324 In combination with other forms of informational
regulation or economic incentives, this expressive function may have a
greater effect on individual behavior than the largely nonexistent
threat of formal legal sanctions. 325 In sum, although command and
control measures are unlikely to be effective as the exclusive
instrument for steering individual environmentally significant
behavior, their expressive effects, in combination with informational
regulation and other measures, may be quite important.
2. Economic Incentives
The principal focus of economic incentive enthusiasts has been
on the development of tradeable allowance schemes for the emissions
from large industrial sources, and these schemes have had a number
of visible successes over the last twenty years. 326 At the same time,
economic incentives have been used only to a very limited extent to
address individual environmentally significant behavior. 327
The
situations in which individual behavior occurs, the characteristics of
the environmental harms that arise, and the characteristics of
individual behavior discussed above all present challenges to the use
of economic incentives.
For example, in theory property rules could be used to regulate
pollution by individuals. To address individual behavior, property
324. See Richard McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L
REV. 338, 356-57 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function ofLaw, 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 2021, 2046 (1996) (noting the potential expressive effects of emissions trading programs).
325. The expressive effects of environmental laws that are directed at individual behavior
but that are rarely enforced will require careful study. For example, widespread belief that a
statute is not enforced could undermine the intended effect of the statute. See, e.g., Kahan, supra
note 291, at 379 (noting the effects of non-enforcement of tax laws). In those situations, it may be
preferable to have no command and control law directed at individual behavior rather than one
that is not enforced.
326. For an overview of marketable allowance schemes and other economic regulatory
instruments, see Wiener, supra note 2, at 679-80, 704-35.
327. As Ann Carlson has noted, despite the evidence that deposits on recyclable containers
increase recycling, no state has enacted a bottle bill in more than fifteen years. Carlson, supra
note 258, at 1245. A partial commodification of highway High Occupancy Vehicle lanes in San
Diego highways appears to have generated increases in carpooling and reductions in congestion.
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, How Changes in Property Regimes Influence Social Norms:
Commodifjing California'sCarpoolLanes, 75 IND. L. J. 1231 (2000).

20041

THE NEW ERA OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

rights could be assigned to goods that are now over-consumed, such as
air, water, and undeveloped ecosystems, and parties could bargain to
efficient outcomes regarding their use. But as Calabresi and Melamed
noted in their analysis of industrial pollution, the barriers to
implementing a property rights scheme for many types of pollution
make its prospect as a regulatory instrument dubious. 328 These
problems are only exacerbated when the polluters include numerous
individuals. As discussed above, many of the human health and
environmental impacts of individual behavior are the product of very
small, diffuse releases of pollutants that cause harms that are chronic,
not acute, and that are widely distributed among victims, in many
cases non-human victims such as flora and fauna. Identifying,
distributing, and enforcing rights to these goods often would be a
monumental and expensive task. In addition, as a result of the
numbers and characteristics of individuals discussed above,
transaction costs often will be high, and thus Coasian bargaining will
rarely occur. The development of a workable property rights scheme
thus will be difficult.
Market mechanisms have been used in the Clean Air Act to
control acid rain precursor emissions on a nationwide basis, and
several regional efforts have been undertaken to use market trading
to address air pollution. 329 However, the examples of successful
marketable allowance schemes may not be indicative of the prospects
for success when individuals are the polluters. The marketable
allowance systems that have succeeded thus far have been
implemented for stationary sources where baseline emissions were
330
available and the number of regulated sources was manageable.
Extending market mechanisms to individual behavior may present a
range of problems. For example, such a program would be expensive
to establish and administer, no baselines exist from which to
determine initial allocations, and the value of any one allowance to
any one individual would be miniscule and in many cases not worth
the transaction costs involved in trading it.
Moreover, the concerns that have been raised about the social
meaning effects of commodifying pollution, although perhaps fairly
dismissed as to schemes that are largely the subject of corporate
emissions and are not widely known by the general public, may be
much more important if those schemes are extended to individual
328. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 22, at 1090-92.
329. See, e.g., Nash & Revesz, supra note 43, at 599-605 (discussing regional NOx trading
programs).
330. For a discussion of regional and local trading initiatives, see Nash & Revesz, supra note

602

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:2:515

behavior. 331 To the extent individual behavior is steered as much by
norms as by legal sanctions or economic incentives, as the discussion
below suggests, a shift in the meaning of certain individual behaviors
from "polluting" to something less value-laden may generate a suboptimal level of social control on individuals' environmentally
significant behavior.
In the Calabresi and Melamed analysis and among economic
incentive enthusiasts generally, the next move is to a liability rule.
Yet the notion that a court action against individuals as polluters
could even be brought, much less be brought to a satisfactory
conclusion, is hard to envision. Where the harms arise from long-term
exposures and are chronic rather than acute, plaintiffs may be
unlikely to bring claims. The scenario involving one individual
causing harm to herself or members of her household is the most
straightforward. Although common law tort actions are potentially
available against other members of a household, often it will not be in
the interest of the potential plaintiff to sue another member of the
332
same household.
The scenarios involving large numbers of defendants as well as
plaintiffs present even greater challenges.
Often thousands or
millions of individual polluters will be implicated, as opposed to at
most a handful as is often the case for industrial sources. The large
number of plaintiffs and defendants casts doubt on the ability of any
scheme that requires common law actions to enforce legal rules,
whether based on property or liability rules. 333
For example,
coordination problems will arise not only on the plaintiffs' side, but on

331. As Sunstein has noted, environmentalists have raised concerns that tradeable
allowance systems may have an unintended effect on social meanings. Sunstein, supra note 324,
at 2046. In short, by creating a market in rights to pollute, marketable allowance schemes may
undermine the notion that pollution is bad. In so doing, they may undermine norms against
pollution. See id. For an interesting example of a commodification that appears not to have had
an adverse effect on social meanings or social norms, see Strahilevitz, supra note 327.
332. Although rare, environmental litigation between individuals in the same household has
occurred. See, e.g., Steven Dujak, Notice and Comment: News That's Reused, ENVTL. F.,
Sept./Oct. 1998, at 19 (noting a 1997 case in which a Chicago man sued his wife in federal
District Court for a Clean Air Act violation based on the EPA determination that second-hand
smoke is a carcinogen. The case was dismissed after the wife agreed to stop smoking.).
333. Of course, liability rules already exist. Nuisance, trespass, and other actions are, at
least in theory, available now to limit the type of individual conduct that creates the human
health and environmental harms discussed in Part III, yet few if any common law tort actions
have been brought regarding these harms. This Article is not the place for a comprehensive
analysis of this issue, but for a number of reasons existing liability rules appear to have had
little effect on this conduct.
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the defendants' side as well.33 4 In addition, the plaintiffs and
defendants often will be the same or at least have interests that
overlap to a significant extent. Courts will be reluctant to enforce
rules protecting entitlements where the classes of plaintiffs and
defendants have overlapping interests and membership.3 35
In
addition, a suit by individuals as victims against individuals as
polluters may confront a cognitive dissonance problem, forcing victims
336
to acknowledge that they are also polluters.
Even assuming that the plaintiffs could overcome these hurdles
and bring an action, the long-term, almost invisible degradation of
goods such as waterways polluted by urban runoff present substantial
challenges for liability rules. 33 7 The burden on the plaintiffs to
demonstrate causation would be almost insurmountable. 33 8
In
addition, a court would face difficulty valuing the harm, even if only to
the extent the court attempted to calculate the average harm of the
cases of this type brought before it. 339 Finally, the large number of
3 40
defendants would make any remedy difficult to enforce.
334. As Kaplow and Shavell note, if not all victims sue, tort actions may result in damages
that are systemically low. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 2, at 731 n.54. This is likely to be the
case where each individual has only suffered minor harms.
335. See Diamond v. Gen. Motors Corp., 97 Cal Rptr. 639, 641-42 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971). The
Diamondcase involved a suit seeking an injunction on behalf of all Los Angeles residents against
all major stationary sources of air pollution as well as the sale and registration of new cars in
Los Angeles. Id. at 641. The suit was dismissed in part because of the overlap in interests and
membership between the classes of plaintiffs and defendants. Id. at 642-44. For an analysis of
the case, see Manaster, supra note 296, at 933-34.
336. The court in Diamond observed that "[w]e do not deal with a simple dispute between
those who breathe the air and those who contaminate it." 97 Cal. Rptr. at 645; see also
Manaster, supra note 296, at 934 (observing that "Pogo's insight ["we have met the enemy and
he is us"] prevailed, and the popular dichotomy again was shown to be illusory").
337. This problem could be addressed by reconceptualizing citizen suits to give citizen
victims the ability to sue citizen polluters, as opposed to only industrial polluters or government
agencies, but these types of actions are likely to be infrequent and unsuccessful. See discussion
supra note 189.
338. See discussion supra notes 37-50. In their discussion of property and liability rules,
Kaplow and Shavell do not account for the plaintiffs' burden of establishing causation. Kaplow &
Shavell, supra note 2, at 731 n.54. The difficulty of establishing causation regarding even the
more concentrated, obvious industrial sources of pollution was one reason that command and
control requirements were adopted by the federal and state governments beginning in the 1970s.
See, e.g., Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1976) ("[wlhere a statute is precautionary
in nature, the evidence difficult to come by, uncertain, or conflicting because it is on the frontiers
of scientific knowledge, the regulations designed to protect the public health, and the decision
that of an expert administrator, we will not demand rigorous step-by-step proof of cause and
effect. Such proof may be impossible to obtain if the precautionary purpose of the statute is to be

served.").
The difficulties in establishing causation would be far greater in the case of multiple, diffuse
sources and long-term harms of many individual environmentally significant behaviors.
339. Kaplow and Shavell have argued that so long as a court can ascertain the average harm
of environmental pollution, liability rules are preferable to property rules, but the administrative
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These factors make actions to enforce liability rules
implausible. 341 As a result, an attempt to protect against individual
environmental harms with property or liability rules in practice would
result in little government intervention to limit those harms, and
would represent an implicit risk management decision that the harms
caused by individuals do not justify the costs of control.
Taxes are a favorite instrument of economists, and in theory
they could be used quite effectively to steer consumer behaviors
ranging from driving to electricity and consumer product use. 342 Yet,
they are politically radioactive in the United States to such an extent
that they are not of more than theoretical interest, at least in the near
term. 343 Even the strong supporters of economic measures in the

costs of estimating harm in the case of diffuse, individual-sourced pollution may be very high,
and there may be a systemic risk of under-estimation. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 2, at
730 (noting that "[wie do suspect that damages are too low when there are components of loss
that are hard to estimate"). When courts do determine average harm, the characteristics of the
harms and cognitive limitations discussed above suggest a high likelihood that they will
underestimate these types of harms. Yet elsewhere Kaplow and Shavell assert that "under the
liability rule, there will not tend to be much pollution if the risk of cancer is serious, for damages
will then be high precisely because the average harm will be high." Id. at 729. They note that all
findings of fact include some amount of "guesswork." Id. at 730. These arguments are weakest in
situations in which the knowledge about the carcinogen is imperfect or where the carcinogen has
latent effects. When the "polluter" consists of multiple individuals, all releasing minute amounts
of numerous compounds, any one of which may have caused harms to multiple victims or to the
environment, the assertion that an average risk of harm approach will not lead to underregulation of certain behavior is even less persuasive.
340. See Krier & Schwab, supra note 2, at 453 (noting that not only do parties face
"transaction costs," but courts face "assessment costs" in determining harm, and that the
assessment costs can be large in environmental cases).
341. Given that government command and control requirements, private property actions,
and nuisance actions are not feasible against many individual environmentally significant
behaviors, in the approach followed by Calabresi and Melamed individuals may be thought to
have by default an entitlement to pollute that is protected by a property rule. This is roughly
analogous to the situation of polluting nations in the international environmental arena. See
Wiener, supra note 2, at 768 (noting that "[a]n externality itself is an involuntary exchange
forced on the victim by the source").
342. See PIGOU, supra note 40. Price-based tools such as taxes, subsidies, and liability rules
also have been selected as the instrument of choice for some environmental problems. In the
United States, tax schemes have been used in a variety of ways, such as to increase the cost of
chemical feedstocks and fund Superfund site cleanups. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 4661 (2000).
343. In Europe, tax schemes have been implemented in the form of commuter taxes to reduce
driving in center cities and for other purposes. See, e.g., Sarah Lyall, Starting Today, Drivingin
London Is PoundFoolish, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2003, at A3 (describing new congestion zone fees
in London). In the United States, however, the political feasibility of using tax and subsidy
schemes to address polluting behavior remains uncertain at best, and it has led environmental
law scholars to conclude that tax schemes are not worthy of extended discussion. See, e.g.,
Karkkainen, supra note 37, at 278.
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academic literature have noted that the prospects for the use of taxes
344
or fees to control pollution in the United States generally are dim.
Subsidies may create perverse incentives, but they also may be
a more viable approach than other economic incentive schemes. 4 5 In
fact, recent experience suggests that Congress is eager to enact
subsidies that affect environmental protection, although those enacted
often have been truly harmful. 346 Nevertheless, subsidies may have
surprising importance as a regulatory instrument directed at
individual behavior. An assumption of the environmental instrument
choice debate is that regulatory tools should be Kaldor-Hicks superior:
the benefits of the regulation should exceed the costs such that those
who benefit could compensate those who lose, although the
compensation need not occur. 347 Kaldor-Hicks superiority is distinct
from Pareto superiority, in which those who benefit actually do
compensate the losers, and no one is in a worse position. 348 Since a
Kaldor-Hicks superior regulatory action leaves some parties in a
worse position, despite the net increase in social benefits, government
must have the power to enforce its requirements. Both command and
control and economic incentive regulatory instruments thus assume
an effective governmental authority. But, as the discussion of the
characteristics of individuals as a source category suggests,
government may have little direct coercive ability against individuals.
Oddly, the regulation of individuals thus may resemble the
regulation of countries in international environmental law. In the
344. See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 4, at 115-16 (noting that "[there has been no significant
use of environmental taxes or fees in the United States, with the exception of taxes on CFCs and
other ozone-depleting substance").
345. This is also the case regarding international environmental law. See Wiener, supra note
2, at 682.
346. Examples include several farm subsidies and the recent change that allows small
businesses to deduct up to $100,000 for the purchase of vehicles weighing over 6,000 pounds. The
favorable tax treatment is only available to those vehicles (e.g., the largest SUVs) over 6,000
pounds. These heavier vehicles are more likely to have higher air pollution emissions and lower
gas mileage than lighter vehicles. See Pamela Najor, Tax-Cut Bill Would Give Small Businesses
Reason to Buy LargestSport Utility Vehicles, DAILY ENV'T REP. (BNA) A-6 (May 28, 2003).
347. See, e.g., Wiener, supra note 2, at 743 (discussing Kaldor-Hicks superiority). Of course,
governments may seek to achieve goals other than efficiency. Environmental harms pose issues
of distributional equity both in terms of the environmental harms that occur and the costs of
avoidance. Issues of distributional equity may arise among those in the current generation, such
as when environmental harms fall disproportionately on ethnic or economic groups. See, e.g.,
Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing "Environmental Justice"." The Distributional Effects of
EnvironmentalProtection,87 Nw. U. L. REV. 787 (1993); see also Revesz, supra note 275, at 536
(noting the protection of a minimum level of human health as a non-efficiency objective of
environmental laws). Distributional equity issues also may arise on an inter-generational basis,
when one generation shifts the environmental harms of its behavior onto future generations. See
supra discussion at notes 278-282.
348. See RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 14 (5th ed. 1998).
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international arena, where no centralized governmental authority is
available to command performance by individual countries, KaldorHicks optimality may not be achievable. 349 Simply put, where a
governmental authority is unable to force those who will lose to
adhere to regulatory commands, government policies that require
coercive force to ensure compliance are likely to fail.
Instead,
achieving a change in behavior may only be possible if the solution
achieves Pareto improvement for those who participate: changes in
behavior occur because some parties are in a better position, and none
350
is in a worse position.
In situations in which individuals are the sole sources of
pollution, the analysis suggests that government strategies that
subsidize desired changes in behavior may achieve greater pollution
reductions than alternative strategies. The most direct form may
occur where government provides a payment directly to individuals,
but many other forms also may be possible. For example, many water
bodies are impaired by pollution from a combination of industrial
point sources and non-point sources such as runoff from individual
behavior, agriculture, and other sources. 351 EPA has struggled for
years to promulgate a regulation (the Total Maximum Daily Load or
TMDL rule) that would establish procedures for addressing water
bodies that fail to meet water quality standards despite the imposition

349. See Wiener, supranote 2, at 743.
350. See id. As Wiener has noted, international regulatory regimes are similar (e.g., among
treaty signatories) in this way to local neighborhood regulatory regimes (e.g., homeowners
associations) in that both require the consent of the regulated parties and therefore must be
Pareto-improving for those parties. Jonathan Baert Wiener, On the PoliticalEconomy of Global
Environmental Regulation, 87 GEO. L.J. 749, 790 (1999) (concluding that "treaties are more like
voluntarily adopted restrictive covenants than they are like legislated statutes").
351. A second example involves low-level ozone. In many areas of the country, both
industrial sources and individual sources contribute to the low-level ozone problem. One role of
government in these situations may be to create the incentives and low transaction cost setting
that would induce concentrated industrial and other sources to compensate individuals for
taking steps that more cost-effectively reduce ozone precursor emissions than would additional
controls on industrial sources. For example, industry could be given credits for inducing private
individuals to purchase less-polluting lawn and garden equipment or to use mass transportation,
such as through supplementing bus fares or funding infrastructure. To some extent, these types
of programs already exist in the form of programs that provide firms with incentives to provide
financial and other inducements to employees who carpool or use mass transportation and
programs that encourage firms to provide individuals with incentives to scrap older, highemitting vehicles, but these programs are not widespread. Alternatively, industry could be given
credits if it can demonstrate that its efforts (e.g., through funding or conducting public
information campaigns or providing financial incentives for individuals to reduce polluting
activities) generate demonstrable changes in individual behaviors or reductions in ozone
precursor emissions.
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of effluent limitations on point sources. 352 If EPA or state agencies
conceive of individuals as potential regulatory targets and recognize
the need for financial inducements to effectuate changes in individual
behavior, it may be possible to structure provisions in regulations
directed at industrial point sources that provide incentives for
industrial sources to demonstrate that they have reduced emissions
from individuals in the watershed. 35 3 For example, industrial sources
could be credited for supporting financial incentive programs that
induce households to reduce or improve fertilizer and pesticide use, or
for funding infrastructure changes, such as providing improved
354
household waste collection options.
These concepts also can be included in trading systems. Some
effluent trading occurs now, but water pollution trading programs
generally have been difficult to establish. 355 An approach to trading
that may be more easily enforced and more politically palatable than
many that have been attempted to date is to provide incentives (e.g.,
through the distribution of excess tradeable allowances) for industrial
point sources to fund the pollution reduction activities of individuals
and households where the individuals' costs of control are less than
those of industry. Although in theory government could do so directly,
local industrial sources may be in a better position to identify the least
356
cost avoiders and to manage efforts to reduce their emissions.
The feasibility of pure subsidy schemes and schemes that
combine subsidies with other economic incentives will require a
352. See Clean Water Act § 303(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (2000); Revisions to the Water
Quality Planning and Management Regulation and Revisions to the National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System Program in Support of Revisions to the Water Quality Planning
and Management Regulation, 65 Fed. Reg. 43,586 (July 13, 2000); Withdrawal of Revisions to the
Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation and Revisions to the National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System Program in Support of Revisions to the Water Quality Planning
and Management Regulation, 68 Fed. Reg. 13,608 (Mar. 19, 2003) (withdrawing the July 2000
rule).
353. For an EPA policy that takes initial steps in this direction, although without conceiving
of individuals as potential regulatory targets, see OFFICE OF WATER, EPA, WATER QUALITY
TRADING POLICY STATEMENT (2003) [hereinafter EPA, WATER QUALITY TRADING POLICY
STATEMENT]. Trading programs for water pollutants have confronted a number of roadblocks.
See, e.g., EnvironmentalistsSay Water Trading May Create Legal Liability, INSIDE EPA, Mar.
21, 2003, at 13.
354. Industry also could be given incentives to conduct public information campaigns
targeted at individual behavior given that the marketing expertise of many firms far exceeds
that of government. In theory, individual behavior change also could be accomplished through
the allocation of credits to individuals in a tradeable allowance scheme, but the coordination
problems faced by individuals may be an insurmountable barrier.
355. See EPA, WATER QUALITY TRADING POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 353.
356. At least in theory, the reverse also could occur where it is more efficient for industry to
reduce costs than individuals. The transaction costs and free rider problems encountered by
individuals make this approach unlikely to succeed.
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detailed analysis of the obstacles that have prevented more
widespread use of such mechanisms and the types of regulatory
interventions that can overcome those obstacles. The obstacles may
be both economic (e.g., information costs incurred by government in
determining the optimal level of incentives, and the transaction costs
of making exchanges and documenting their impact) and psychological
(e.g., the likely resistance of business managers to subsidizing
individuals' pollution reduction efforts, even if businesses' net costs
will decrease).
In addition, when subsidies and other economic
incentive schemes are applied to individuals as a source category, care
must be taken to ensure that the psychological effects of economic
incentives do not undermine their effectiveness. For example, in some
circumstances financial inducements appear to undermine the psychic
benefits an individual receives for performing a cooperative act and
357
may discourage, rather than encourage, the targeted behavior.
Nevertheless, it is clear that by combining the concepts of individuals
as sources and Pareto improvement, innovative new mechanisms may
emerge.
3. Informational Regulation and Norm Management
Perhaps the most important implication of the new focus on
individuals as polluters is the need to look beyond the command and
control versus economic incentives debate to informational regulation
and norm management. Informational regulation has received a great
deal of attention in recent years, but it has been principally used to
address large industrial sources of pollution (e.g., the TRI toxic
chemical release data).
Attempts to influence individual
environmentally significant behavior have been much less common.
The various forms of informational regulation can be thought of
as falling into two categories. The first, descriptive informational
regulation, involves simple disclosure of data without an attempt to
characterize the information when it is disclosed.
Descriptive
information may affect behavior simply by changing an individual's
beliefs about the costs and benefits of particular actions, or it may
influence personal and social norms. The second category, persuasive
informational regulation, includes government characterizations of
information designed to persuade individuals and other regulated
entities to change behavior. Examples range from simple publication
of brochures advocating a particular behavioral change to elaborate
357. See, e.g., Ernst Fehr & Armin Falk, Psychological Foundations of Incentives 11-12 (Ctr.
for Econ. Studies & Ifo Inst. for Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 714, 2002),
http://ssrn.com/abstractid=294287.
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public information campaigns.
In this type of informational
regulation, the agency activity is a more direct attempt to change or
activate norms about a particular activity.
Both categories of
informational regulation are potentially powerful tools for changing
individual environmentally significant behavior, but their uses may
differ. Some types of behavior may change after the individual is
exposed to descriptive information, while others may require
persuasive information. In addition, as discussed in Part V.C, below,
descriptive and persuasive information may be subject to different
standards under a new statutory provision imposing restrictions on
federal agency information dissemination programs.
a. DescriptiveInformation
The TRI program is perhaps the best example at the federal
level of the use of purely descriptive information to change the
behavior of large industrial firms. Several empirical studies suggest
that TRI data have changed firm behavior, and there is some
indication that the effects may be associated with the norms of firm
managers, shareholders, or customers, although the role of norms has
not been explored in any detail.3 58 As to individuals, several laws
impose product labeling requirements on manufacturers in an attempt
to provide individuals with descriptive information. Attempts to
describe the environmental impacts of products, sometimes known as
"eco-labeling," range from purely descriptive to more persuasive
efforts. On the whole, product labeling schemes have only been
undertaken in the United States on a limited scale, and have provoked
mixed reviews from legal academicians. 35 9
FIFRA, the federal
pesticide statute, includes extensive product labeling requirements for
home and garden pesticides. The FIFRA labels are purely descriptive,
requiring product content and use information but not requiring
information about the overall advisability of using the pesticide. 360
California Proposition 65 requires manufacturers and retail firms to

358. See, e.g., Shameek Konar & Mark A. Cohen, Information as Regulation: The Effect of
Community Right to Know Laws on Toxic Emissions, 32 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 109 (1997).
359. See, e.g., VISCUSI, PRODUCT-RISK LABELING, supra note 287, at 3-5 (noting the mixed
success of product hazard warnings). EPA has developed several voluntary labeling programs
directed at the manufacturers of consumer products, including Energy Star labels for electronics.
Studies of product labeling programs have suggested that market pricing may more accurately
reflect the environmental impacts of products than eco-labeling. See, e.g., Menell, supra note 56,
at 1465 (proposing environmental information on consumer environmental impacts modeled on
the nutrition pyramid).
360. See FIFRA § 3, 7 U.S.C. § 136a (2000); discussion supra notes 244-246.
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identify the human health effects of products they make or sell. 361
Studies suggest that the Proposition 65 labeling requirements have
had significant effects on manufacturers and consumers.
In
particular, concerns about the effects of Proposition 65 warning labels
have induced many manufacturers to remove substances from their
products to avoid labeling requirements. 362 Many consumers appear
to misunderstand the Proposition 65 warning labels, however, and
studies suggest that they tend to overestimate the risks arising from
3
the products. 36
Descriptive information has the greatest prospects for success
where a behavior is not in the individual's interest and is not the
subject of ingrained habits. For example, careless use of household
pesticides might change if individuals were aware that 80 percent of
all pesticide exposure occurs from household pesticide use. 364 Over the
long run, purely descriptive information also may affect personal and
social norms. In the near term, however, where behaviors that are
harmful to the actor are habitual or where the harms of the behavior
are externalized (e.g., the release of air toxics from driving), something
more than simple descriptive information may be necessary to change
behavior.
b. PersuasiveInformation
One form of persuasive informational regulation is norm
management.
Although norm management has been largely
unexplored in the environmental literature, in recent years the legal
norms scholarship has suggested that agencies may be able to manage
norms through information dissemination, serving as "norm
entrepreneurs."3 65 Although the use of persuasive public information
361. The Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986, Cal. Health & Safety
Code § 25249.6 (West 1999).
362. See ViSCUSi, RATIONAL RISK POLICY, supra note 287, at 40 n.9.
363. See, e.g., id. at 40; W. Kip Viscusi, Predictingthe Effects of Food CancerRisk Warnings
on Consumers, 43 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 283, 288 (1988). Behavior change in response to
information on risk may vary based on the way the risk of the behavior is framed. For example, a
risk could be expressed as a lifetime cumulative risk (you have a one in ten chance of getting X
over the course of your life if you do Y over the course of your life), not a per-occurrence risk (you
have a one in 10,000 chance of getting X if you do Y today) to garner the individual's attention
and provoke a response. See PAUL SLOVIC, THE PERCEPTION OF RISK 77 (2000).
364. See discussion supra note 229-232.
365. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 909
(1996) (discussing "norm management"); see also Steven Hetcher, The FTC as Internet Privacy
Norm Entrepreneur,53 VAND. L. REV. 2041, 2046 (2000) (suggesting that the Federal Trade
Commission can be viewed as a "website privacy 'norms entrepreneur"). For a discussion of the
potential influence of environmental laws on norms, see generally NRC, NEW TOOLS FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, supra note 53 (noting the importance of social influence on
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campaigns may be the most explicit form of norm management,
command and control and economic incentive measures also may play
a role in norm management.
The information conveyed by the
enactment of such a law may trigger, reinforce, or change social norms
3 66
and social meanings.
A number of challenges face norm management efforts
regarding individual environmentally significant behavior. A first is
overcoming the social meanings of "polluter" (industry) and "citizen"
or "victim" (individuals).367
The pervasiveness of these social
meanings can be seen in the distinction that federal statutes draw
between those acts that are the subject of federal environmental
regulatory and enforcement actions and those that are not. Only in
the areas of wetlands and endangered species are individuals
routinely the subject of federal environmental regulation and
enforcement. 368 According to one scholar, social meaning may explain
why. Federal law in this area applies to us because of "what it says
about us. '369 In other words,
at least some of our reasons for not wanting to wipe out the grizzly bear have to do with
what it would say about us as a community if we were willing to do so. Specific
environmental issues serve to some extent as proxies for deeper concerns about who we
3 70
are and how we understand our relationship with nature.

environmentally significant behaviors); Lynn E. Blais, Beyond Cost/Benefit: The Maturation of
Economic Analysis of the Law and Its Consequences for Environmental Policymaking,2000 U.
ILL. L. REV. 237, 250-51 (2000) (noting that social norms research has a role in expanding the
value of economic analysis of environmental law); Carlson, supra note 258 (discussing the
influence of norms on recycling); Daniel Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously, 23 HARv. ENVTL. L.
REV. 297, 320-21 (1999) (discussing the growing interest in the relationship between norms and
environmental compliance); Vandenbergh, supra note 284 (discussing the unintended effects of
environmental laws on social meanings, norms and individual behavior).
366. See, e.g., McAdams, supra note 324, at 340 (defining a social norm to refer to "informal
social regularities that individuals feel obligated to follow because of an internalized sense of
duty, because of a fear of social sanctions, or both").
367. See, e.g., Bobertz, supra note 296, at 718; Manaster, supra note 296, at 931;
Vandenbergh, supra note 284, at 193. The concept that individuals are victims lies deep in the
origins of environmental law and policy. One of the leading texts on the history of environmental
policy concludes that in the late 1960s, "both the goals and the villains of the environmental
movement were traditional ones. . . The villains ...

were the traditional villains of American

popular folklore: the greedy magnates of big businesses and the bureaucrats of big government."
RICHARD N.L. ANDREWS, MANAGING THE ENVIRONMENT, MANAGING OURSELVES: A HISTORY OF
AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 225 (1999).
368. See ROBERT PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY

125 (2003) (noting that wetlands and endangered species statutory provisions have been enacted
and enforced against individuals but that other command and control approaches directed at
individual polluting behavior have not).
369. Sherman ,J. Clark, The Courage of Our Convictions,97 MICH. L. REV. 2381, 2394 (1999).
370. Id.
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For some reason, destroying endangered species and wetlands says
something about our relationship with nature, whereas spewing air
toxics as we drive, or pouring consumer solvents on the ground, at
least for many, does not. In short, it may be easier to envision
individuals as poachers than as polluters. This may be simply an
issue of availability: the environmental harms of paved wetlands and
dead eagles are readily apparent, but the harms of diffuse discharges
of small amounts of pollutants are not. Cognitive dissonance also may
play a role: most of us in our daily lives are able to avoid paving
wetlands or killing eagles with little or no effort. Bringing used
solvents to a household waste collection center or avoiding driving is,
for many of us, far more difficult. The easier solution then is to avoid
any inquiry into the effects of our behavior. In any event, current
social meanings will be an initial hurdle for any effort to use norm
management to change the polluting behaviors of individuals.
A second challenge, as in other regulatory areas, is the deep
skepticism among many environmental regulators and activists about
The comments of Aldo
the efficacy of informational regulation.
Leopold, one of the most important early influences on the
environmental movement, capture the classical environmental view of
informational regulation: "[c]onservation education, in facing up to its
task, reminds me of my dog when he faces another dog too big for him.
Instead of dealing with the dog, he deals with a tree bearing his
trademark. Thus, he assuages his ego without exposing himself to
danger. '' 37 1 In short, the mission of real regulators is to regulate, not
Given the historical lack of rigorous empirical
to educate.
examinations of public information campaigns, and the pressures on
regulatory agencies to back off of industry regulation, the skepticism
of environmental activists is understandable. To the extent a focus on
using information to change individual behavior is simply a means of
avoiding the difficult political, economic, and technical issues involved
in regulating industrial facilities, the effort is likely to undermine, not
achieve, desired environmental standards. Perhaps as a result, the
federal environmental statutes do not require EPA to conduct public
information campaigns or other persuasive campaigns directed at
individual behavior, and EPA has only made occasional use of these
When EPA has conducted public
types of persuasive efforts.
information campaigns, the campaigns often have been based on little
data about individuals' contributions to the environmental harm that
is the subject of the campaign and have made limited use of social
371. Aldo Leopold, Land Use and Democracy, in THE RIVER OF THE MOTHER OF GOD AND
OTHER ESSAYS 295, 297-98 (Susan L. Flader & J. Baird Callicott eds., 1985).
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science insights on how to steer individual behavior. 372 Similarly,
although public information campaigns and other persuasive efforts
are more common among state and local governments, the bulk of the
state and local efforts to change individual behavior also have been
poorly staffed and funded, and often have consisted of simply
373
distributing brochures to the public.
Nevertheless, there is reason for optimism. Experience with
informational regulation in several fields suggests that a properly
designed public information effort, particularly when used in
combination with other regulatory instruments, may be quite
successful.3 74 As some have noted, laws prohibiting smoking and
372. An example of the limited data supporting EPA public information campaigns arises
from a recent effort to induce individuals to change their behavior to reduce releases of certain
household chemicals. In 2002, EPA initiated the "Resource Conservation Challenge," a major
national effort to conserve natural resources through waste reduction and energy recovery. Office
of Solid Waste, EPA, Resource Conservation Challenge, http://www.epa.gov/epaoswer/osw/
conserve/index.htm (last modified Mar. 23, 2004). At the announcement of the program, an EPA
manager stated that EPA was "challenging all Americans to take personal responsibility for
their day-to-day decisions, and to take one small action every day to conserve our natural
resources." Id. The Resource Conservation Challenge is a two-pronged scheme, calling for an
increase in the national recycling rate to 35 percent by 2005 and a decrease in the generation of
thirty "Priority Chemicals" by 2005. Id. For a list of the thirty Priority Chemicals, see EPA,
WASTE MINIMIZATION PRIORITY CHEMICALS & CHEMICAL FACTS SHEETS, http://www.epa.gov/

epaoswer/hazwaste/minimize/chemlist.htm (last modified Feb. 25, 2004). One might assume that
information gathered by the Office of Solid Waste could be used to trace some emissions to
individual and household sources. EPA staff have indicated, however, that data are not available
on the quantities of releases of the thirty Priority Chemicals attributable to individuals and
households. E-mail from Priscilla Halloran, EPA Office of Solid Waste, to Chelsey Burns (Sept.
25, 2002) (stating that "the information we, in the Office of Solid Waste, tend to use relates to
industry and facilities, rather than households . . . . Consumer exposure, household emissions,
releases, etc.... are areas of information not easily acquired") (copy on file with the author).
373. One study found that fifty local programs that attempted to reduce non-point source
runoff from households were poorly staffed and had miniscule budgets ranging from $2,000 to
$25,000. See Thomas R. Schueler, On Watershed Education, 3 WATERSHED PROTECTION TECH.
680, reprintedin THE PRACTICE OF WATERSHED PROTECTION 629, 630 (Thomas R. Schueler &

Heather K. Holland eds., 2000) (noting that the local programs focused on lawn care, septic
cleaning and pet wastes, and that staffing levels were between 0.1 and 0.5 staff years). Local and
state public information campaigns tend to use measures such as brochures, which are
inexpensive but far less effective than television, radio and local newspapers. Two more effective,
more expensive techniques used in watershed education are media campaigns (the use of radio,
TV, mailings, and signs to educate the general public) and intensive training (the use of
workshops and books to provide more in-depth education to a smaller group). See id at 631-32
(concluding that "[miessages sent through television, radio and local newspapers are consistently
more influential in reaching residents than any other technique, with up to 30 percent recall
rates by the watershed population for each medium.").
For examples of persuasive information efforts on the state level, see Mo. Dep't of Natural
Res., Preventing Pollution Begins With You (1995), http://es.epa.gov/techinfo/facts/missouri/missp2.html; Georgia Department of Natural Resources, Georgia's Environment 99 (1999), http://
www.dnr.state.ga.us/dnr/environlgaenviron files/annlrptfiles/gaenv99_14.html.
374. See Stern, supra note 17. EPA has noted that combinations of public information
campaigns and other regulatory activities have had some success in reducing the effects of
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requiring seat belt use may have signaled a social consensus and may
have facilitated the efforts of private norm enforcers. 375 Both smoking
and seat belt use have been the subject of efforts that included
combinations of informational regulation and other instruments. For
example, both areas included public information campaigns (e.g., antismoking and seat belt campaigns), command and control laws (e.g.,
bans on smoking in certain areas and seat belt use requirements), and
economic incentives (e.g., cigarette taxes and child safety seat
subsidies). And both areas have demonstrated dramatic changes in
376
individual behavior over a period of several decades.
The experiences with informational regulation to date in the
environmental area are consistent with the smoking and seat belt
efforts. For example, according to one review of public information
campaigns, "dramatic social shifts" have been seen in several
regulatory areas that utilized public information campaigns directed
at individual behavior, such as recycling, household hazardous waste
disposal, littering, and motor oil disposal. 377 Although a number of
factors are very important, including external constraints (e.g., the
existence or lack of infrastructure for recycling), the characteristics of
the population in which the behavior occurs (e.g., the existence of
close-, intermediate- or loose-knit groups), and the extent to which the
behavioral change conveys a tangible personal benefit to the

individual behavior. For example, EPA has stated that it "believes that there has been increasing
success in addressing [non-point source water pollution] problems through initiatives such as
storm drain stenciling and recycling programs, including household hazardous waste special
collection days." EPA, Phase II Storm Water Regulations, 64 Fed. Reg. 68,722, 68,729 (Dec. 8,
1999). Studies examining the impact of public information campaigns are rare, but some have
demonstrated effects on environmentally significant behaviors. For example, a study of the ozone
action day program in the Atlanta, Georgia, area demonstrated that a public information
campaign combined with employer incentives could reduce vehicle miles traveled on high ozone
days. Gary T. Henry & Craig S. Gordon, Driving Less for Better Air. Impacts of a Public
Information Campaign, 22 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 1, 45 (2003). Of course, public information
campaigns must be well designed and implemented to achieve their intended effects. For
example, Kip Viscusi has noted that public information programs that offer little new
information have had limited success. VISCUSI, PRODUCT-RISK LABELING, supra note 287, at 4.
375. Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 1030-31
(1995); see Kahan, supra note 291, at 377-78; McAdams, supra note 324; Sunstein, supra note
365.
376. See discussion infra notes 392-397.
377. Schueler, supra note 373, at 630-32. Results of the media campaigns included a
decrease of lawn chemical use from 2 percent to 5 percent, a decrease in car washing, oil
changing, and radiator draining by 5 percent to 7 percent, and a 10 percent change in grass
recycling, fertilizer use, and hand weeding. Id. One media campaign resulted in 19 percent of the
population reporting that they had changed various behaviors to help the environment. Id.
Results of the intensive training campaigns included a 10 percent shift from personal to
commercial car washing, changes as high as 40 percent in reduced pesticide use, a 10 percent
increase in recycling of grass clippings, and a 10 percent decrease in fertilizer use. Id.
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individual (e.g., the tangible safety benefits of seat belt use versus the
intangible psychic benefits of recycling),378 studies suggest that public
information campaigns have led to changes in environmentally
379
significant behaviors of 10 percent to 20 percent or more.
Reducations in polluting behaviors of 10 percent to 20 percent may not
be meaningful when applied to a handful of industrial facilities, but
they may be quite important when multiplied by 281 million people or
105.5 million households. In addition, many of the policy steps that
have the potential to lead to improvements in environmental
protection over the long term, such as investments in mass
transportation and greater density in land use patterns, may be more
likely to occur if information is provided in the near term that
influences the beliefs and norms of individuals regarding the
relationship between individual behavior, human health, and
environmental quality.
Developments in theories of human behavior also suggest
reason for optimism. In the past, a fundamental barrier to more
effective use of informational regulation has been the inability of
models of behavior to account for social influences. Economic models
based on narrowly defined subjective expected utility have competed
with less reductionist social psychological models. As many norms
scholars have noted, the economic models that exclude informal social
influences on behavior have difficulty accounting for a number of
individual environmentally important behaviors that provide little or
no tangible benefit to the individual, such as recycling and littering. 38 0
The more complex social psychological models account for a wide
range of social influences on behavior, but have difficulty generating
falsifiable hypotheses about any one behavior. The result is that even
if environmental policymakers had the time and inclination over the
last several decades to examine the available models of behavior, they
would have found little to guide the development, testing, and
modification of strategies designed to steer individual behavior.
The legal, economic, and social psychological approaches are
beginning to converge, however, in ways that may lead to greater
378. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAw: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 177

(1991) (hypothesizing that "welfare-maximizing norms emerge in close knit settings"); Carlson,
supra note 258, at 1245 (noting the importance of physical infrastructure for residential
recycling); Stern, supra note 17, at 463 (noting the importance for models of environmentally
significant behavior of whether a particular behavior "brings no tangible personal benefit to
those who engage in it"); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Social Norms from Close-Knit Groups to LooseKnit Groups, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 359, 361-67 (2003) (noting the importance of the close-knit,
intermediate-knit or loose-knit nature of the group).
379. Schueler, supra note 373, at 632-33.
380. See, e.g., McAdams, supra note 324; Sunstein, supranote 365.
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success in predicting individual environmentally significant behaviors.
In the last decade, legal norms scholars have suggested ways in which
economic models can be broadened to account for the effects of
personal and social norms.3 81 At the same time, social psychologists
have developed models of behavior that are compatible with the legal
norms approach. 38 2 Although substantial differences in approach
remain, the ability to model the response of individuals to
environmental information appears to be improving. 38 3 Empirical
studies have identified an increasing number of individual
environmentally significant behaviors that are influenced by personal
or social norms. 38 4 The studies also suggest that information can
change a wide range of behaviors that may be more important for
environmental protection than recycling or littering, such as driving
and residential electricity use, although the informational regulatory

381. See, e.g., ELLICKSON, supra note 378; McAdams, supra note 324.
382. For example, Paul Stern and colleagues have proposed the values, beliefs, norms (VBN)
model, which suggests that in the absence of other constraints, environmentally significant
behaviors can be predicted based on the values, beliefs and norms of individuals. Thomas Dietz
& Paul C. Stern, Toward a Theory of Choice: Socially Embedded Preference Construction, 24 J.
SocIo-ECON. 261, 266 (1995) (concluding that "processes based on checks and balances among
key interests and values are more likely to approximate normatively ideal social choices than are
simple quantitative aggregations of individuals' expressions of preference"); Paul C. Stern et al.,
A Value-Belief-Norm Theory of Support for Social Movements: The Case of Environmentalism, 6
HuM. ECOLOGY REV. 81, 85 (1999) [hereinafter Stern, The Case of Environmentalism]; Stern,
supra note 12, at 415 (noting the existence of value orientations that correlate to
environmentally significant behaviors). The other leading model that has been applied to
environmentally significant behavior is the theory of planned behavior, which suggests that
behavioral intentions are the product of three variables: (1) the attitude of the individual; (2) the
individual's perception of "subjective norms"; and (3) perceived behavioral control. See generally
Icek Ajzen, From Intentions to Actions: A Theory of Planned Behavior, in ACTION CONTROL:
FROM COGNITION TO BEHAVIOR 11 (Julius Kuhl & Jorgen Beckmann eds., 1985) (describing the
theory of planned behavior). Ajzen suggests that increases in these variables lead to increases in
behavioral intentions. See Thomas J. Madden, Pamela S. Ellen & Icek Ajzen, A Comparison of
the Theory of Planned Behavior and the Theory of Reasoned Action, 18 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. BuLL. 3, 3-5 (1992). The theory has been used in studies of the effects of public
information campaigns on driving and other behaviors. See Henry & Gordon, supra note 374, at
45. For a discussion of the convergence of legal norms and social psychological models of
behavior, see Vandenbergh, supra note 314, at 72-78.
383. See, e.g., Stern et al., The Case of Environmentalism, supra note 382, at 85 (citing
studies to support the proposition that "[tihe VBN model is supported by a growing body of
literature on environmentally relevant behavior").
384. See generally Stern, The Case of Environmentalism, supra note 382 (discussing
research on social influences on environmentalism and pro-environmental behavior). One
example of early research is a study regarding yard brush burning. The study concluded that
individuals who were aware that the air emissions from yard waste burning harm human health
and who believed they could reduce the harms were less likely to burn yard waste than others.
Kent D. Van Liere & Riley E. Dunlap, Moral Norms and Environmental Behavior: An
Application of Schwartz's Norm-Activation Model to Yard Burning,8 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL.
174, 187 (1978) (describing the relevant norm as "respect for the health of others").

20041

THE NEW ERA OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

process must be finely tuned to be successful. 3 5 Overall, it is clear
that progress is being made in both developing models of individual
environmentally significant behavior and conducting empirical studies
to assess their predictive capacity. 38 6 Policymakers thus now can
draw on a growing base of theoretical and empirical work to aid in the
38 7
design of informational regulation.
V. BEYOND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE
REGULATORY STATE

The re-conceptualization of the individual as a source of harms
and a worthy target of regulatory efforts also has broader implications
for the regulatory state. The premise that the most efficient way to
reduce net societal risks is not to regulate individual behavior, but to
regulate firm conduct in ways designed to induce firms to reduce the
risks of individual behavior, is widespread in regulatory areas outside
of environmental protection. The focus on regulating industry, rather
than individual behavior, may be seen in the laws and policies
implemented by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA), the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA), and other federal agencies. 388 This approach may in part
have been a rational risk management decision in some areas where
firms represented early low-hanging fruit.38 9 The approach also may
have been the product of skepticism about the ability of government to
change individual behavior and to document the change in ways that
allow some degree of confidence that the regulatory end has been
achieved. As in the environmental area, the suspicion of interest

385. See, e.g., Henry & Gordon, supra note 374, at 42. Additional studies on driving include
Jorgen Garvill et al., Effects of IncreasedAwareness on Choice of Travel Mode, 30 TRANSP. 63
(2003); Jeffrey A. Joireman et al., An Interdependence Analysis of Commuting Decisions, 27
EUROPEAN J. SOC. PSYCH. 441 (1997); Maria Nilsson & Rikard Kiuller, Travel Behavior and
Environmental Concern, 5 TRANS. RESEARCH PART D 211 (2000); Annika M. Nordlund & Jorgen
Garvill, Value Structures BehindProenvironmentalBehavior,34 ENV'T & BEHAV. 740 (2002).
386. The National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences has recognized the
progress and growing importance of social science in environmental protection efforts. See NAT'L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 53; NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, HUMAN DIMENSIONS OF GLOBAL

ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE: RESEARCH PATHWAYS FOR THE NEXT DECADE (Paul C. Stern ed.,
1996), http://www.nap.edu/catalog/9641.html.
387. Agencies can act through public information campaigns, and Congress can act through
statutes that require that information be provided to individuals in ways that will trigger,
reinforce, or change norms.
388. See MASHAW & HARFST, supranote 14, at 4.
389. The approach also may have reflected the relative ease with which politicians and
regulators may have identified black hats and white hats and directed regulations at the black
hats in a wide range of regulatory areas. See discussion supra note 296.
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groups regarding "soft" measures may lead to avoidance of
390
informational regulation or norm management.
For example, the focus of the early advocates of motor vehicle
safety on automobile manufacturers and their skepticism of attempts
to induce seatbelt use, although now called into question, have been
widely discussed. The comments of Aldo Leopold discussed above
track the view of the seat belt skeptics. 391 Along the way, however,
regulators may have lost sight of the need to understand the role of
individuals in risk creation and the ability of government to change
individual behavior.
Thus, for many years NHTSA pursued
requirements for manufacturers to install air bags in cars, rather than
seeking to increase individuals' seatbelt use. 3 92 Recent studies suggest
that NHTSA's reluctance to focus on individual behavior may have
been costly. Efforts by state and local governments have encouraged
seat belt use through a mix of regulatory instruments over the last
two decades, including public information campaigns and seat belt
laws, and have demonstrated that individual behavior can be changed.
For example, seat belt use has increased from 14 percent in 1983 to
over 75 percent in 2002. 393 NHTSA may once again be facing a
challenge arising from individual behavior. Personal driving behavior,
not vehicle design or manufacturing or roadway safety, contributes

390. The same dynamic occurs with privacy concerns regarding information on individuals
that is gathered over the Internet. See Hetcher, supra note 365, at 2044 (noting that interest
groups are suspicious of Federal Trade Commission efforts to use non-regulatory means to
influence private firms' website privacy policies out of concern that such non-regulatory means
are a "ruse" that reflects industry capture). For an account in the popular literature of the role of
public interest group concerns about changing individual behavior to achieve greater motor
vehicle safety, see Malcolm Gladwell, How the Fight to Make America 's Highways Safer Went
Off Course, NEW YORKER, June 11, 2001, at 50, 59-60 (discussing the views of Ralph Nader and
Joan Claybrook regarding public information campaigns to increase seat belt use).
391. The seat belt skeptics included Ralph Nader and Carter Administration NHTSA
Administrator Joan Claybrook. See MASHAW & HARFST, supra note 14, at 4; Gladwell, supra note
390. Similarly, in the development of workplace standards for benzene, OSHA early on required
reduction of benzene levels by employers in the workplace, rather than assuming that employees
could be induced to use respirators. See Indus. Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607,
653-55 (1980).
392. See MASHAW & HARFST, supra note 14, at 229. The point is not that the public will react
positively to efforts to change its behavior. The negative public reaction to NHTSA's ignition
interlock requirement in the auto safety area parallels the negative reactions to EPA's occasional
attempts to restrict individual behavior. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assoc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983) (reviewing federal motor vehicle safety requirements). Instead, the
point is that combinations of traditional regulatory tools and informational regulation may have
more success, at least over the long run, than limiting regulation to command and control
measures directed at firms.
393. GAO, HIGHWAY SAFETY: FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO TRAFFIC CRASHES AND NHTSA's

EFFORTS TO ADDRESS THEM 5 (2003), http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/multilb.cgi.
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most often to motor vehicle crashes. 394 Personal driving behavior
includes factors such as speeding, violating traffic laws, use of alcohol
or drugs, inattention (e.g., due to eating 395 or cell phone use396),
decision errors, and age. Many of these factors are potentially
amenable to efforts that combine informational regulation with other
measures, but it is unclear whether the lessons of the seat belt era
have been learned.
Other health and safety areas also demonstrate the importance
of individual behavior and the reluctance of regulators to focus on
individual behavioral change. For example, obesity has emerged as
the second leading cause of preventable deaths in the United States,
with $117 billion spent annually on the direct and indirect medical
expenses arising from the condition.3 97 Although much of the harm
caused by obesity is suffered by the individual causing the harm,
family members and others also bear the medical and other costs.
Familiar battle lines are forming, with the federal government
uncertain of its role (and advocating but not funding public
information efforts), citizens' advocates pushing for government
regulation of firms (e.g., restaurants and food processors), and
industry groups describing the issue as one of "personal responsibility"
for individuals while opposing government actions to induce
398
individual behavior change.
For these and other regulatory issues, it may be time to revisit
the assumption that individual behavior cannot be changed and to
explore the mix of regulatory instruments that can achieve the desired
change. As the discussion above suggests, there is reason to believe
that through the use of several regulatory instruments, including
394. Id.
395. See Press Release, Highway Safety Research Center, University of North Carolina,
Unusual UNC Research Confirms Drivers Face Multiple Distractions (Aug. 6, 2003) (concluding
that 71 percent of all people eat while driving), http://www.hsrc.unc.edu/pressrelease/pressmain.htm.
396. See Press Release, National Safety Council, Study Finds "Inattention Blindness" in
Behind-the-Wheel Cell Phone Users (Jan. 27, 2003) (concluding that roughly 75 percent of all
people report that they use a cell phone while driving and that inattention is a contributing
factor in 20 percent to 30 percent of all automobile accidents), http://www.nsc.org/news/policy/
multitasking.htm.
397. See CDC Chief Obesity Top Health Threat, CNN.coM/HEALTH (Oct. 29, 2003), http://
www.cnn.com/2003/HEALTH/diet.fitness/10/29/obesity.threat.reut; see also John F. Banzhaf, III,
Using Legal Action to Help Fight Obesity, at http://banzhaf.net/obesitylinks (last visited May 10,
2004). Smoking is one of the best examples of a health-related behavior that has changed in
response to a mix of public information campaigns, economic incentives, and legal prohibitions.
See discussion supra notes 375-376.
398. See Ceci Connolly, Public Policy TargetingObesity, WASH. POST, Aug. 10, 2003, at Al;
see also Nat Ives, Food CompaniesAre Urgedto Act to Deflect Blame for the Nation's Increasein
Obesity, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2002, at C4.

620

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:2:515

various forms of informational regulation, government may be able to
achieve greater reductions in risks at lower costs across a wide range
of safety, health, and environmental risks. A second look at the
traditional targets of regulatory instruments and the optimal mix of
instruments across a wide range of regulatory areas thus is in
399
order.
To address individual behavior, federal agencies that have
spent thirty years targeting large firms almost exclusively will have to
change in a variety of ways. More sophisticated use of the social
sciences will be required in the development, evaluation, and
modification of agency regulatory programs.
The organization,
staffing, procedures, and funding priorities of federal agencies will
need to evolve.
The federal-state relationship will need to be
reexamined. The use of cost-benefit and risk analysis will need to be
adapted to account for individuals as potential regulatory targets and
to account for the importance of social, as much as economic,
influences on the behavior of the new type of regulatees. 40 0 A radical
redirection is unlikely to occur, and may not be advisable given the
continuing importance of industrial sources. Instead, the process will
likely occur in an evolutionary fashion. Although a full examination of
these issues is beyond the scope of this Article, three early steps of
fundamental importance are discussed below.
A. PredictingSocial Influences on Behavior
The intellectual infrastructure for influencing social norms will
need to be developed in the academic literature and deployed by EPA
and other regulatory agencies. In recent years, substantial progress
has been made in the development of models that account for social
influences, but far more needs to be done. 40 1 If regulators are to target
individual behavior, further progress must be made in explaining and
predicting the influences of legal, economic, psychological, and social
incentives on individual behavior. In particular, the level of social
psychological sophistication of government public information efforts
399. The instrument choice debate also may have not focused sufficiently on the availability
and efficient use of government resources for environmental protection. In some cases it may be
far more cost effective for government to conduct a public information campaign to induce a 5
percent change in individual behavior than to develop and enforce rules that seek additional
gains from particular existing source categories.
400. In some cases, the other principal sources that have been largely overlooked, such as
farming and small businesses, may function more like individuals than large industrial firms,
and the steps taken by agencies to adapt to individuals as regulatory targets also may facilitate
regulation of those sources. In other cases, different approaches will be required.
401. See discussion supra notes 380-382.
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and other regulatory efforts will need to rise to the level now given to
the economic analysis of regulations. In some cases, regulatory efforts
directed at industry may have unintended consequences that should
In other cases, public information
be understood and avoided.
campaigns may be able to take advantage of the substantial and
growing literature on the ways in which individual behavior can be
changed. The research on the social influences on behavior suggests
that many individual responses to information are counterintuitive,
and that there are vast differences in responses based on the content
of the message and the medium by which the message is conveyed.
The staffing of federal agencies also reflects the focus of the
instrument choice debate: the agencies are dominated by lawyers and
economists, and to a lesser extent engineers and natural scientists.
Few social psychologists or sociologists are on the EPA staff, and none
are employed to review systematically regulatory or information
dissemination issues to assess impacts on individual behavior.
Rigorous, quantitative social science research that draws on
the best theoretical work yet is closely tailored to support specific
regulatory objectives will be necessary. Economies of scale exist at the
federal level to conduct, assess, and report to the states and local
governments on the general lessons of research on how to influence
environmentally significant behaviors. For some issues, states and
localities may be better positioned to tailor public information
campaigns and other informational regulatory efforts to local
populations. 40 2 For others, EPA may be better situated to play the
role of providing information directly to the public40 3 as well as to
facilitate the activities of state and local governments.
B. DemonstratingBehavioral Change
One of the principal barriers to redirecting agencies toward
regulation of individuals is skepticism about the efficacy of measures
directed at individuals. The skepticism of regulators and public
interest groups toward public information efforts as opposed to
command and control regulatory efforts is understandable to anyone
who has served in a government regulatory agency. The pressure
402. Although in theory these steps may be taken by states and localities, they often lack the
resources to do so. In addition, they often do not place a high priority on "soft" information-based
measures. See, e.g., NASHVILLE AREA METRO. PLANNING ORG., 2004-2006 TRANSPORTATION

IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM 4 (2003) (listing criteria for Transportation Improvement Program
funding), http://www.nashvillempo.org/tip-2002.html.
403. A good example of a current federal effort to facilitate state and local public information
campaigns is EPA, It All Adds Up to Cleaner Air, at http://www.italladsup/gov (last visited May
10, 2004).
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brought to bear on regulatory agencies by regulatory targets to underregulate generally or to under-regulate as to a particular industrial
facility, firm, or sector is tremendous. 4 4 Regulators and public
interest groups are understandably concerned, then, that in the
absence of hard, enforceable requirements, promised gains will not be
achieved. 40 5 The fear is that the effect will not be an expansion of the
potential targets of regulation or a reduction in the costs of regulation,
but deregulation.
The ability to evaluate and demonstrate the efficacy of
informational regulation of individual behavior thus may be
particularly important. In the face of this concern, the need for
rigorous, quantitative assessments of the effects of regulatory efforts
on targeted individual behaviors and the resulting changes in
emissions and ambient environmental conditions cannot be
overstated. Although remarkably little assessment of the effects of
industrial regulation occurs, statutory emissions reporting and
enforcement programs collect data that provide regulators with some
degree of comfort regarding corporate compliance levels.
With
individual behavior, these measures are not available. In the absence
of rigorous, quantitative analyses, the opportunities for waste and de
facto deregulation will be substantial.
C. ProvidingProceduralProtections
The use of informational regulation to change individual
behavior also will have important implications for administrative law
generally.
In particular, the procedural protections of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) may not be adequate for a
regulatory state focused on regulating though information
dissemination. Among the unspoken assumptions that underlie the
APA are that agencies' most significant regulatory activities are
formal and informal rule makings, and that the highly structured,
technical rule-making processes required by the APA provide a means

404. See C. Boyden Gray, Public Versus Private Environmental Regulation, 21 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 431 (1994) (noting the lobbying efforts of automobile manufacturers). As the difficulties EPA

encountered in attempting to implement the Clean Air Act inspection and maintenance
requirements suggest, similar pressures will be brought to bear on anyone who seeks to change
individual behavior. See, e.g., McGarity, supra note 36 (discussing the resistance to EPA vehicle
inspection and maintenance requirements).
405. An example of a policy reflecting this skepticism is that EPA only gives a 3 percent
credit to states for voluntary ozone reduction control measures, such as public information
campaigns and incentive schemes. RICHARD D. WILSON, OFFICE OF AIR & RADIATION, GUIDANCE
ON INCORPORATING VOLUNTARY MOBILE SOURCE EMISSION REDUCTION PROGRAMS IN STATE

IMPLEMENTATION PLANS (1997), http://www.epa.gov/oms/transp/trancont/vmep-mem.txt.
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for regulated entities and other affected parties to participate in
agency regulatory activity. 40 6 In fact, the unspoken assumptions of
the APA have been reasonably accurate for the last fifty years: many
of the most important federal agency actions to date have taken the
form of formal and informal rule makings directed at corporate
behavior. Although the success of the APA is certainly a matter of
dispute, the corporate targets and their public interest group
antagonists have been quite successful at communicating their views
in agency rule-making proceedings.
When agencies turn to informational regulation of individual
behavior, however, they are unlikely to rely heavily on formal or
informal rule makings. Instead, simple disclosure of descriptive
information and persuasive public information campaigns are likely to
be among the tools of choice for steering individual behavior. Yet the
agency actions involved in these types of informational regulation
often will not trigger the procedural requirements applicable to APA
rule makings and adjudications. Scholars have begun to turn their
attention to the importance of standing and judicial review when
agencies engage in informational regulation, but a wide range of
important issues remain largely unexplored. These uncertain issues
include the extent to which the APA should be amended to require
disclosure of proposed agency informational regulatory actions,
solicitation of public comment, creation of a public record, and
407
disclosure of the reasons for engaging in informational regulation.
406. Administrative law not only reflects a bias in favor of regulation, but in favor of coercive
governmental action. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576-78 (1992)
(rejecting the concept of procedural standing); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832-33 (1985)
(concluding that a decision not to initiate an enforcement action is "committed to agency
discretion by law" and hence is unreviewable). Informational regulation is often persuasive
rather than coercive and thus may fall outside of the paradigm that triggers procedural and
judicial safeguards.
407. For an examination of standing and informational regulation, see Sunstein, supra note
53, at 653-73. In addition, the optimal procedural protections for informational regulation of
individual behavior may differ from the optimal protections for regulation of industrial firms.
Even if the APA were amended or interpreted to impose requirements similar to notice-andcomment rule-making procedures on agencies that engage in informational regulation, the APA
requirements may be inadequate when the regulated entities are individuals. For example,
although the general public participates in rulemakings through attendance at public meetings
and letters placed in agency rule-making dockets, the vast majority of the comments that
influence rule making occur through focused, detailed comments by sophisticated
representatives of regulated industries and the public interest groups organized to combat them.
See, e.g., Nash & Revesz, supra note 43, at 567 (citing Cary Coglianese, Challenging the Rules:
Litigation and Bargaining in the Administrative Process 46-47 (1994) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Michigan)). If the targets of agency informational regulation are
individuals, not industries, the use of the Federal Register may not be an adequate means of
soliciting comments from the regulatory targets. Instead, agencies may need to solicit comments
on proposed agency actions in ways that are more accessible to the general public. For example,
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Until recently, Congress had not revisited the federal
administrative laws in a way that could influence the new focus on the
use of informational regulation. That changed in December 2000
when, in a move that has received little attention in the academic
literature, Congress enacted the Information Quality Act (IQA).408
Congress adopted the IQA without legislative history as an
amendment to an omnibus spending bill, but the IQA may ultimately
play a remarkably large role in steering the informational regulatory
activities of EPA and other federal agencies. 40 9 The IQA required
OMB to "provide policy and procedural guidance to Federal agencies
for ensuring and maximizing the quality, objectivity, utility, and
integrity
of information
(including
statistical
information)
disseminated by Federal agencies." 410 The IQA also directed OMB to
require federal agencies to issue guidelines using the same quality,
objectivity, utility, and integrity criteria and to establish
"administrative mechanisms allowing affected persons to seek and
obtain correction of information maintained and disseminated by the
agency." 411 In response to the IQA, OMB and the executive branch
agencies have adopted guidelines regarding data quality and
412
administrative appeal mechanisms.

the Internet may provide opportunities to solicit comments from members of the general public
who may be the targets of informational regulation. See, e.g., ENVTL. LAW INST., LIBRARIES AS A
COMMUNITY RESOURCE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION (2000), available at http://www.eli.

org/pdfflibrariesOO.pdf (last visited Dec. 15, 2003) (evaluating the use of on-line dialogues for
public involvement in EPA decision making). An example of a website for an EPA on-line
dialogue is available at www.network-democracy.org/epa-pip/wlecome.shtml.
408. See Consolidated Appropriations-FY 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 515, 114 Stat.
2763A-153 to 2763A-154 (2000). For a discussion of the Information Quality Act, see James W.
Conrad, Jr., The Information QualityAct-Antiregulatory Costs ofMythic Proportions., 12 KAN.
J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 521, 521 (2003) (describing the statute as "the most significant conceptual
advance in administrative law in the last three decades"); John D Echeverria & Julie B. Kaplan,
Poisonous Procedural 'Reform". In Defense of Environmental Right-to-Know, 12 KAN. J. L. &
PUB. POLY 579 (2003) (raising concerns about the effects of the IQA on citizen right-to-know
efforts).
409. The only legislative history regarding Section 515 of the Treasury and General
Government Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2001 is from the conference report, which states
that "[t]he Committee includes a new provision requiring the OMB to develop guidelines for
ensuring and maximizing the quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity of information
disseminated by federal agencies." See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 106-756, at 83 (2000).
410. IQA § 515(a).
411. Id. §§515(b)(2)(A), (B).
412. See, e.g., Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility and
Integrity of Information Disseminated by Federal Agencies, 67 Fed Reg. 8,452 (Feb. 22, 2002)
[hereinafter OMB, IQA GUIDELINES]; EPA, OFFICE OF ENVTL. INFO., GUIDELINES FOR ENSURING
AND

MAXIMIZING

THE

QUALITY,

OBJECTIVITY,

UTILITY

AND

INTEGRITY

OF INFORMATION

DISSEMINATED BY THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (2002) [hereinafter EPA, IQA
GUIDELINES], http://www.epa.gov/quality/informationguidelines.
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To the extent informational regulation is the wave of the
future, the IQA may shape the wave. Although the IQA is only
beginning to affect agency behavior, the debate in the academic
literature already has a familiar ring. The debate has focused on the
traditional issues posed by industry and citizens groups seeking
industry regulation: will the IQA ensure that data released by EPA is
accurate, or will it drain resources away from regulatory efforts to
reduce health and environmental risks? Will agency actions pursuant
to the rules be subject to judicial review? Will the OMB and EPA
guidelines be treated as legislative rules or policy statements for
purposes of judicial deference? 413 The resolution of these issues
undoubtedly will be important to the further application of
environmental requirements to industrial sources, but when the role
of individuals is included in the analysis, new concerns arise.
For
example,
the
OMB
guidelines broadly
define
"information."4 14 At least in theory, agency dissemination of both
descriptive and persuasive information is subject to the guidelines.
The OMB guidelines require that agencies "adopt a basic standard of
quality (including objectivity, utility, and integrity)" and ensure that
the information quality is "appropriate to the nature and timeliness of
the information." 415 As to objectivity, two requirements must be met:
(1) the information must be presented in an "accurate, clear complete
and unbiased manner, which includes presentation in the proper
context," and (2) the information must be "accurate, reliable and
unbiased."4 16 The OMB guidelines recognize the importance of the
413. See, e.g., Conrad, supra note 408, at 538-39; Echeverria & Kaplan, supra note 408, at
618-22.
414. Although the applicability of the OMB and EPA guidelines to EPA persuasive
information campaigns will have a substantial effect on EPA's ability to engage in norm
management, both guidelines are ambiguous on this point. The OMB guidelines define
"information" to mean "any communication or representation of knowledge such as facts or data,
in any medium or form .... This definition does not include opinions, where the agency's
presentation makes it clear that what is being offered is someone's opinion rather than fact or
the agency's views." OMB, IQA Guidelines, 67 Fed. Reg. at 8,460. The EPA guidelines also
include ambiguous language. The EPA guidelines state that information "generally includes any
communication or representation of knowledge such as facts or data, in any medium or form" and
follow the OMB guidelines by stating that "information" does not include "opinions, where EPA's
presentation makes it clear that what is being offered is someone's opinion rather than fact or
EPA's views." EPA, IQA GUIDELINES, supra note 412, at 16. The OMB and EPA guidelines thus
are unclear whether expressions of opinion or "views" by a federal agency are "information"
subject to the IQA's objectivity requirement.
415. OMB, IQA Guidelines, 67 Fed. Reg. at 8,458.
416. Id.at 8,459. As to risks to health, safety, or the environment, the guidelines draw from
the Safe Drinking Water Act to require information to be based on "the best available, peerreviewed science and supporting studies conducted in accordance with sound and objective
scientific practices; and.., data collected by accepted methods or best available methods (if the
reliability of the method and the nature of the decision justifies use of the data)." Id.at 8,460.
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context in which information is presented, and they require the
agency to present additional information if necessary to provide the
context to ensure the accurate, clear, and unbiased presentation of the
disseminated information.
To the extent
EPA seeks
to influence individual
environmentally significant behavior through public information
campaigns designed to shape norms, this language may ensure that
the most Orwellian aspects of information manipulation will be
avoided. 4 17 At the same time, the language could prevent the Agency
from engaging in norm management by conducting a persuasive
public information campaign, which might include the use of nonobjective hortatory language or the selective presentation of
information either to steer norms or to compensate for an information
gap, cognitive dissonance, countervailing social influences, or habits.
Many questions remain about the scope of the IQA and the extent to
which its provisions will be judicially enforceable. The answers will
have a profound effect on the use of informational regulation to steer
18
individual behavior. 4
VI. CONCLUSION

Individuals are important, overlooked sources of pollutants and
environmental harms. Despite their importance, individuals have
been the subject of little regulation and have not been a focus of the
environmental regulatory debate. A variety of reasons may explain
the oversight. Although large industries were the most obvious
targets in the 1960s and 1970s, and in many cases were likely the
least cost avoiders, that argument is often much harder to make after
thirty years of increasingly stringent controls on large industrial
417. See Lessig, supra note 375, at 1018 (noting concerns about Orwellian uses of
information). The climate change issue was the subject of the first IQA litigation. See Andrew C.
Revkin, Suit Challenges Climate Change Report by US., N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2003, at A16
(noting that an anti-regulatory group sued the Bush Administration under the IQA to prevent
distribution of a 2000 report on climate change). The litigation was settled and the complaint
dismissed with prejudice before a court could rule on whether the IQA creates a right of judicial
review. See Pat Phibbs, White House, Institute Agree to Dismiss Suit Alleging Violations of
Information Quality Act, DAILY ENV'T REP. (BNA) A-12 (Nov. 7, 2003).
418. Other important questions along these lines are already beginning to reach the courts.
For example, the Ninth Circuit recently rejected a challenge to EPA's authority to require local
governments to conduct public information campaigns as a part of the Phase II storm water
regulations. Envtl. Def. Ctr., Inc. v. EPA, 344F.3d 832, 848-51 (9th Cir. 2003), petition for cert.
filedsub nom. Tex. Cities Coalition on Stormwater v. EPA, 72 U.S.L.W. 3513 (U.S. Dec. 15, 2003)
(No. 03-1125). In the future, courts also may need to give more thought to the inherent authority
of agencies to disclose information within their mission. See Conrad, supra note 408, at 529
(noting that the Clean Air Act includes broad language authorizing EPA to gather and disclose
data on air pollution); Pedersen, supra note 8, at 171-72.
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facilities. Public choice arguments may explain policymakers' lack of
focus on individuals: regulating individual behavior may require
politicians to impose requirements directly on voters, rather than
allowing voters to believe that the costs of a better environment will
be borne by industry. At the same time, it is not clear why small,
concentrated, industry groups were unable to shift costs to diffuse,
numerous, individual citizens. Alternatively, the social meanings of
"citizen" and "polluter" and the scapegoating effects of identifying
industry as the sole wearer of the black hat may have explanatory
force. Even today, the picture of individuals as polluters will be
counterintuitive to many readers.
Regardless of the reasons, the failure to focus on individuals is
a yawning gap in the current environmental regulatory regime.
Enthusiasts of existing regulatory instruments have yet to tackle the
theoretical and practical challenges of steering individual behavior. In
the next era of environmental law, they will need to consider new
combinations of traditional instruments, as well as new tools, such as
informational regulation. The importance of norms for changing
individual environmentally significant behavior also may have
implications for the instrument choice debate regarding industrial
sources. In short, the debate may have understated the effects of
norms on firm managers, shareholders, employees and customers, and
ultimately on firm behavior.
In addition, a fresh look at the emerging role of individuals
across a wide range of regulatory areas is in order. The movement in
the 1960s toward regulation of firms to the exclusion of individuals
may have taken the complex interactions between formal and informal
social control too lightly. By regulating firms almost exclusively, the
early approach guaranteed some measure of success. The approach
may have been not only quite successful, but the most rational one in
the 1960s and 1970s when government was faced with a withering
array of risks created from an increasingly densely populated,
industrial society. Now that many of the gains from that approach
have been won, we are left with the residue. Across a wide range of
fields, individuals have received a message from the environmental,
health, and safety laws and the administrative apparatus: you are
victims of the risky behavior of large industrial firms, and the
regulatory state can make you safer by regulating those firms. The
effects of that message have not been studied empirically, but
certainly the symptoms of individuals' lack of awareness of and
concern for the environmental harms they cause are widespread.
Moreover, as individuals emerge as important sources of a wide range
of societal risks, we may need not only to revisit the ways in which

628

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:2:515

laws directed at industry may have undermined informal social
influences on individual behavior, but also to begin to retool our
administrative apparatus to develop new approaches to change
individual behavior.
In the long run, achieving a safer society, or simply one in
which current levels of safety are achieved at lower cost, may require
us to revisit the notion of personal responsibility. 419 The regulation of
industrial sources of pollution gave us a thirty year respite from the
need to encounter the environmental and other effects of individual
and household behavior. The free lunch is over. Even at current
levels, individuals and households may contribute levels of pollutants
that will lead to an unsustainable environment for future generations.
And even if that view is too pessimistic, with population increasing at
a rate of 38 percent every thirty years and many other relevant
measures of individual behavior increasing at an even greater clip,
steering individual environmentally significant behavior can no longer
be a relatively unsophisticated, uncoordinated afterthought of
policymakers.
This Article thus suggests the opening moves in what will be a
long term effort. With some adjustments, the procedural protections
and regulatory tools may be available to redirect federal, state, and
local efforts toward reducing the risks caused by individual behavior
directly, rather than just through the regulation of large industrial
firms. The results may not only achieve social goals that now appear
unattainable, but may do so at costs that are lower than now
imaginable.

419. The concept of individual responsibility may be important for issues far beyond the
environmental, health, and safety areas discussed in this Article. See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry,
Responsible Republicanism: Educating for Citizenship, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 131, 145-56 (1995)
(discussing the focus on individual rights rather than individual responsibilities in modern legal
scholarship).

